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ABSTRACT 
 
 American policy toward the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of 
China from 1949-1979 was geared primarily toward the accomplishment of one 
objective: to achieve a reorientation of Chinese Communist revolutionary foreign policy 
that would contribute to the establishment of a “tolerable state of order” in the 
international community based on the principles of respect for each nations’ territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty.  China’s revolutionary approach to its foreign 
relations constituted a threat to this objective.  During the 1960s and ‘70s, however, 
Beijing gradually began accepting views conducive to the achievement of the “tolerable 
state of order” that Washington hoped to create, thus contributing significantly to the 
relaxation of Sino-American tensions and the normalization of relations in 1979.   
From this basic thesis four subsidiary arguments emerge.  First, the seven 
presidential administrations from Harry Truman to Jimmy Carter pursued a common set 
of objectives toward which their respective China policies conformed, thus granting 
American China policy a degree of consistency that historians of Sino-American 
relations have not previously recognized.  Second, the most significant dilemma 
American officials faced was striking an effective balance between containment (to 
punish aggression) and engagement (to emphasize the benefits of cooperation).  Third, 
American policy toward the ROC throughout virtually the entire period in question 
remained a function of Washington’s effort to reorient Beijing’s foreign policy approach.  
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Fourth, domestic American opinion was of secondary importance in determining the 
nature and implementation of American China policy. 
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DEDICATION 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to the late Dr. Russell J. Linnemann, dear friend and 
mentor, who showed a young scholar what it really means to be passionate about history. 
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PREFACE 
 
When I first began researching Sino-American relations, I began by asking what 
I assumed was a relatively straightforward question: Why did the United States 
government, from 1949 through 1979, refuse to recognize the communist government of 
the People’s Republic of China, and why and how did that policy change?  Primary 
research on the administrations of Harry Truman and Jimmy Carter, the presidents who 
initially refused and ultimately granted recognition, respectively, revealed striking 
similarities in terms of their fundamental goals and in the place they envisioned for 
China in the global order.  Both Truman and Carter presided during times of 
revolutionary change in China, and both hoped that the changes would allow the 
emergence of a Chinese regime that favored a cooperative, constructive approach to 
international affairs.  Truman was disappointed; Carter was not.  From this comparison, 
my analysis broadened beyond the policy of recognition, attempting to discern whether 
the intervening presidential administrations also shared these objectives, and to what 
extent these shaped the course of American policy toward China.  I do not intend to 
validate the American approach to China, but rather to understand how American 
officials validated themselves.   
This dissertation’s focus on the underlying internationalist principles guiding 
American foreign policy, as opposed to offering a more complex multi-causal 
framework, is justified on a number of grounds.  First, the chronological scope of this 
project – spanning three decades – does not provide space to analyze in sufficient detail 
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the array of forces acting on policymaking.  Second, this project views these principles 
as the most significant factors affecting the formulation and implementation of China 
policy.  And finally, for this reason, these principles deserve far greater attention than the 
historical literature has yet provided. 
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NOTE ON SOURCES 
 
 
 
 Historians of 20th century American foreign relations benefit from the increasing 
and unprecedented availability of relevant internet-based primary source material.  With 
this in mind, and for the sake of convenience for the reader, the footnotes do not include 
full citation information for the document collections consulted if those collections are 
readily available online.  These collections and access information are as follows: 
 The Department of State’s Foreign Relations of the United States series contains 
documents considered necessary for the reader to obtain an overall understanding of the 
development of American foreign policy.  The University of Wisconsin Digital 
Collections (http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS) include all volumes through 
1960, and are searchable by both keyword and page number.  The Department of State’s 
Office of the Historian (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ebooks) has 
complete holdings from 1955 through the most recent volumes, and is designed to be 
browsed by date and document number. 
 The annual Yearbook of the United Nations provides a detailed overview of U.N. 
discussions and activities, including all major General Assembly, Security Council, and 
Economic and Social Council resolutions.  The entire collection from 1946 to the present 
can be accessed at http://unyearbook.un.org/.  The collection is keyword searchable, and 
can be browsed by sections dealing with specific topics. 
 The Public Papers of the Presidents is a database of public statements and 
messages made by the Presidents of the United States since Herbert Hoover.  The 
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American Presidency Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has 
supplemented that collection with other similar items and made them all available to 
search by date at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
American policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic 
of China (ROC) from 1949-1979 was geared primarily toward the accomplishment of 
one objective: compelling the Chinese Communists to abandon the revolutionary basis 
of their foreign policy, thus contributing to the establishment of a “tolerable state of 
order” in the international community.1  Non-interference in the affairs of other states, 
either through internal subversion or external aggression, constituted the fundamental 
prerequisites to the achievement of this goal.  Indeed, the formation of the United 
Nations had elevated non-interference and non-aggression to the status of international 
obligations to which all countries must adhere.  American officials often viewed the 
People’s Republic of China as actively resisting these ideals, fueling Cold War tensions 
and helping to perpetuate that conflict through subsequent decades.   
From this basic argument in the chapters that follow, four basic themes emerge.  
First, American China policy from Truman to Carter demonstrated considerable overall 
consistency in terms of the overall objectives each administration sought to achieve.  
Second, domestic opinion, in the form of pressures from either Congress or the broader 
American population, proved of secondary importance in the formulation of China 
policy.  Third, most of the variation that existed across the seven presidential 
administrations studied here resulted from efforts to achieve an appropriate balance 
                                                            
1 This phrase is taken from NSC 68.  
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between two competing imperatives: demonstrating resolve against aggression and 
demonstrating a willingness to engage constructively with Beijing.  And fourth, the 
United States formulated its policies toward the Republic of China in accordance with 
the same principles and imperatives that dictated its policies toward Beijing.  Thus, 
Washington consistently struggled to prevent Nationalist aggression and convince Taipei 
to act in a manner conducive to the maintenance of regional and global order.  
Simultaneously, however, it also utilized the ROC as a tool to achieve its broader 
objective of reorienting China’s foreign policy – a precarious, and not always successful, 
balancing act. 
 
International Obligations 
A key American objective during the twentieth century, and especially during the 
Cold War, was to nurture an international environment in which nations could resolve 
disputes through constructive negotiations held in good faith.  In the absence of this ideal 
scenario, American officials struggled to create means of enforcing the proper standards 
of conduct that most nations acknowledged but often nonetheless violated.  The 
economic and political differences between the communist and non-communist states 
during the Cold War colors traditional perspectives of the post-1945 era, but these 
international standards had deep roots in the American – and, indeed, global – past.  
Although disdain for socialism and the lack of political liberties in the communist world 
pervaded both domestic and official American thought in the late-1940s, the foremost 
concern among those officials responsible for formulating foreign policy was not 
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necessarily defeating communism as an economic or political system.2  Rather, they 
endeavored to create, in Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s words, “an environment in 
which our national life and individual freedom can survive and prosper,” or in other 
words, assuring that no nation would seek to undermine American values on American 
territory.  Yet Acheson also wished this freedom for other nations as well, and to 
develop an international order that would allow them to maintain their “freedom to 
develop along their chosen paths, however diverse.”3  These conditions would only 
emerge, however, once nations ceased efforts to extend political or physical control over 
or to engage in aggressive force against other nations.  By the end of World War II, these 
two conditions had emerged as the most important obligations the members of the 
international community were expected to uphold, lest the world once more devolve into 
a state of global war. 
This trend began in the 1890s when Americans denounced traditional European 
colonial domination and sought to replace it with a system that would offer 
developmental advice and guidance while retaining indigenous political self-rule.  In 
deciding to remain in the Philippines, for instance, President William McKinley 
expressed that an American withdrawal would allow Europe to carve up the archipelago 
and oppress the native population.  Similarly, following the Spanish-American War, the 
United States issued the Platt Amendment that prohibited Cuba from entering into any 
                                                            
2 As the following chapters suggest, the Korean War and subsequent regional tensions convinced many 
high-ranking officials that aggressive expansionism was, in fact, an inherent component of the communist 
outlook. 
3 Dean Acheson, This Vast External Realm (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973), 19; Robert J. 
McMahon, Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2009), 49. 
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foreign treaty that would infringe upon its political independence.  Theodore Roosevelt’s 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 expressed a similar sentiment; though 
Roosevelt sought to compel stability and responsibility in Latin American economies – 
which, indeed, did constitute a form of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign 
nations – the subtext of his approach was that such guidance under the benevolent hand 
of the United States was preferable to the exploitative domination of the European 
powers.  World War I strengthened the American abhorrence of foreign political control, 
as that conflict resulted from anti-imperial violence among a repressed ethnic population.  
When Wilson promulgated his Fourteen Points, therefore, he included calls for the self-
determination of colonial peoples and for the preservation of the political and territorial 
integrity of states.  Despite the failure to achieve universal acceptance of this position at 
Versailles, these ideas persisted.  In 1922 they found expression in the Nine-Power 
Treaty that called upon nations to cease interference in China’s development and grant 
the Chinese the “fullest” opportunity to “develop and maintain for herself an effective 
and stable government.”4 
The American determination to prevent external interference in the internal 
politics of other countries gained additional import as a result of the Bolshevik 
Revolution.  Socialism had always been somewhat taboo to the pre-WWI American elite 
despite frequent socialist political candidates during the Progressive Era.  After 1919, 
however, Lenin’s creation of the Comintern and strident revolutionary rhetoric 
dramatically affected the American perception of that ideology, converting a relatively 
                                                            
4 Nine Power Treaty, 6 February 1922, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/pre-war/9_power.html, accessed 
on 6 September 2012. 
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benign progressive movement into a dangerous harbinger of violence and tyranny.  
Anticipating Acheson’s concerns, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby explained in 1920 
that the Bolsheviks were “determined and bound to conspire against our institutions,” 
and their diplomats “will be the agitators of dangerous revolt.”5  Moscow’s apparent 
influence over the communist parties of the world through its chairmanship of the 
Comintern led Americans to fear that the “despotic disfranchisement” of the Russian 
people under Lenin would become the global norm if left unchecked.6  The tide of 
communist revolution appeared to have already swept through Mexico, and a series of 
bombings in the United States suggested the imminence of violent communist revolt at 
home.  Americans responded by supporting, at least initially, Attorney General A. 
Mitchell Palmer’s crackdown of American leftists and President Calvin Coolidge’s 1926 
decision to intervene in Nicaragua in response to the “serious threat to stability and 
constitutional government” there to which he accused “outside influences,” particularly 
Bolshevism, of contributing.7   
Franklin Roosevelt applied a different strategy to American relations with the 
Soviet Union, believing that a more accommodating approach would reap greater 
benefits than the standoffish, interventionist policies of his predecessors.  Upon 
achieving the presidency, FDR moved immediately to recognize the Soviet Union, 
accepting at face value Stalin’s pledges to end the Comintern’s interference in the 
                                                            
5 Quoted in John Richman, The United States and the Soviet Union: The Decision to Recognize (Raleigh: 
Camberleigh & Hall, 1980), 35. 
6 Quoted in Daniela Spenser, The Impossible Triangle: Mexico, Soviet Russia, and the United States in the 
1920s (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 15. 
7 Ibid, 3.  These forces helped maintain social order and the validity of the 1928 elections.  They were 
withdrawn in 1933. 
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internal affairs of other nations.  The State Department vigorously disagreed with this 
move.  Foreign policy officials remained concerned about the Soviet practice of 
“systematic interference” in the “domestic affairs of a country” and argued that 
recognition would not result in any change in Soviet behavior.8  Stalin’s failure to end 
the activities of the Comintern, or at the very least to sever Moscow’s direct control over 
that organization, seemed to confirm their fears, and tensions mounted during the latter 
half of the decade.9  The practice of “appeasement” had yet to gain the notoriety it later 
earned after the 1938 Munich Conference, but the failure of U.S. recognition to bring 
about any appreciable alteration in Soviet behavior offered an important lesson for future 
American policymakers.10   
Stalin’s policies constituted only one of many cases during the 1930s of 
dictatorial regimes intent on violating the independence of other peoples through 
military or diplomatic conquest or coercion.  Following its 1931 attack on China, Japan 
created the Manchukuo puppet state in Manchuria and gave the new nation a semblance 
of legitimacy by appointing as its nominal ruler the deposed Manchu Emperor Puyi; in 
reality, control remained in the hands of Japanese military officials.  Mussolini adopted a 
similarly aggressive expansionist agenda in the Mediterranean.  Tensions resulting from 
a series of encroachments on Ethiopian territory erupted in warfare in 1935, after which 
                                                            
8 Quoted in Richman, The United States and the Soviet Union, 38; One official explained the objectives of 
the Bolsheviks as “forming, subsidizing and actively directing and controlling from Moscow a small 
strongly disciplined group of communists in each country whose purpose is to ‘win over the majority of 
the working class’ and bring about the development of conditions within each country which will be 
favorable to a revolutionary, armed coup d’etat under communist leadership and the resultant 
establishment of a communist government.”  Ibid, 56. 
9 Ibid, 231-232. 
10 For American recognition of the Soviet Union and its consequences, see Thomas R. Maddux, Years of 
Estrangement: American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941 (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1980). 
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Italy incorporated the African country into its empire.  In March 1938, the Austrian Nazi 
Party staged a successful coup d’état in order to incorporate Austria into Adolf Hitler’s 
new German Empire and attempted to legitimize the move with a plebiscite in which the 
Nazis received over ninety-nine percent of the votes.  Simultaneously, Germany 
orchestrated the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia into a series of protectorates, 
occupied areas, and puppet regimes.  The Soviet Union followed suit in 1940 when it 
forcefully incorporated the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the USSR.  
The violent conquest of several other nations during the course of World War II 
perpetuated this trend.  In all of these cases, parts or the whole of nations were illegally 
reduced to subservience beneath totalitarian regimes seeking enhanced national power at 
the expense of local self-rule.   
After the war, the United States joined with the other nations of the world in 
elevating Wilsonian principles once more to the level of an international creed that all 
nations had an obligation to uphold.  Indeed, one of the most basic criteria that the 
Truman administration used to determine eligibility for diplomatic recognition was that a 
nation must have both the ability and willingness to discharge its international 
obligations, a concept that assumes a set of justifiable and unjustifiable behaviors and 
responsibilities that a country has when conducting its foreign relations.  
The term “international obligations” covers a wide array of items.  In the 
traditional sense, the most basic obligations that a nation has toward its neighbors are 
those it agrees to in treaties – legal contracts that form the foundation for all international 
diplomacy.  Trust is among the most important currency in this regard; for the orderly 
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conduct of international relations nations must believe that the signatories of an 
agreement have negotiated and entered into the contract in good faith with full 
willingness to carry out its provisions.11  Faithful adherence to treaty provisions has 
always presented problems to international order, however, given vague phraseology 
that allows nations to observe the letter if not the spirit of an agreement.   
The frequent lack of enforcement measures also confounds such schemes.  In a 
December 1904 message to Congress in which he first announced his Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine, Theodore Roosevelt demonstrated his keen awareness of this problem.  
He began by noting the goal of “all enlightened nations” as “to strive to bring ever 
nearer the day when there shall prevail throughout the world the peace of justice,” which 
could only come “when each nation is not merely safe-guarded in its own rights, but 
scrupulously recognizes and performs its duty toward others.”  While societies had 
created domestic governmental structures to ensure rights of their citizens, however, the 
international community had not created similar structures to protect the rights of nations: 
There is as yet no judicial way of enforcing a right in international law.  
When one nation wrongs another or wrongs many others, there is no 
tribunal before which the wrongdoer can be brought….Until some method 
is devised by which there shall be a degree of international control over 
offending nations, it would be a wicked thing for the most civilized 
powers, for those with the most sense of international obligations and with 
                                                            
11 Of course, carrying out treaty provisions could also cause much trouble, as was the case with the secret 
military alliances that contributed to the expansion of World War I. 
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keenest and most generous appreciation of the difference between right 
and wrong, to disarm.12 
In making this assertion, Roosevelt evoked a common set of ideals shared by all 
“civilized” nations, and provided an intellectual basis for his “Big Stick” diplomacy that, 
as a great power, the United States was obligated to wield in defense of international 
order.   
The failure of the great powers to act responsibly in the manner that Roosevelt 
had articulated in 1904 catalyzed the movement for greater enforcement measures in 
international agreements.  Woodrow Wilson offered the blueprint for this effort in the 
form of a League of Nations that would either police or mediate international disputes, 
and would codify a set of standards intended to ensure the long-term peace and stability 
of the international community.  The League Convention began by emphasizing the 
“acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,” the centrality of “international law as 
the actual rule of conduct among Governments,” and “a scrupulous respect for all treaty 
obligations.”13  Indeed, according to Article I the decisions to permit entry to and force 
withdrawal from the League were both based on whether a nation had fulfilled its 
international obligations.  When a party brought a dispute to the League for arbitration or 
judgment, the League’s ruling, according to the Covenant, became yet another obligation 
that nations must fulfill lest they forfeit their membership.   
                                                            
12 Theodore Roosevelt’s State of the Union address, 6 December 1904, Public Papers of the Presidents, 
hereafter cited as PPP. 
13 Convention of the League of Nations, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp, accessed on 
7 August 2012. 
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For his vision of a new international organization designed to preserve order, 
Wilson stood out to an entire generation of American officials as an admirable figure. 
“We had been thrilled to the depths of our emotional being,” Sumner Welles once 
commented, “by the vision that Woodrow Wilson had held out to us of a world order 
founded on justice and on democracy.”14  As a columnist during the 1920s, Franklin 
Roosevelt wrote on the need for the United States to take a leading role in the world 
toward “the lessening, not only of the horrors of war, but of the chances of war itself.”15  
Harry Truman, who had seen the ravages of the European war firsthand, advocated 
American adherence to the World Court and proclaimed the League of Nations “a great 
thing and another step in the right direction.”16  Even Richard Nixon admired Wilson, 
expressing that “we had made a serious mistake in not joining the League of Nations” 
and that “the UN offered the world’s best chance to build a lasting peace.”17 
The State Department at the time shared much of this enthusiasm, despite 
Congress’ refusal to allow American entry into the League.  To further the goal of 
ending aggressive war, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg entered into dozens of bilateral 
treaties calling for peaceful arbitration of disputes, struggled to prevent a naval arms race 
among the great powers, and orchestrated the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 that pledged 
the signatories to “condemn recourse to war for the solution of international 
                                                            
14 Quoted in Christopher O’Sullivan, Sumner Welles, Post-War Planning, and the Quest for a New World 
Order, 1937-1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 3. 
15 Franklin Roosevelt, 2 May 1925, in Donald Scott Carmichael, F.D.R., Columnist: The Uncollected 
Columns of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Chicago: Cuneo Press, 1947), 65; John Allphin Moore, Jr., and Jerry 
Pubantz, To Create a New World? American Presidents and the United Nations (New York: Peter Lang, 
1999), 28. 
16 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I: 1945, Year of Decisions (New York: Signet, 1955), 172. 
17 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 45. 
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controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with 
one another.”18  Subsequent violations of these agreements during the 1930s and ‘40s, 
however, did much to destroy the notion that the United States could blindly trust any 
nation’s professions of good faith when accepting an international obligation.  Hence, 
the U.N. framework included strengthened enforcement measures that the responsible 
powers, having recognized the value of upholding the Charter’s principles, would utilize 
as needed. 
The Charter of the United Nations in essence is a treaty, the signatories of which 
agree to adhere to its articles.19  Article II laid out its various guiding principles: 
sovereign equality of its members, fulfilling in good faith Charter obligations, settling 
disputes by peaceful means, refraining from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, supporting U.N. action and 
refraining from assisting violators, ensuring that non-members act in accordance with 
U.N. principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and non-intervention in strictly domestic affairs.  With the exception of 
self-determination as applied to colonial peoples, the founding members of the United 
Nations at the time did not dispute the validity or importance of these Charter principles.  
The problem, thus, was not a lack of principles, but rather ensuring that the U.N. 
bureaucratic machinery would work effectively, and that the members would abide by its 
                                                            
18 Quoted in Robert Ferrell, The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, Vol. XI: Frank B. 
Kellogg-Henry L. Stimson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1963), 122-123. 
19 Even Beijing apparently perceived the U.N. Charter as a treaty, and, both before and after it joined that 
organization, frequently pointed out various nations’ violations of their “international obligations” as 
member nations.  See Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People’s China and International Law: A 
Documentary Study, Vols. 1 and 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), especially 57-58 and 74-
75. 
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terms, especially their obligation to act collectively against violators and to exert 
influence and power in a responsible manner.20  This constituted the most fundamental 
dilemma of the Cold War as the State Department struggled to convince the communist 
nations to behave in a manner Washington considered appropriate, and to convince U.S. 
allies and, indeed, even the American people to stand firm in the face of violations that 
might spark another global conflagration.   
 
The Communist Challenge to the Post-War International System: The View from 
Washington 
As events unfolded in the latter half of 1945, the Truman administration 
increasingly believed that Stalin would not fulfill the promises he had made at the Yalta 
Conference for Eastern European elections, but would rather seek to control those 
governments and to establish repressive internal security systems that would destroy 
political dissent.  This was, in fact, the case; in 1945, Stalin explicitly commented to one 
of his communist associates that “It cannot be otherwise” that “whoever occupies a 
territory also imposes his own social system.”21  To Truman and Churchill he offered the 
similarly blunt argument that “the Soviet Union was entitled to insist that the future 
government should be made up of men who would be actively promoting friendly 
relations between the two countries.”  He rejected as insufficient Churchill’s 
compromise solution that only those individuals who were “extremely unfriendly toward 
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Russia” should be excluded.22  He also prevented Western representatives to enter the 
countries in the Soviet occupation zone for the purpose of observing the elections, 
arguing that such “foreign interference” was unnecessary.23 
Unwilling to go to war to prevent this trend, Truman watched in trepidation as 
events unfolded.  He frowned upon the situation that had developed in Yugoslavia, 
where “concessions made in Belgrade to the members of the government-in-exile were 
to the extent of six only, against twenty-five of Tito’s own nominees.”24  In Rumania, 
reports indicated that the communist-backed government represented less than ten per 
cent of the population and that the vast majority “did not want either the government 
they had or any other form of communism.”  In Bulgaria, the communists had firm 
control of the police and army and “had succeeded in suppressing all opposition 
sentiment in the press by labeling it ‘Fascist.’”  Similar conditions existed in Poland 
where immediately prior to the formation of the new Polish Provisional Government 
Moscow began the trials of sixteen Polish democratic leaders who had previously been 
arrested under what Truman described as “outrageous circumstances.”25  Stalin’s 
adamant refusal to alter his position at Potsdam in July 1945 led directly to Truman’s 
decision not to allow the Soviet Union into post-war Japan, lest the Japanese also fall 
under the heavy hand of Soviet-style dictatorship.  In subsequent months, the 
administration witnessed new Soviet moves to gain strategic advantages in Iran and 
Turkey at the expense of those nations’ sovereignty.  In September, Truman received 
                                                            
22 Truman, Memoirs, I, 283-285. 
23 Ibid, 64. 
24 Ibid, 127. 
25 Ibid, 355. 
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reports that Soviet forces in Iran were preventing Iranian officials from operating in the 
northern provinces and had encouraged the development of a radical separatist 
movement which moved to form a new Soviet-backed government in December.   
All of this contributed to the hardening of the American position that occurred in 
January 1946.  In a letter to Secretary of State Jim Byrnes, Truman laid out the pattern 
he perceived in Soviet behavior up to that point.  A State Department mission to the 
Balkans, he wrote, revealed that rather than exaggerating or overstating the case, 
American observers had actually understated the repressive conditions that existed 
there.26  Truman refused to grant recognition to those Soviet-dominated “police states” 
unless radical changes occurred.  He also found no justification for Soviet “undue 
interference in Iran’s internal affairs,” which paralleled previous Soviet efforts in the 
Baltic States and Poland.27  Stalin also seemed intent on violating Turkish sovereignty 
by forcing it to hand over control of the Dardanelles.  But even more than the strategic 
issues regarding the control of Iran’s oil or the Turkish straits, what bothered Truman 
most “was Russia’s callous disregard of the rights of a small nation and of her own 
solemn promises.  International co-operation was impossible if national obligations 
could be ignored and the U.N. bypassed as if it did not exist.”28        
Soviet behavior continued to cause concern in 1946, beginning with Stalin’s 
February speech in which he emphasized the incompatibility of capitalism and 
communism, the inevitability of warfare between the two camps, and the need to rearm 
                                                            
26 Oral History Interview with Mark F. Ethridge, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/ethridge.htm, 
accessed on 7 August 2012.  
27 Truman, Memoirs, I, 574; On 3 December, following an increase in Soviet troop levels, Moscow radio 
announced the formation of a new revolutionary government in Northern Iran.   
28 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: 1946-1952, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Signet, 1956), 117. 
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in order to ensure Soviet security.29  The deadline for Stalin to remove his forces from 
Manchuria and Iran came and went with no withdrawal.  The Soviet approach to the 
United Nations reflected this increasingly uncooperative Soviet posture.  At the first 
meeting of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), the French agreed to withdraw their 
troops from Syria and Lebanon in an arrangement that the latter nations found 
completely acceptable.  The Soviet representative, Gromyko, nonetheless vetoed it on 
the grounds that the language of the agreement describing French actions was 
insufficiently harsh.  In March when the Security Council met for the first time, 
Gromyko walked out because the Council had failed to approve the Soviet resolution to 
remove the Iranian question from the agenda.  The United States continued to hope that 
the Council could reach an agreement on the formation of an international military force 
that the U.N. could utilize as needed against aggressors, but Moscow remained cautious 
to any such plans.  During only the first half of the first session, the Soviet representative 
issued nine vetoes, which U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie considered a “chill 
forewarning of the Cold War to come.”30  During the second half of the session, many 
nations complained of Moscow’s abuse of its veto power while the representatives of the 
Soviet bloc accused the West of promoting another war. 
By that point, cooperation had broken down in other parts of the world.  The 
Soviets renewed their proposal to the Turkish government for joint control of the 
Dardanelles and the exclusion from their use of any non-Black Sea power.  The 
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30 Quoted in Harrelson, Fires All Around the Horizon, 8. 
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following month, U.S.-Soviet talks on the reunification of Korea collapsed because of 
disputes over the formation of a nationwide provisional government.  When the United 
States submitted the problem of Korea for U.N. consideration, the Soviets refused to 
assist in the holding of free elections and instead solidified the division of the peninsula 
through its support of the North Korean regime.  In December, the Security Council 
completed its investigation of the Greek civil war and condemned the neighboring 
communist nations of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria for supporting the rebels in 
violation of Greece’s rights.   
Interpreting the situation in Greece as a Soviet effort to extend its dominion, and 
perhaps also in response to the fraudulent elections held in Poland in January 1947, 
Truman decided that his administration would not allow the Soviet Union or its proxies 
forcibly to deprive any additional nations of their independence and sovereignty.  When 
the United Kingdom announced that it could no longer support the faltering Greek 
government, Truman addressed a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, insisting 
that the United States step in to help.  While remembered chiefly as the beginning of the 
American policy of containing communist expansion in general, the speech focused 
specifically on the preservation of the democratically-elected government of Greece.  
Nearly 700 American observers had verified the elections that produced the Greek 
Parliament the previous year as “a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.”   
Truman stressed that the allied nations during World War II had fought against countries 
“which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations” and argued 
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that “we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration.”31 
Moscow’s actions throughout the rest of 1947 and 1948 merely confirmed that 
the Soviet Union would continue to deprive other nations of the right to make their own 
decisions free from external coercion.  When representatives from Czechoslovakia and 
Poland considered accepting American Marshall Plan aid, Stalin ordered them to reject 
such offers.  The Soviets followed this action by throwing off even the pretense of 
democracy in Eastern Europe.  When the non-communist parties in Hungary seemed on 
the verge of making enormous electoral gains in August 1947, Stalin instituted more 
stringent repressive measures to subdue political independence.  Similar repression 
occurred in Bulgaria and Poland, and the USSR, under the threat of force, invited 
Finland to sign a treaty of friendship.  By the end of February 1948 the last bastion of 
democracy in Eastern Europe fell when communists, supported by the threat of Soviet 
military intervention, instigated a coup against the Czech government. 
 In response, on March 17, 1948, Truman addressed a joint session of Congress 
emphasizing the grave dangers the world now confronted.  The Soviet Union actively 
sought to prevent an honorable peace, had “persistently obstructed the work of the 
United Nations by constant abuse of the veto,” and had “destroyed the independence and 
democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe” with 
the intention to “extend it to the remaining free nations of Europe.”  In making this 
argument, Truman emphasized the ongoing plight of Greece in its battle against the 
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communist rebels, and how in Italy “a determined and aggressive effort is being made by 
a Communist minority to take control of the country.”  In contrast to this pattern of 
communist aggression, five European nations were just then signing an agreement “for 
economic cooperation and common defense against aggression.”  In explaining the 
“great significance” of this event, Truman noted that “this agreement was not imposed 
by the decree of a powerful neighbor.  It was the free choice of independent 
governments representing the will of their people, and acting within the terms of the 
Charter of the United Nations.”32   
 The only Eastern European government to escape from this pattern of Soviet 
domination was that of Josep Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia.  By virtue of the fact that he had 
not relied on outside help to defeat the Axis forces in his country, Tito had avoided the 
repression and coercion that had resulted from Soviet occupation of the other Eastern 
European nations.  Tito refused to blindly follow Moscow’s orders, and exclaimed in 
May 1945: 
We are not going to pay the balance on others' accounts, we are not going 
to serve as pocket money in anyone's currency exchange, we are not going 
to allow ourselves to become entangled in political spheres of interest.  
Why should it be held against our peoples that they want to be completely 
independent?  And why should autonomy be restricted, or the subject of 
dispute?  We will not be dependent on anyone ever again!33 
                                                            
32 Quoted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 278-279. 
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Mounting tensions over the next three years culminated in Stalin’s denunciation of Tito, 
and Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform on June 28, 1948. 
The State Department offered a mixed response.  It praised the “awakening of 
national independence and self-interest” that Tito’s move represented, but at the same 
time American officials acknowledged that he remained the dictator of a police state.  
The increasing belligerency of the Soviet Union that summer certainly contributed to the 
decision to support Tito economically and politically, but the underlying principles 
remained intact; national independence constituted the necessary prerequisite for a 
people to determine their own political fate.  As such, the new American ambassador to 
Yugoslavia expressed to Tito Truman’s view that “our support of the sovereign integrity 
of independent states applied as fully to Yugoslavia as to any other state.”34  
Yugoslavia’s successful bid for independence from Moscow suggested that a communist 
China, especially one that had achieved success largely on its own, might also choose to 
join with the rest of the world in preserving international peace and order.  Many 
observers wondered which course the emerging Chinese Communist regime would 
adopt. 
 
Capitalist or Communist Imperialism?:  A Comment on Mutual Misperception 
 Although the argument this dissertation advances focuses on American policy 
toward China, a brief examination of how China perceived American motivations, the 
post-war international order, and the nature of international law is in order.  Historian 
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Chen Jian, in his work on CCP Chairman Mao Zedong and the Cold War, argues that 
Chinese foreign policy always served the interests of Mao’s domestic revolutionary 
agenda.  Yet Chen’s analysis does not do justice to the breadth and depth of China’s 
intellectual consideration of international relations and the laws that govern them.  By 
the 1960s, Communist China had existed long enough and engaged in a sufficient 
number of international agreements to allow analyses of its record of both fulfilling 
treaty obligations and the extent to which it had (or had not) adopted the commonly-
accepted standards of the international community.35  Throughout those decades, Beijing 
produced a steady stream of propaganda, editorials, official documents, and scholarly 
essays on virtually every facet of international relations, thus allowing for some tentative 
conclusions regarding its own perception of itself and the United States in relation to the 
international order. 
 The first and most pertinent fact of significance to the current study is the 
considerable extent to which China had by 1949 adopted a Western-style of diplomacy.  
Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the series of Western 
intrusions and injustices against China compelled Chinese leaders to abandon their 
traditional, imperial style of international relations in favor of a distinctly Western mode.  
In acknowledging the validity of this diplomatic system, China’s intellectuals could not 
help but notice how frequently the European nations violated their own standards of 
conduct, or, worse, how they twisted “legal” norms in a manner that justified their unjust 
and exploitative policies.  In this regard, communism’s ideological portrayal of capitalist 
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nations as inherently imperialistic fit rather well into the matrix of Chinese nationalistic 
thought.  As such, by the time the Chinese Communists came to power, many of them 
appear to have concluded that a balance of power was necessary in order to force the 
Western nations to adhere faithfully to the precepts of their own international legal 
system.36  Beijing’s view suggested the necessity of increasing its power for largely 
defensive reasons, namely, the capacity to prevent other nations from infringing on 
China’s sovereignty.  Yet this also constituted an implicit admission that Beijing sought 
to compel appropriate behavior on the part of the Western world – though less from the 
external application of power than by maintaining the security of its territory against the 
incursions of aggressing or exploitative nations.   
Thus, the international order that Beijing hoped to achieve in many ways 
reflected the one Washington also pursued.  In both cases, the United States and the 
People’s Republic feared for their security against external threats, and viewed those 
same threats as also endangering the security and independence of other nations.  Far 
from seeking to overturn the post-war international order, evidence suggests that Beijing 
welcomed the United Nations as a valuable contribution to global peace and stability – 
so long as it operated in genuine accordance with the Charter principles.  Yet China 
perceived in the U.N. the subtle hand of the imperialistic domination that Beijing had 
already condemned the United States and its allies of seeking.  So long as this remained 
the case, according to the Chinese Communists, neither China nor the international 
community could ever find true security.   
                                                            
36 Cohen and Chiu, People’s China and International Law, 3-13. 
22 
 
 The similarities between American and Chinese objectives extend also to the 
realm of social and economic systems, though this dissertation views the internationalist 
dimensions as of more immediate importance to American policymakers during the three 
decades in question.  On the most fundamental level, both China and the United States 
believed that their respective systems provided a degree of liberty that the other lacked.  
Americans praised capitalism and representative democracy over socialist dictatorships 
that stole from the people a say in their government and the just fruits of their labor.  The 
Chinese Communists praised people’s socialist dictatorships that strove to ensure the 
welfare of every individual equally and in which the true interests of the common man 
found expression free from the exploitative and corrupting hand of capitalist greed.   
From this brief discussion, one can conclude that what truly occurred during the 
first few decades of the Cold War between China and the United States was two nations 
striving for similar objectives yet unable to comprehend this essential fact.  The social 
and economic differences between the two countries may very well have proved 
irreconcilable at the domestic level, yet the internationalist objectives required only that 
the two countries trust the intentions of the other.  However, with each side apparently 
implacable, both China and the United States persevered, firm in their devotion to stop 
the other from achieving their apparent imperial goals.   
The perceived stakes of defeat in this contest drove both sides toward actions that 
occasionally contradicted their stated principles, and, in turn, to justify their actions 
based on the perceived efforts of the other – a double standard to which every powerful 
nation is prone.  Thus, just as the United States endeavored to subvert the leftist 
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governments of Guatemala, Iran, Cuba, and even China during the 1950s and ‘60s 
despite its professions of non-interference as a core international principle, so too did 
China, contravening its own principle of non-interference, actively support the 
revolutionary movements in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, and several 
African nations.  This does not, however, mean that these two countries adopted these 
principles as mere pretexts or that the principles mattered little to those making policy – 
far from it.  Both sides apparently remained in a sort of crisis mentality during the 1950s 
and early 1960s, but gradually freed themselves from some – though not all – of the 
more dire assumptions that drove their earlier policies.  The following chapters will 
illustrate the American experience. 
 
The Case for Consistency in American China Policy 
Can a case be made for consistency in American policy?  Could the seven 
presidential administrations from Harry Truman to Jimmy Carter have pursued a 
common set of objectives toward which their respective China policies conformed?  
Many historians note specific instances in which China policies survived political 
transitions.  William Stueck, for instance, sees notions of credibility as creating a 
“measure of continuity to American policy before and after” the outbreak of war in 
Korea.37  Fred Greene sees broader continuity, arguing that American actions from the 
late-1940s through the mid-1960s centered on the avoidance of “domination by any one 
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power or political system by means other than voluntary association.”38  Noam Kochavi 
points out the “considerable convergence in the China perspectives” of the Republican 
Eisenhower and Democratic Kennedy administrations.39  Steven Goldstein and James 
Thomson both reject the common division of Sino-American relations into pre- and 
post-Kissinger eras, and note a variety of diplomatic efforts during the 1960s that set the 
stage for Nixon’s initiatives.40  Arthur Waldron takes this a step further, contending that 
“Nixon’s China policy differed scarcely if at all from those of his predecessors.”41  
Rosemary Foot, in an argument that resembles in important ways the one presented here, 
notes that the China policies of each administration after 1949 all stemmed in part from 
“China’s challenge to world order goals.”42 
The broad continuity of policy objectives identified in this dissertation resulted 
from the American acceptance of the responsibility for upholding the standards and 
principles of the post-WWII international order against any perceived or actual threat to 
them.  Historians have not wholeheartedly incorporated the American defense of U.N. 
principles into the narrative of U.S. Cold War policy.  Conversely, historians of the U.N. 
cannot help but discuss how the rivalry spilled over into the councils of that organization.  
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Max Harrelson, for instance, notes that the USSR used the veto twenty-one times prior 
to 1948, and “seemed to be bent on preventing the Security Council from performing its 
peace-preserving functions.”  In contrast, Truman in his welcoming address 
characterized the United Nations “not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent 
partnership – a partnership among the peoples of the world for their common peace and 
well-being.  It must be the determined purpose for all of us to see that the United Nations 
lives and grows in the minds and hearts of the people.”43  John Alphin Moore and Jerry 
Pubantz similarly note that from Woodrow Wilson to the late-1990s, “American 
presidents have been at the forefront in twentieth-century developments to create and 
maintain a universal and workable world political association” and to “sustain that vision 
on the basis of American principles.”44 
This dissertation takes seriously the enduring American commitment to the 
principles of the United Nations, even as it recognizes that the American commitment to 
the organization itself wavered.  The fact that the Soviet Union and its proxies continued 
to block progress and that many Americans and American allies were often either too 
weak or too irresolute to stand steadfastly in defense of the Charter’s principles meant 
that the U.S. government placed upon itself the moral responsibility to fight even harder 
and exert ever more pressure in order to keep the hope and promise of these principles 
alive.  Washington found this mission increasingly difficult, however, as both domestic 
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opposition and the specific interests and perspectives of other nations undermined the 
government’s effort to hold the line.45   
 
Competing Imperatives: Containment vs. Engagement 
From attempts to determine how to bring about communist adherence to proper 
international standards of conduct emerged American policy toward China.  American 
officials adopted a two-part strategy to accomplish this ambitious goal.  The first part 
derived from anti-appeasement thought and formed the core of the doctrine of 
containment.  Namely, American officials believed that the determined and effective 
application of counterforce against communist aggressions, if maintained long enough, 
would gradually convince the aggressing nations that the international community would 
not tolerate and the violating states would obtain no benefit from such actions.  Should 
the violators obtain rewards – such as increased trade, territorial gain, or even diplomatic 
recognition – this would only encourage a continuation or intensification of undesirable 
behaviors.46  Eventually, this theory went, a rigid non-appeasement policy would compel 
the violating states to accept the inevitability of their policies’ failure and convince them 
to adjust their policies appropriately.   
This effort remained effective only to the extent that the United States 
maintained its credibility – the perception among foreign nations of Washington’s ability 
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and willingness to prevent violations from occurring, or to counter them once begun.  
Successive administrations had to uphold the validity of all U.S. treaties and 
commitments lest their allies view such pledges as unreliable and choose to 
accommodate the aggressing nations.  Similarly, having decided to counter an aggressive 
action, these administrations believed they could not afford to retreat from that stance or 
allow the effort to fail lest the aggressing nations perceive weakness and launch 
additional moves – in essence, appeasement through weakness or lack of resolve.   
The evolving American perception of the Soviet Union and PRC as aggressive, 
expansionistic, and power hungry led to direct comparisons with the totalitarian 
dictatorships that had caused World War II.  Such comparisons abound throughout the 
documentary record.  In the early months of the Korean War, Truman commented that 
“If the history of the 1930’s teaches us anything, it is that appeasement of dictators is the 
sure road to world war.  If aggression were allowed to succeed in Korea, it would be an 
open invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere.”47  In June 1954, Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles referenced the American denunciation of Japan’s 1931 attack on 
China and the failure of the international community to heed Washington’s call for 
action.  This prefaced his remarks on developments in Korea and Indochina, thus 
suggesting that “history is repeating itself.”48   In 1960, Chester Bowles “propounded 
that China craved lebensraum in Southeast Asia, likening Beijing to Nazi Germany and 
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Imperial Japan, and said that the United States needed to make ‘crystal clear’ its 
determination to intervene in the eventuality of a Chinese drive into the region.”49   
Richard Nixon’s direct experience with the emerging Cold War in the 1950s instilled in 
him this same fear of appeasing the aggressive appetites of the communist nations.  Thus, 
for American officials, avoiding a repeat of the catastrophes of the past required a refusal 
to make the same mistakes in the present.  
The second component of the American approach was to display to violators a 
willingness to negotiate with them in good faith and to engage with them cooperatively 
if and when they had abandoned their revolutionary challenge to the international order.  
This component of the strategy was crucial in order to give communist leaders a vision 
of the benefits they might derive from a cooperative, rather than adversarial approach – a 
difference that containment was meant to emphasize by increasing the costs of deviation.  
Yet one administration after another confronted the dilemma that the imperative of 
confronting and deterring communist aggression required that they refuse to grant 
concessions lest this signify that aggressive acts would reap benefits.  But this very effort 
to make the costs of a revolutionary foreign policy prohibitive placed limits on the extent 
to which these administrations could demonstrate their genuine willingness to cooperate.  
Indeed, the most significant difference among the China policies of these administrations 
lay in their assessment of what concessions they could offer without signaling weakness 
or a lack of resolve to counter further violations.   
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In the early years of the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration ruled out 
virtually all concessions, from the relaxation of trade and travel restrictions to diplomatic 
recognition and membership in the United Nations.  In this regard, the administration 
even viewed the establishment of higher-level contacts as a gesture that might enhance 
rather than reduce Chinese militancy and undermine the international united front it 
struggled to maintain against further concessions.  By the 1960s, some American 
officials began to recalculate the costs of making small gestures, seeing these as a means 
of facilitating a relaxation of tensions that would demonstrate more concretely than 
before the genuine American desire for constructive relations.  Many academics and 
mid-level officials criticized Ike’s approach as too narrowly focused on containment, 
and called for a more balanced policy that gave equal weight to demonstrating American 
friendliness and willingness to engage in constructive diplomacy.   
With the ascendance of Richard Nixon to the presidency in 1969 the scales 
tipped decisively in favor of accommodation, a shift that, in part, occurred as a result of 
a general consensus that China did not seek domination of other nations, but rather was 
concerned primarily with its own security.  As such, China did not require containment.  
Nixon nonetheless clearly believed that containment of aggression and “hegemony” 
remained a valid pursuit in the 1970s, particularly as regards the Soviet Union.  Nixon 
and Ford utilized this as a method of bridging the gap between China and the United 
States, but although they enjoyed a certain amount of success they still failed to achieve 
the more fundamental reorientation that would convert the temporary ideological truce 
between the countries into a more enduring and stable method of engagement.  
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Ultimately, the reorientation that Washington sought did not result from American 
policies.  Rather, this change occurred following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the 
subsequent purges of his radical followers, and the development of a more pragmatic, 
less ideological foreign policy under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.   
Ironically, each administration had tentatively concluded that events would end 
in this way: that China’s revolutionary foreign policy would not change until such time 
as Mao died.  This did not, however, stop the United States from endeavoring to end the 
conflict earlier through a variety of alternative strategies, many of which required the 
United States to militarily defend, economically develop, and politically support the 
Republic of China. 
 
The Role of Taiwan in American China Policy 
 American policy toward the Republic of China remained primarily an outgrowth 
of American policy toward China, rather than the other way around.  Virtually every 
decision regarding Taiwan served any one of a number of purposes in the ideological 
and military struggle against PRC-backed communist aggression or subversion in East 
Asia.  Protecting the island from military attack and developing the capabilities of the 
island’s armed forces served the broader goal of deterring regional aggression and 
countering it when it occurred.  Economic assistance and development helped maintain 
internal stability and turned Taiwan into a model that might win the approval of Chinese 
officials and citizens alike.  Maintaining recognition of the ROC as the sole legitimate 
government of the Chinese people and fighting to preserve Taipei’s seat in the United 
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Nations would strengthen the hope and resolve of other threatened allies by 
demonstrating the extent of the American commitment.  Furthermore, maintaining the 
ROC’s diplomatic and political status would deny Beijing an important symbolic victory 
for its domestic consumption and would prevent the regime from achieving the 
international legitimacy it so desired and that might encourage undesirable behaviors.  
Washington thus perceived ample benefits to its international imperatives from its 
support of Taipei, and required little prodding from domestic American opinion to 
perpetuate the partnership.   
But this did not immunize the ROC from American pressure to conform to the 
same standards that Washington insisted China adopt.  These administrations exerted 
considerable effort to ensure that the ROC did not become a threat to the very global 
peace and stability that the United States sought to maintain.  As the following chapters 
will demonstrate, the ROC under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek did, in fact, pose a 
threat to peace in East Asia during the 1950s and ‘60s, but one that the United States 
proved capable of moderating.  The continuation of the partnership in such 
circumstances makes sense only in light of the existence of the even larger threat of 
Chinese Communist aggression.   
By the 1970s, China ceased its overtly threatening posture, a fact that removed 
whatever value the ROC had as an instrument of containment.  Despite this, it still 
retained its value as a symbol of the American commitment to uphold the crucial 
principles of peaceful resolution of disputes and the inviolability of pledges.  The United 
States had entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC in 1954, and, for better or 
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worse, Washington had both a moral and legal commitment to the island’s defense.  To 
break that commitment would undermine the principles of the international order at a 
time when the Soviet Union continued to cause trouble, and when doubts of 
Washington’s credibility might yet prompt considerable disruptions.  As Kissinger noted 
in his memoirs, for “a great power to abandon a small country to tyranny simply to 
obtain a respite from our own travail” was “profoundly immoral and destructive of our 
efforts to build a new and ultimately more peaceful pattern of international relations.”50   
Thus, during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter eras, Washington primarily sought to 
conjure some method whereby the fate of Taiwan would rest with the Taiwanese people 
themselves, rather than with an imposed solution on the part of either the United States 
or China.  Ultimately, they achieved this goal.  Thus the so-called “abandonment” of 
Taiwan accorded well, and continues to do so, with the principles and standards that 
these administrations sought to uphold.  Indeed, in 2005 Kissinger explicitly rejected the 
notion that the United States had “cut loose” the Nationalists, saying “Here we are, 
thirty-four years later.  We have navigated a tricky situation for a generation, 
maintaining friendly relations with China while Taiwan has remained, with our help, 
strong and democratic – all this based on documents negotiated in 1971 and 1972.”51 
 
The Secondary Importance of Domestic Opinion in the Making of China Policy 
In arguing for consistency in American objectives over such a long period of 
time, this dissertation views domestic opinion as of secondary importance and of having 
                                                            
50 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 228. 
51 Alistair Horne, Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 82. 
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a direct and significant influence on China policy in only a handful of instances.  Many 
historians view irrational anti-communist sentiments among American officials, the 
American people, or both, as contributing to the lack of friendly relations between the 
United States and Communist China.  Warren Cohen, for instance, sees such views as 
causing the “Great Aberration” in the traditional friendship and respect of the United 
States toward the Chinese and Chinese nationalism.52  The work of Nancy Tucker and 
others also attributes much importance to domestic anti-communism enflamed by the 
propaganda efforts of the Republic of China.  The outbreak of war in Korea represents 
the key event for these historians; it effectively closed the door on any possible 
accommodation by making the political costs of recognition too high for subsequent 
administrations to pay.    
In contrast, many historians of Sino-American relations have challenged what 
Fredrik Logevall proclaimed the “intimate” relationship between domestic politics and 
foreign relations.53  Leonard Kusnitz notes, for instance, that Truman and Acheson 
expected public opinion to accept the wisdom of their considered policies.54  Stueck 
argues that domestic calls against recognition “merely reinforced Acheson’s inclinations,” 
while Robert Accinelli agrees that foreign policymaking during the early-1950s “was 
affected intermittently and secondarily by domestic considerations and by pressures 
                                                            
52 Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, 3rd edition (New 
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from concerned friendly nations.”55  Robert Ross sees strategic considerations as 
dominant, arguing that “When domestic politics did influence policy, policy makers 
considered it an obstacle to implementing their preferred, internationally derived foreign 
policies.”56  Even Tucker has recently admitted the secondary importance of domestic 
opinion; citing examples from Truman to Johnson, she wrote in 2009 that 
the siren call of parochial constituent interests and the hostility of many 
executive branch officials more often eliminated Congress from important 
China-related decision making.  Public opinion at times provided a more 
effective constraint, given the power of retributive voting.  But ultimately, 
high-level officials and foreign policy affairs specialists determined the 
direction of US relations with Beijing and Taipei.57 
Historians who emphasize the power of domestic politics and the China Lobby 
frequently cite the various ways in which these interests forced accommodations from 
the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations.  They argue, for instance, that 
domestic forces compelled Eisenhower to appoint several pro-Chiang individuals to key 
State Department positions.  Scholars of the Kennedy administration similarly point to 
Kennedy’s narrow electoral victory and lingering fears of the China Lobby as factors 
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preventing movement toward a rapprochement during the 1960s.  While these limiting 
domestic factors did exist, attributing to their influence a lack of movement in the Sino-
American relationship is misleading since historians ultimately fail to demonstrate a 
clear connection between these factors and policymaking.  For instance, Ike excluded 
from his inner circle those officials supposedly appointed to placate the China Lobby, 
such as Walter Robertson, Karl Rankin, and Arthur Radford.  As Kochavi points out, the 
assertion that the purge of the “China Hands” prevented the introduction of alternative 
policies into the official discourse ultimately remains speculation rather than 
demonstrable fact.58   
These interpretations also fail to take into account the fact that those responsible 
for foreign policy frequently considered that task as having a degree of importance and 
responsibility that often transcended the domestic concerns of their constituents.  Early 
in 1956, Ike wondered that if the PRC “should finally get out of North Korea, release our 
prisoners, and act decently, how in the world could the United States continue to avoid 
recognizing Communist China?”59  Two years later, his Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, publicly stated that “Certainly you cannot allow your foreign policy to be 
dictated by public opinion.”60  Kennedy, too, in the early months of his presidency 
expressed his willingness to defy public opinion if China provided any indication of a 
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change in attitude.61  Even as domestic pressures became unbearable during the post-Tet 
era, Nixon and Kissinger expressed contempt for irresponsible Congressional 
interference in foreign policy and moved toward a covert form of diplomacy that 
preserved their ability to pursue a policy they considered more conducive to achieving a 
peaceful world order.  Jimmy Carter eventually adopted a similar approach toward China 
for much the same reason.   
Acceptance of this assessment leads, then, to the tentative conclusion that had 
China indicated that it would engage constructively with other nations rather than 
pursuing a more bellicose approach, then it is at least plausible that prior to Nixon an 
American president may have taken greater initiative to improve relations.62  Under such 
circumstances, a president may well have faced considerable political difficulties at 
home.  But because Chinese radicalism rarely provided opportunities for rapprochement 
that would have been acceptable from the standpoint of American foreign policy 
objectives, assessments of the true power of the domestic factor must remain speculative 
and inconclusive. 
 
The Structure of this Dissertation 
The five chapters in this dissertation are arranged chronologically and are 
generally divided by presidential administrations.  Chapter One begins with an 
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examination of the initial decision not to recognize the nascent Chinese Communist 
government prior to the Korean War because of Beijing’s persistent and escalating 
violations of the commonly-accepted standards and principles of the international order.  
It then discusses the hardening of China policy during the Korean War, and concludes 
with an examination of the administration’s effort to either moderate Beijing’s 
communist leaders or to overthrow the government during this period of economic and 
social turmoil.   
Chapter Two covers the China policy of Dwight Eisenhower’s administration.  
During the mid- and late-1950s, the United States struggled to prevent aggressive actions 
on the part of both the PRC and ROC from erupting into a larger conflict.  While it 
sought to hold the line against communist expansion, the administration simultaneously 
implemented a long-term strategy of exacerbating mainland social and economic 
conditions in order to facilitate the emergence of an indigenous resistance movement.  
Like Truman, Eisenhower hoped that this would result in either the moderation or 
replacement of the existing regime.   
Chapter Three recounts the efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson administration to 
perpetuate the military containment of communism in East Asia.  Yet in so doing, these 
Democratic administrations also accepted the permanency of the communist regime and, 
thus, gradually abandoned the alternative strategies for reorienting Beijing’s policies that 
their predecessors had adopted.  As a result, Taiwan lost much of its previous political 
and diplomatic value during the 1960s, even as it played an increasingly important role 
as a strategic outpost that facilitated American military operations in the region.   
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Chapter Four analyzes the development of the Sino-American rapprochement 
during the Nixon and Ford administrations as they struggled to create conditions 
conducive to achieving a greater degree of international stability.  This did not mean that 
these administrations had abandoned efforts to compel Beijing to abandon its 
revolutionary line, however.  During the high-level talks of 1971-1972, Kissinger 
implemented a new strategy designed to guide PRC leaders toward a more legitimate 
form of international relations.  This produced real, though limited, success, but by the 
end of 1975 the persistence of revolutionary thought among Beijing’s leaders produced a 
diplomatic context in which compromise on several key issues proved impossible. 
This all changed over the course of the next several years as a more pragmatic 
leadership emerged under Deng Xiaoping, a trend discussed in Chapter Five.  Taiwan 
had also undergone a change during the 1970s.  Under the new leadership of Chiang 
Ching-kuo, the ROC generally reconciled itself to the abandonment of its ambitions to 
rule the mainland.  Instead, it now focused more on enhancing the island’s military 
security and ensuring a separate existence free from PRC control.  Yet it did so in a way 
that cast Taipei in the eyes of American officials as a destabilizing influence.  The 
incoming Carter administration lamented Taipei’s approach, even as it responded 
favorably to Beijing’s new moderation.  Yet the imperative of peaceful change 
compelled the Carter administration to seek a pledge that the PRC would strive for 
reunification by peaceful means.  The compromise the two sides reached did not resolve 
the issue, yet with China’s abandonment of its revolutionary line and its constructive 
cooperation in world affairs, Washington believed that it had finally achieved its long-
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sought objective.  The result, on January 1, 1979, was American diplomatic recognition 
of the People’s Republic of China. 
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CHAPTER II 
HARRY TRUMAN AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST THREAT TO 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER, 1948-1952 
 
 In the late-1940s, with the Cold War begun and the communist revolution in 
China reaching fruition, the administration of Harry S. Truman struggled to determine 
the extent to which Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would 
conduct their foreign relations in accordance with the principles and standards of the 
post-war international order.  Had they concluded, as had the United States and its allies, 
that nations should not seek to control other nations?  Did they understand the dangers of 
such international instability as had produced the tragedies of the 1930s and ‘40s?  Or 
would they join with the Soviet Union in carrying out a disruptive, revolutionary 
program to unsettle the nascent international order in favor of one that prioritized 
communist ideological unity over the freedom of indigenous peoples to choose their own 
political systems free from outside interference?   
The Truman administration soon concluded that the leaders of the newly-formed 
People’s Republic of China would adopt the latter course, following in the footsteps of 
their comrades in Moscow.  Under such circumstances Washington sought to convince 
Beijing that cooperation remained possible, that the international order in no way 
threatened China’s decision to pursue communism domestically, and that the principles 
of the United Nations would guarantee, rather than endanger, the territorial integrity of 
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its borders.1  Washington determined, however, to refrain from granting Beijing 
diplomatic recognition until such time as the CCP accepted the norms of the 
international order and its own responsibilities as a member of it.  Indeed, this 
constituted one of the three basic criteria that Secretary of State Dean Acheson advanced 
for any nation – communist or otherwise – to receive recognition: it must have control of 
the territory over which it claims sovereignty, it must enjoy the general acquiescence of 
its people, and it must demonstrate both ability and willingness to carry out its 
international obligations.2  Though the administration initially perceived the PRC as 
failing to meet any of these criteria, it considered the third by far the most important.  
Thus, long before the outbreak of war in Korea the United States, responding to 
Beijing’s uncooperative attitude, had set the general tone of the approach Washington 
would pursue throughout the next three decades. 
 
The Soviet Pattern in the Chinese Dust: American China Policy Prior to the Korean War, 
1948-1950 
Throughout 1948 and the early part of 1949, the Truman administration came to 
accept that, at best, the government of China would soon include representatives of both 
the Nationalist and Communist Chinese.  As 1949 progressed, however, the 
administration realized that Mao Zedong and the CCP would completely dominate the 
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new China and exclude representatives of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist 
Kuomintang Party (KMT).  This realization may have disheartened many Truman 
administration officials due to their previous experiences with communist regimes, but 
such feelings did not prevent the administration from giving the Chinese Communists 
the benefit of the doubt.  Armed with the example of the independence-minded Marshall 
Tito in Yugoslavia, the administration waited patiently to determine the extent to which 
the CCP wished to engage with the rest of the world in accordance with the ideals of the 
U.N. Charter and the norms of international diplomacy. 
Even as Chinese Communist forces began gaining ground in the civil war, 
Washington did not end its ties with the Republic of China.  U.S. support of the KMT 
during and immediately after World War II stemmed from wartime agreements that 
identified Chiang’s government as the legitimate representative of the Allied powers in 
East Asia.  Continued U.S. support through 1948 also accorded with the fact that the 
Republic of China remained the sole recognized government of the country, a fact 
unaltered by the existence of a civil conflict.  As Chiang’s rule deteriorated, however, 
the Truman administration realized the extent to which the KMT had lost popular 
support.  Mass Nationalist army defections compounded the economic and social 
problems facing Chiang and contributed to the overwhelming success of the communist 
military campaign in 1948-49.  Under such circumstances, the Truman administration 
chose to withdraw its support from the Nationalists; if the Chinese people and Chiang’s 
own armies would not support the regime, why should the United States?   
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This did not mean that the administration would automatically throw its support 
behind the communists, though Truman and Acheson did take steps to signify that they 
did not oppose the rise of a Chinese Communist government.  After all, constructing a 
post-war order conducive to peaceful relations required integrating into it even those 
nations and peoples once considered enemies, as the cases of Japan, Germany, and even 
the Soviet Union attest.  In early 1949 Acheson rejected a proposal by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to station limited naval forces on Taiwan, hoping to signal a friendly attitude 
toward the PRC through a hands-off approach to the fate of the island.3  When the 
Chinese Communists conquered the Nationalist capital of Nanjing in April 1949, 
Truman ordered Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart to remain there in case opportunities 
arose for constructive contact with the CCP.  That summer, the administration published 
the China White Paper, laying out the facts of its previous dealings with Chiang Kai-
shek, and suggesting that it would have nothing more to do with the Nationalist regime.  
The administration hesitated to make further gestures, however, in the absence of “deeds 
capable of convincing people of US that continued American support of Chinese 
objectives is in mutual interest of both countries.”4     
CCP leaders refused to accept such gestures at face value.  On January 8 the CCP 
politburo passed a resolution criticizing the administration’s continuing support of the 
Chinese Nationalists, and suggested that even if Washington chose to recognize the PRC 
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Far East: China, 372-373, hereafter cited as FRUS, 1949, VIII.  When the CCP later that month invited 
Stuart to Beijing, he similarly cautioned that accepting the invitation “would be second step on our part,” 
and might “break united front policy” regarding recognition.  Letter, Stuart to Acheson, 30 June 1949, ibid, 
766-767. 
44 
 
government this would merely allow the United States to “conduct subversive activities 
from within.”5  From this view sprang an intense propaganda campaign.  Mao 
characterized Acheson as an agent of Wall Street and Ambassador Stuart as “a loyal 
agent of U.S. cultural aggression” who only pretended to love China and “was able to 
deceive quite a number of Chinese.”  The United States supported Chiang during the 
civil war in order to turn China “into a U.S. colony,” which constituted “an important 
component of the U.S. imperialist policy of world-wide aggression since World War 
II.”6  That same week, Mao penned an editorial for the New China News Agency 
expressing his firm belief that the American imperialists “will never lay down their 
butcher knives” and would continuously “make trouble” in the world.7    
CCP actions matched this rhetoric.  In November 1948 the Chinese Communists 
surrounded and cut off water and electricity to the American Consulate in Mukden, 
keeping the staff incommunicado for months.8  Chinese officials in other cities barred 
not just American but also French and British officials from carrying out their diplomatic 
functions, thereby demonstrating that “they were not going to play the diplomatic game 
by the international rules practiced in the West if it did not suit them.”9  In July 1949, the 
Chinese arrested, imprisoned, and beat American Vice Consul William Olive, apparently 
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on trumped-up charges.  That summer, American businessmen in China, disillusioned 
with the “future under Communist rule,” began “packing up and leaving Shanghai rather 
than submit to humiliations and insecurities of present situation.”10  All of this suggested 
a dangerous Chinese antipathy to normal, constructive international discourse.   
Washington also perceived an apparent lack of concern among CCP officials for 
international law.  The Chinese Communists announced as early as February 1947 their 
intention to abrogate China’s existing “disgraceful” and “treasonous” international 
treaties that they believed infringed on Chinese sovereignty, a threat that Mao continued 
to make for the next several years.11  In part, this stemmed from the Marxist-Leninist 
view that while nations must uphold the provisions of treaties they enter into – which 
Chinese intellectuals characterized as “a fundamental principle of the whole body of 
international law – this did not apply to treaty provisions “concerning aggression and 
slavery.”  Such treaties, this argument went, emerged from a lack of “genuine sovereign 
equality between all parties concerned.”12  Beyond this ideological argument, however, 
the Chinese Communists did, in fact, develop sophisticated legal arguments regarding 
the illegality of treaties signed under KMT rule.  They pointed out, for instance, that the 
KMT bypassed China’s Political Consultative Conference, a body that “comprised all 
major political parties, groups, and prominent social figures” in China and without 
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whose blessing no treaty could be considered valid.13  They further argued that China 
enjoyed the right to reconsider or abrogate treaties on the basis of changed 
circumstances – that the conditions existing at the time the parties signed the treaty no 
longer prevailed, thus justifying alterations.   
The administration could understand this Chinese antagonism up to a certain 
point; officials clearly understood the nationalistic fervor sweeping Asia in the wake of 
over a century of Western imperialism.14  In the chaos of the immediate post-war years, 
Truman lamented the “pent-up fanatical nationalisms” that gave rise to “little Caesars” 
who “invoked national honor, national dignity, and every demagogic appeal, even if the 
quarrel might lead to their own destruction.”15  Indeed, much of the Chinese Communist 
attitude and behavior of late-1948 and early-1949 likely had as much to do with the long 
history of Western intervention in China as it did with any ideological misgivings about 
capitalist nations.  Yet from Washington’s perspective, the repudiation of China’s treaty 
commitments, however minor, suggested the possibility that Beijing might yet repudiate 
other, more important obligations in the future.16  Historian Nancy Tucker adequately 
sums up Washington’s view on this matter, writing that a state “could not simply pick 
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and choose which agreements it would honor if any equitable system of global relations 
were to survive.”17 
Beyond awareness of Chinese nationalistic sentiment, the administration also 
noted disturbing signs that Moscow’s influence extended to Beijing.  Believing that the 
Soviet Union had initiated an aggressive policy of expansion, the administration looked 
with concern upon any nation that demonstrated it might – or had – come under the 
influence of the Soviet Union, whether through the manipulation of nationalistic 
sentiment or through open acceptance of Moscow’s leadership.18  British Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin did not believe that that influence had yet extended to the CCP 
and insisted that recognition of the Chinese Communists would help keep them out of 
the Soviet orbit.  Excessive obduracy, he argued, would only confirm in Chinese eyes 
the validity of Soviet propaganda, and would “drive the Chinese into Russia’s hands.”19   
Acheson disagreed, emphasizing the mounting evidence of Sino-Soviet economic, 
diplomatic, and ideological ties, and the fact that the CCP had already begun following 
“the Kremlin line.”  Indeed, for an entire year prior to the establishment of the People’s 
Republic the CCP behaved in a manner consistent with previous American experiences 
with Soviet proxy governments: the appearance of Soviet “advisors” that signified an 
end to legitimate indigenous political control, the excessively poor treatment of 
American diplomatic officials and staff, the refusal to accept the legitimacy of treaties 
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that had been signed prior to World War II, even the active support of revolutionary 
movements in neighboring countries (as in the case of Greece and its communist 
neighbors).  All of these factors, prominent in Europe in 1945-46, re-emerged in China 
in 1948-49.  Acheson thus believed that no possibility currently existed for Chinese 
Titoism, and asserted that “To encourage the influences that, over time, might detach 
China from subservience to Moscow, by a cautious application of our attitude toward 
Tito would require first that the Chinese Communists follow Tito in stopping active 
abuse of us.”20  Truman reiterated this theme when he insisted on the State Department 
“judging their intentions by their actions.”21 
Yet CCP actions had already cast them as complicit in the effort to expand 
communism globally – by fair means or foul.  The pattern of Chinese Communist 
interference among other countries began as early as 1946 when the CCP sent cadres 
into French Indochina to obtain the support of Chinese living there.  For the next three 
years, the Chinese Communists and Viet-Minh established a variety of cultural and 
military ties related to the latter’s effort to overthrow French colonial rule.  The Chinese 
provided training, equipment, and a safe haven within China.22  In 1948, and again in 
1950, the Viet Minh founded organizations to mobilize overseas Chinese support in its 
war efforts.23  When Vietnamese communist leader Ho Chi Minh formed his own 
communist government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), in January 1950, 
the PRC was the first nation to recognize it.  Ho soon thereafter visited Beijing and 
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received Mao’s assurances of continued assistance.24  By that time, revolutions had also 
erupted in Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia.  Though the administration viewed Moscow 
rather than Beijing as inciting these revolutions, the CCP nonetheless seemed 
increasingly to encourage and support them.25 
Under such circumstances, recognizing the PRC might have an undesirable effect 
in terms of the millions of Chinese residing elsewhere in the region.  If China ultimately 
revealed itself as an active partner in the Soviet quest for world domination then Beijing 
might take advantage of the legitimacy that American recognition would confer as a tool 
to convert the overseas Chinese into a willing, able, and loyal army of subversives.  Far 
from theoretical, American officials based this view on a series of events and 
developments that suggested such a process had actually begun.  Indeed, even Beijing’s 
official pronouncements stressed “the task of winning over the Chinese residing abroad,” 
rhetoric that did “nothing to dispel mistrust in Southeast Asia.”26   
The communist world had no such reluctance to confer international legitimacy 
upon its newest member.  Offers of recognition from the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and 
several Eastern Bloc countries quickly followed the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China on October 1, 1949.  Reluctant to follow suit yet mindful of its 
interests in Hong Kong, the United Kingdom announced what American officials 
considered a curious policy of de facto relations without de facto recognition “for the 
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greater convenience of both governments and promotion of trade between the two 
countries.”27  Stung by this British failure to consult with the United States regarding 
relations with the new Chinese government, the Truman administration emphasized that 
non-Communist nations should avoid appeasement by first awaiting signs of PRC 
willingness to accept its international obligations.28  The administration placed high on 
the list of these obligations the proper treatment of foreign diplomats, an issue 
highlighted by the CCP’s refusal to release the American diplomatic staff in Mukden 
which by that point had lasted over ten months.29  Furthermore, Acheson wrote to Bevin, 
independent action by any one of the Western Powers would “be exploited to full by Chi 
Commies” and would “inevitably have adverse effect on resolution and cooperation of 
independent Asiatic countries.”30 
 Several American allies nonetheless pressed for closer relations with Beijing.  In 
early October, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sent a friendly note to the PRC 
and informed Truman and Acheson that “there was now no alternative to the 
Communists in China.”31  A week later, the Netherlands also sent a note that went far 
beyond what Washington “considered desirable under present circumstances” by 
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encouraging informal contacts with Chinese authorities at the local level and promoting 
mutual trade.32  Two days later, the Netherlands expanded their contacts with PRC 
officials, arguing that the British decision to establish contact had forced them to follow 
suit.  Canada also sent a note to Beijing requesting that the PRC allow Canadian officials 
in China to continue their normal duties, though the note avoided language suggesting 
official recognition.  Some members of the diplomatic community predicted that most 
European and Asian nations would recognize the PRC by mid-December, and reports 
revealed that house hunting on the part of several diplomatic missions had stimulated the 
Beijing real estate market.33 
 The slow but steady breakdown of the American non-recognition campaign 
reached a critical point in November when London informed Washington that it now 
favored recognition of the Chinese Communist government.  Formally abandoning the 
American rationale for non-recognition, the British now noted how “the disadvantages 
of nonrecognition were so great as to outweigh any possible advantages to be obtained 
from securing Chinese Communist assurance of respect for international obligations.”  
Though hoping for international consensus on this important issue, the British 
nonetheless implicitly threatened unilateral action, stating “it is accepted that every 
government has, in the final analysis, the right to take such action as it considers 
appropriate.”34  Having just returned from a visit to East Asia, New Jersey Senator H. 
Alexander Smith expressed that the British had adopted this line in order to protect both 
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Hong Kong and British trading privileges in China rather than out of some loftier goal in 
the international struggle against communism.35  Madame Chiang concurred, likening 
the decision to “Munich” and asserting that the British were “motivated by the search for 
the almighty dollar.”36 
 The new British policy contributed further to the deterioration of the American 
wait-and-see approach.  Portugal now expressed concern that it would be “extremely 
difficult for the Portuguese Government not to follow suit, particularly in view of the 
position of Macao.”37  On November 14 Canada approved the British view that “the 
advantages outweighed the disadvantages” and that “recognition should come sooner 
rather than later.”  In response, American officials pleaded their case for “all the friendly 
Western powers to take a common stand” in delaying recognition of the PRC, 
emphasizing “the desirability of at least obtaining some indication from the Chinese 
Communists that they were prepared to live up to normal standards of international 
conduct.”  To bolster its argument, the administration drew upon the recent PRC 
“barbarisms,” referring to the “general treatment of U.S. officials in China” which 
“should be of concern to all the friendly Western powers.”38  In addition, recognition 
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would contribute “little or nothing” to the hoped-for Sino-Soviet split, as the British 
suggested might occur.39   
 These efforts failed.  The administration could only watch with apprehension the 
steady deterioration of the united front strategy to what it perceived as the ultimate 
benefit of the communist movement.  Britain, Canada, India, and the Netherlands all 
began establishing general timetables for recognition, with the Indians arguing that 
China had met all three of the American preconditions for recognition.40  The staunchly 
anti-communist South Korean President Syngman Rhee threatened to break relations 
with the United Kingdom if the latter should follow through.  The CCP continued its 
military advance against the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s shattered armies on the 
mainland, sent a message to U.N. Secretary General Trygvie Lie noting that Chiang’s 
government “has lost all de jure and de facto grounds for representing the Chinese 
people,” and demanded that the U.N. deprive the ROC of its seat.41  Lie sympathized, 
commenting that “the work of the UN should not be made to suffer because of this 
‘political struggle.’”42  Indications emerged that Burma and Indonesia also desired swift 
recognition and that Thailand, the Philippines, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, 
and Italy, all noting the prevailing global trend, might now favor that policy as well.  
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Even the Vatican began to encourage France to recognize Beijing because the former 
lacked adequate resources to protect Catholic interests in China. 
 Discussions regarding recognition affected debates about the China seat in the 
United Nations.  Though in military disarray, the Nationalist regime remained intact on 
Taiwan, and the fledgling U.N. had not previously faced the problem of two competing 
governments claiming the same seat.43  Switzerland offered one of the earliest solutions 
to this dilemma by refusing to recognize Communist China until such time as a majority 
of nations had done so.  In January 1950, Britain advocated applying this approach to the 
U.N. representation issue, namely, when a majority of member nations recognized the 
PRC the U.N. should then grant that nation the China seat.44  The representative from 
India suggested that the International Court of Justice take up the question and hand 
down a binding decision based not on politics, but rather on the merits of the case.45  Not 
satisfied with any of these approaches, the representative of the Soviet Union demanded 
Beijing’s unconditional and immediate seating.46  For its part, the Truman administration 
remained opposed to seating the PRC but had committed to accepting the will of the 
majority of U.N. members even if they should choose to admit the Chinese Communists.   
 While attempting to hold the line against the diplomatic generosity of allied and 
neutral countries, the State Department also struggled against the bellicose proposals of 
                                                            
43 Precedents predating the U.N. did exist, especially regarding the governments-in-exile during World 
War II.  The U.N. only later attempted to determine exactly how or by what criteria a government could be 
considered legitimate. 
44 Telegram, Austin to Acheson, 9 January 1950, FRUS, 1950, II, 188-189. 
45 Telegram, Austin to Acheson, 11 January 1950, ibid, 192-193. 
46 Telegram, Acheson to Austin, 12 January 1950, ibid, 194-195; Acheson rejected these proposals on the 
basis of uncertainties surrounding the complex legal and procedural issues these proposals would raise 
rather than on any ideological or political grounds.  See Telegram, Acheson to Austin, 21 January 1950, 
ibid, 202-204.   
55 
 
American military officials.  In December 1949, almost three weeks after the final ROC 
withdrawal from the mainland, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) argued that “military aid 
to the anti-communist government in Taiwan would be in the security interest of the 
United States” and emphasized that Taiwan “is a part of the overall problem of resisting 
the spread of Communist domination in East Asia.”47  Although admitting that for the 
nations of Southeast Asia “the risk was one of infiltration and subversion rather than 
invasion by armed forces from China,” the JCS nonetheless believed that “Chinese 
communist expansion to the south might be deflected so long as they had Formosa to 
contend with or subdue.”  Again, Acheson vetoed such plans, pointing out the lines 
along which he believed the Sino-Soviet relationship would eventually fracture and 
emphasizing that “it would have to be for a very important strategic purpose that we 
would take an action which would substitute ourselves for the Soviets as the imperialist 
menace to China.”  Furthermore, he continued, “there does not appear to be 
demonstrated a claim that the loss of Formosa really breaches our defense.”48  The CCP 
had proven troublesome, but the major threats in the region simply did not seem to 
require depriving the PRC of control over Taiwan. 
 Certain members of Congress had other ideas about the island, however, and the 
administration could do nothing to curb the free expression of their opinions.  In 
November Senator Smith suggested that the United States had the authority as the 
occupying power of Japan to establish a protectorate over Taiwan, a former Japanese 
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colony.49  Subsequently, Senators William Knowland of California and Robert Taft of 
Ohio, as well as former President Herbert Hoover, all publicly urged the State 
Department to extend naval protection to the island.  Citing these proposals, and thus 
demonstrating their ignorance of the American governmental process, the Chinese 
Communists charged the United States with intention to occupy Formosa.   
In response, Truman “decided that he must speak at once, and speak in so crisp 
and brutally frank a manner as to end further propaganda and speculation.”50  On 
January 5, 1950, the White House released to the press a Presidential statement on the 
Formosan situation that laid out the process by which the island had reverted to Chinese 
control and asserted the U.S. lack of territorial or military ambitions there.  The 
administration would no longer provide military aid to the ROC, nor would it “pursue a 
course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.”51  Later that same 
day, “to make the policy clear to the most perverse intelligence,” Acheson held his own 
press conference that same day to provide detailed background information placing 
Truman’s statement in appropriate context.  Chiang’s forces lacked adequate will to 
resist the communists militarily, he said, and either had or could obtain from other 
nations whatever armaments their continued defensive needs might require.  Settlement 
of the situation did not require the formalities of a peace treaty with Japan.  American 
economic aid would continue – specifically, providing fertilizer for crops and oil for 
power plants – but aid would not extend to the military sphere.  In conclusion, Acheson 
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noted Truman’s statement that the United States “has no desire to obtain special rights or 
privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time.”  This concluding 
phrase, he expressed, merely recognized the fact that “in the unlikely and unhappy event 
that our forces might be attacked in the Far East, the United States must be completely 
free to take whatever action in whatever area is necessary for its own security.”52   
This had no effect on the Chinese Communists.  The following day, the same day 
the British officially recognized it, the PRC announced its intention to requisition the 
portions of the American, French, and Dutch consulates that China had previously 
allowed those governments, by treaty, to utilize for official purposes.53  The State 
Department urged the affected nations not to acquiesce in this illegal seizure of property, 
warning that capitulation to the Chinese demand “would invite similar and progressive 
actions by the Chinese Communists against our people and other official property.”54  
When PRC officials and police entered the American Consulate on January 14 – “a 
flagrant violation of our treaty rights and of the most elementary standards of 
international usage and conduct” – the State Department ordered the withdrawal of all of 
its personnel from Communist China and the closure of its four remaining consular posts 
in the country.55  Soon thereafter, the administration concluded that the PRC intended 
the requisition threat as a means to force foreign governments in general, and the United 
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States in particular, to recognize the Beijing government.56  If true, CCP officials could 
not have been more mistaken; as one observer noted, this “sudden turn of events had 
checked the growth of the movement in favour of recognition” within the American 
government.57     
 Beijing’s behavior quickly began undermining the support it enjoyed from other 
countries.  Granting recognition, many nations discovered, had “not made any difference 
whatever,” failing to ameliorate the CCP’s distrust of even the most accommodating of 
American allies.58  Some U.K. officials lamented that Beijing’s reply to Britain’s 
generous recognition policy appeared “the beginning of an attempt to make recognition 
‘conditional.’”  Such fears proved accurate, as Washington had feared.  One Chinese 
newspaper confidently asserted that the U.K. had recognized China merely out of 
economic necessity and that the Chinese people should not expect the British to deviate 
from the imperialist behavior that they had followed for centuries.  Such articles 
confirmed British concerns that PRC leaders remained locked in an antagonistic view of 
the West.  Burma, too, had recognized the PRC, but one Burmese newspaper 
characterized the Chinese response as “an unmerited piece of studied coldshouldering.”59  
In a move that contributed to these international concerns, the PRC moved even closer to 
the Soviet Union by signing a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance on 
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February 14.  Such trends may also have compelled India to consider increasing its 
military assistance to Tibet.60 
 As the administration labored to reach an understanding with Beijing, it also 
grew concerned that within a few years the Soviet Union would have the capability and 
willingness to launch a military campaign against Western Europe and, perhaps, other 
parts of the world as well.  This view emerged primarily from the Soviet development of 
an atomic bomb in late-1949 that signaled the end to the American nuclear monopoly.  
With the fear of Soviet nuclear retaliation, according to this argument, the USSR could 
take full advantage of its conventional superiority on the Eurasian landmass against 
America’s weakened allies.  As a result, in January 1950 Truman ordered a 
“reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives 
on our strategic plans.”61  The ensuing discussions produced in April the first draft of 
NSC 68, a document that expanded upon the ideas set forth in George Kennan’s “Long 
Telegram” and laid out the general framework for how the United States should wage 
the Cold War.  Though the motivation for this review of American policy remained the 
fear of Soviet behavior, the administration later utilized these same analyses to interpret 
the actions and intentions of the PRC and to develop strategies for dealing with them. 
NSC 68 begins by lamenting the breakdown of the international order since 1915, 
a process that had undermined the system of “sovereign and independent states” in 
which “no state was able to achieve hegemony.”  In the post-war era, however, the 
                                                            
60 Telegram, Acheson to Embassy in India, 1 March 1950, FRUS, 1950, VI, 314. 
61 Letter, Truman to Acheson, 31 January 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. I: 
National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, 141-142, hereafter cited as FRUS, 1950, I. 
60 
 
Soviet Union sought “to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.”  The 
Kremlin’s success in this effort would imperil both the United States and “civilization 
itself,” and “the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction” 
would present to every nation the “possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter 
the phase of total war.”62  From this apocalyptic analysis, the paper called for a massive 
military build-up that would enable the United States and its allies to deter or resist the 
Soviet offensive if and when it finally occurred.  Such is the standard interpretation of 
NSC 68.63 
More fundamentally, however, NSC 68 offers a penetrating look into the 
American self-image, the kind of international order the United States sought to create, 
and the characteristics of the international communist movement that officials believed 
would undermine such an effort.  As suggested in the document’s opening paragraph, the 
basic American goal was to create an international order in which no state could gain 
hegemony or domination over another.  The Soviet system constituted a direct threat to 
this goal by seeking “the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of 
government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their 
replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the 
Kremlin.”  In contrast, a “free” society relies on the “strength and appeal of its idea, and 
it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.”  
Indeed, the free society’s protection of the rights of its individual citizens reflects the 
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international community’s broader protection of the rights of individual nations.  NSC 
68 explicitly identifies the protection of these rights as an inherent obligation of the 
international community.  This doctrine of “freedom with responsibility” requires of the 
nations of the world   
only that measure of self discipline and self restraint which makes the 
rights of each individual compatible with the rights of every other 
individual.  The freedom of the individual has as its counterpart, therefore, 
the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his freedom in 
ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive 
responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a 
just society.64 
 To win the Cold War, the document continued, the United States must ultimately 
“foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system.”  But such a change 
would not occur as a result of American demands that Moscow alter its domestic 
policies.  Rather, the United States “should limit our requirement of the Soviet Union to 
its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of 
others.”65   To achieve this result required “developing the moral and material strength of 
the free world” so that “the Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its 
assumptions and that the pre-conditions for workable agreements can be created.”66  
Indeed, NSC 68 explicitly characterizes containment – the consistent and firm 
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application of counterforce – as “a policy of calculated and gradual coercion” for the 
purpose of convincing the Kremlin to “conform to generally accepted international 
standards.”67  Because of the perceived duplicity of communist rulers, however, “the 
absence of good faith on the part of the USSR must be assumed until there is concrete 
evidence that there has been a decisive change in Soviet policies.”68  This did not 
constitute a dramatic departure from existing official thought, but rather a continuation 
and refinement of ideas that had percolated over the previous five years.   
Even before Truman approved NSC 68 as official U.S. policy, both the United 
States and the United Kingdom began to set in place military and economic assistance 
programs and mutual security pacts in Asia in an effort to counter the presumed 
expansionistic tendencies of the Soviet Union and its proxies.  In April, upon his return 
from visiting fourteen Asian nations, American Ambassador Philip Jessup confirmed 
fears of aggressive communist expansionism by reporting that “a situation of actual war” 
existed between the government forces and radicals in Korea, Indochina, Malaya, and 
Burma.69  The previous month, India, at the urging of the British government and with 
American expressions of support, began to provide military materiel and training to 
Tibet in an effort to bolster that country’s defensive capabilities.  Simultaneously, 
American military officials in Asia once more advocated that the administration reverse 
its policy toward the Nationalist Chinese.  Noting that the PRC had amassed the bulk of 
their forces in preparation for the “liberation” of Taiwan, they argued that providing 
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more military assistance to the remnants of the KMT would keep the Chinese 
Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied, prevent the PRC from exerting 
“full pressure” along its periphery, and grant the United States and its allies “time for 
strengthening the defences of Southeast Asia.”70 
 By this time, events along the China coast had moved inexorably toward a PRC 
conquest of Taiwan and the destruction of the last vestiges of the Kuomintang.  In mid-
April, PLA forces invaded Hainan Island, compelling the Nationalist Chinese defenders 
to evacuate.  In response to a threatened PRC attack on the Chusan Islands, Chiang 
withdrew from there as well.  With Nationalist morale at an all time low, American 
officials made preparations to remove unnecessary personnel from Taiwan, and on May 
19, anticipating a PRC aerial bombardment or other assault, the State Department sent 
notices to all Americans on the island urging them to leave.   
In contrast, military officials continued to urge the administration not to stand 
idle.  In May, intelligence reports warned that Korean elements of the Chinese 
Communist army had moved to positions along the 38th Parallel, thus linking the PRC to 
the rising tensions on the peninsula.  Less than two weeks before the outbreak of 
hostilities in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers in Japan and Commander in Chief of American forces in the Far East, warned of 
the dire consequences for American security should the United States complacently 
allow Taiwan “to fall into the hands of a potential hostile power or of a regime which 
would grant military utilization of Formosa to a power potentially hostile to the United 
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States.”  Preventing a Chinese Communist takeover of Taiwan would maintain the 
Pacific island chain, “reduce the ability of the USSR to exploit the natural resources of 
East and Southeast Asia,” retain in friendly hands the island’s “concentration of 
operational air and naval bases,” and deny the communists the use of Taiwan “as a 
springboard for military aggression directed against areas to the south.”71   
 John Foster Dulles, who Acheson had appointed special consultant for purposes 
of the Japanese peace treaty, offered similarly dire warnings.  The formation of NATO, 
he argued, had sent a powerful message to communist and non-communist nations alike 
that the United States would defend the nations of Europe against communist aggression.   
However, no such guarantee existed outside of Europe and the Western Hemisphere.  “If 
our conduct indicates a continuing disposition to fall back and allow doubtful areas to 
fall under Soviet Communist control,” Dulles argued, “then we can expect an 
accelerated deterioration of our influence in the Mediterranean, Near East, Asia and the 
Pacific.”  Under such conditions, the situation in Japan and the Philippines “may become 
untenable,” and the “vast natural resources” of Indonesia and the Middle East “will be in 
jeopardy.”  The United States could only prevent such disasters “if at some doubtful 
point we quickly take a dramatic and strong stand that shows our confidence and 
resolution.”  Taiwan offered a solution: 
It is not subject to the immediate influence of Soviet land power.  It is 
close to our naval and air power.  It is occupied by the remnants of the 
non-Communists who have traditionally been our friends and allies.  Its 
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status internationally is undetermined by any international act and we have 
at least some moral responsibility for the native inhabitants.  It is gravely 
menaced by a joint Chinese-Russian expedition in formation.  The eyes of 
the world are focused upon it.72 
As part of his recommendations, Dulles advocated using American air and naval power 
to “neutralize” Taiwan, “not permitting it either to be taken by Communists or to be used 
as a base of military operations against the mainland.”  Committing American forces for 
this policy, and the resulting possibility of military losses or even war, Dulles considered 
secondary to the more important outcome.  He concluded, “sometimes such a risk has to 
be taken in order to preserve peace in the world and to keep the national prestige 
required if we are to play our indispensable part in sustaining a free world.”  Acheson 
continued to reject such proposals. 
 
The Korean War and the Creation of the American Hard-Line Against China, 1950-1953 
 On June 25, 1950, the military forces of the communist Democratic Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) moved south across the 38th parallel, launching an unprovoked war 
against the U.S.-backed government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in violation of the 
long-standing U.N. effort to reunify the peninsula peacefully.  Administration officials 
quickly concluded that the Soviet Union lay behind the North Korean attack and, with 
the lessons of the 1930s forefront in their minds, decided to counter this act of 
aggression even if this required unilateral action.  Many allied and neutral countries 
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endorsed strong counteraction, however.  Nations around the world, from the U.K. and 
India to Brazil, supported the U.S. decision to avoid “another Munich,” and a U.N. 
resolution condemning Pyongyang’s aggression easily passed.73  For Truman and 
Acheson, the passage of this resolution conferred upon every U.N. member nation the 
obligation to support efforts to defend the ROK.  Thus armed both morally and legally, 
the Truman administration readied the United States for a war it had feared might 
happen, but for which it had not prepared.   
In corroborating earlier predictions of the communists’ aggressive expansionistic 
intentions, the Korean War led many American officials to alter their view of the broader 
ideological conflict.  As Truman noted in his speech to Congress on June 27, “The attack 
upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use 
of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and 
war.”74  Indeed, many officials concluded that the “Deliberate and carefully planned 
attack of Communist force” in Korea suggested that “Communists throughout Asia 
might be preparing commit series of aggressive acts.”75  Moscow, some officials 
speculated, might have set in motion a coordinated “continental policy” of using Asian 
nationalistic and anti-Western sentiment to achieve its own imperial ambitions – a 
situation facilitated by the fact that the “rank and file of Viet Minh, Chinese-Malayan 
guerillas, North Koreans and Chinese do not appreciate that Moscow directs their 
nationalist movement.”  The Vietnamese also perceived events in Korea as “gravely 
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disquieting” and feared that “if Soviet-inspired forces are attacking without regard to UN 
and US in order ‘unify’ Korea, then Soviets and Chinese may do same in aid of Viet 
Minh.”76  American Soviet specialist George Kennan shared this view, expressing that 
Taiwan “would be the next likely spot for a Communist move.”77 
 Uncertainty regarding the broader communist strategy in the region and in the 
world compelled the Truman administration to take precautionary measures to prevent 
hostilities from spiraling into a broader conflict and to insure that further communist 
moves would not jeopardize the U.N. effort to repel the North Korean invasion.  On June 
25, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley supported MacArthur’s 
June 14 argument that the United States, as a strategic imperative, must prevent the 
island from falling into hostile hands.  At that same meeting, Acheson also came out in 
favor of the plan, and presented Dulles’ neutralization concept as an acceptable 
solution.78  The following day, Truman accepted these proposals.  In his speech to 
Congress announcing this policy, the president emphasized that “the occupation of 
Formosa by Communist forces” would threaten the U.N. coalition in the performance of 
“their lawful and necessary functions in that area.”  The administration’s sense of 
obligation to the U.N. required not merely preserving the territorial integrity of South 
Korea against external attack, but also preventing the hostilities from spreading into a 
broader conflict.  For these reasons, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to “prevent any 
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attack on Formosa,” and called upon “the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all 
air and sea operations against the mainland.”79   
 The decision to neutralize the Taiwan Strait thus can only be understood when 
placed in the broader context of perceived communist aggressions and violations during 
the preceding two years.  As already mentioned, Americans feared a direct linkage 
between Moscow and the wave of communist revolutions that swept through Southeast 
Asia in 1948, and had already accumulated evidence of Chinese Communist support of 
both North Korea and the Viet Minh.  Indeed, the administration coupled the 
neutralization policy with a dramatic increase in aid to Indochina and the Philippines, a 
fact that some historians often overlook in their portrayal of neutralization as a rushed, 
ill-considered, and unfortunate policy.80  As historian William Stueck notes, although 
neutralization did constitute a reversal of the hands-off policy toward Taiwan, it was 
nonetheless “consistent in the new circumstances with Truman administration statements 
of the previous January, and predictable in the context of an increasingly alarmist 
climate in Washington.”81  Even if one argues that the administration maintained a faulty 
perception of PRC motives, given the circumstances and the available evidence the 
administration could hardly have considered alternative policies prudent.   
In this regard, Acheson perceived a direct connection between the current 
situation and the “tragic history of the 1930s.”  In a July 10 letter to Bevin, the Secretary 
of State expressed that “we have no intention of retreating from the position taken by the 
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Pres in his statement of June 27,”  and asserted that “any sign of retreat from these 
positions would have disastrous consequences that might easily place in jeopardy the 
entire venture to resist aggression.”  While the administration felt it could not simply 
rely on communist good intentions, its rigid posture did not preclude accommodation.  
Once conditions in the region had stabilized – a situation characterized primarily by the 
“absence of coercion” – the United States would remove its forces from the Taiwan 
Strait and “the UN could set about the matter of seating in a normal fashion, perhaps 
seating no Chi representative pending full consideration of the unprecedented problem of 
competing claimant Govts.”82  Indeed, Truman noted in August that with the conclusion 
of hostilities on the peninsula the presence of the Seventh Fleet would no longer be 
required.83  The unspoken qualification of that statement, however, remained the 
expectation that an end to the hostilities in Korea would signify an end to the broader 
problem of communist aggression.   
The decision to neutralize the Taiwan Straits in no way indicated that the 
administration’s view of the ROC had improved.  Fed up with the corruption within the 
KMT, Truman refused to support Chiang’s requests for financial assistance, noting that 
all the money the United States had previously given Chiang “is now invested in United 
States real estate.”  Acheson concurred, arguing that despite both neutralization and 
continued American recognition of Chiang’s government, the United States should not 
“make any commitment” to the Chinese Nationalists “as to how long this relationship 
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will extend into the future.”84  Rather, the administration identified either a U.N. 
trusteeship or settlement through the Japanese Peace Treaty as “the only two methods 
that were lawful and valid.”85   
This constituted a dramatic reversal of the administration’s previous apathy 
toward the fate of the island.  Only a month before, Truman and Acheson seemed 
content to allow the island to fall to the invading Chinese Communist armies, but now 
asserted the expectation of a peaceful resolution.  The administration’s insistence on a 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue most likely constituted an attempt to give legal 
weight to a decision made for more practical military reasons.  Many U.S. allies 
supported the U.N. resolution condemning the North Korean invasion and willingly 
provided supplies and men to defeat it.  But they did not wholeheartedly support 
neutralization, considering it an unnecessary provocation that could only exacerbate 
Sino-American tensions.  As such, for the sake of allied unity, the administration felt it 
had to provide some legal justification for its decision.  This position was not entirely 
hypocritical, however, for many administration officials had long sought to include the 
desires of the indigenous Taiwanese when determining the island’s status.  When Chiang 
Kai-shek withdrew to Taiwan, his repressive rule over the local population and the 
strength of his military apparatus limited the administration’s ability to take steps toward 
Taiwanese self-determination, as did the impending invasion of Mao’s armies.  With 
Chiang now dependent on American protection and support, however, new opportunities 
arose to grant the Taiwanese a greater voice in their government.  Although this 
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remained a genuine concern for several administration officials, particularly John Foster 
Dulles, the onrush of events and Chiang’s opposition to such schemes made achievement 
of this goal impossible.   
The American defense of Taiwan also had broader implications in that it 
constituted a demonstrable test case of American credibility.  Most of the non-
communist nations of East Asia feared China in the same manner as the nations of 
Western Europe feared the Soviet Union.  As such, these nations welcomed signs of 
American resolve in its dealings with the Chinese Communists.  In reference to the 
announcement of the neutralization policy, Kennan expressed that a “Communist 
conquest of Formosa, either by political or military means or both, coming in the wake 
of the President’s statement, would be gravely damaging to our political position not 
only in Asia but possibly throughout the world.”  He believed such an event would 
demonstrate American inability or unwillingness to counter communist moves, and 
“would be comparable in its effect to a complete military defeat in Korea.”86  This 
proved to be a particularly sensitive point given the parallel interests of Chiang Kai-shek 
and Syngman Rhee, both of whom presided over non-communist portions of divided 
nations and faced the direct threat of Chinese Communist military attack.   Indeed, Rhee, 
mirroring the JCS position of the previous December, expressed hope that the United 
States would take steps to prevent a communist takeover of Taiwan since he wanted “to 
see the Chinese Communists kept occupied for a while.”87 
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Uncertainties regarding communist intentions also upset plans to seat the PRC in 
the United Nations.  The U.N. Secretariat had hoped to accomplish this as early as July 3, 
but expressed that the outbreak of hostilities had “completely upset all UN plans” and 
made seating the PRC representatives “out of the question.”88  This reluctance emerged 
from the belief that the Soviet Union could bring about a North Korean withdrawal, but 
would only do so if the U.N. granted membership to the Chinese Communists; the 
international community generally frowned upon such coerced arrangements.  
Attempting to carve out a middle course, India continued to advocate seating the 
Chinese Communists.  Although agreeing that “anything we do should not appear as 
appeasement,” India hoped that the opportunity for discussion in the U.N. “could 
convince Russians and Communist Chinese that it was a mistake to resort to armed 
force.”89  Truman vehemently disagreed, characterizing such a proposal as “sheer 
unadulterated blackmail” which “has no support in the Charter or in reason or 
conscience.”90   
Evidence of PRC complicity in the North Korean attack mounted during the 
initial weeks of the war.  Reporting on front line conditions on July 9, General 
MacArthur expressed that the North Korean offensive “more and more assumes the 
aspect of a combination of Soviet leadership and technical guidance with Chinese 
Communist ground elements” and “can no longer be considered as an indigenous North 
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Korean mil effort.”91  Equally disturbing, intelligence confirmed that the PRC had 
previously released tens of thousands of ethnic Koreans from their service in China’s 
armies, thus contributing a “vast pool” of manpower to the North Korean military 
offensive.92  The movement of large Chinese forces to Manchuria, training of Vietminh 
soldiers at camps in southern China, and the appearance of small numbers of Chinese 
soldiers in Korea painted a disturbing picture of China’s overall intentions.   
Armed with such evidence, the State Department renewed its efforts to convince 
both American allies and neutral nations of the wisdom of pursuing a tough stance 
toward China.  When India criticized the neutralization policy, Acheson argued that the 
United States “could not afford permit Communist planes and ships to swarm over 
Formosa and use the island for base for attack on US in Japan and elsewhere.”93  
Preventing strategically valuable goods from reaching China, especially through Hong 
Kong, placed U.S. policy at odds with British economic interests in the region.  The 
State Department retorted, “it seemed the height of foolishness to permit any oil supplies 
to move into Mainland China during this period of uncertainty.”  Furthermore, American 
public approval of the U.K. would suffer “if Chinese communist troops appeared in 
battle against American troops in Korea and it could be said that they rode into battle on 
oil supplied by a British company.”94   
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At this time, in a detailed letter to Bevin, Acheson laid out the “basic attitudes” 
that underlay the U.S. refusal to recognize the PRC.  Among these reasons he included 
the apparent lack of desire within the PRC leadership for normalized relations and its 
singling out of American citizens and interests for “specially hostile treatment.”  The 
PRC showed no interest in accepting and carrying out the obligations expected of a 
member of the international community, and in fact endangered international order 
through its support and encouragement of communist insurgents in Indochina, the 
Philippines, Malaya, and Burma.  Acheson also cited the CCP’s still incomplete control 
over the mainland and lack of popular Chinese support.  In addition, the PRC apparently 
accepted Soviet control of its affairs, which threatened Beijing’s political independence 
and could only lead to China’s “de facto dismemberment.”  Acheson further noted 
Beijing’s open defiance of the United Nations in Korea and its mobilization of Asian 
political support “on behalf of the aggressors.”  He concluded, “There can be little doubt 
but that Communism, with Chi as one spearhead, has now embarked upon an assault 
against Asia with immediate objectives in Korea, Indo-China, Burma, the Philippines 
and Malaya and with medium-range objectives in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Siam, India 
and Japan.”95   
For some American officials, the non-appeasement mentality coupled with their 
adherence to the values of the U.N. produced an extreme response toward the communist 
aggression in Korea, particularly regarding the question of whether U.N. forces should 
attempt to unify the peninsula by force.  On September 15, General MacArthur initiated 
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an amphibious landing at Inchon, throwing the North Korean military into disarray and 
initiating an offensive drive that rapidly approached the 38th parallel.  As the moment for 
making a decision regarding crossing that line approached, Truman and Acheson faced a 
dilemma.  Preventing all military actions north of the parallel would create a safe haven 
for the North Korean forces, granting them the initiative and allowing them free rein to 
reinforce their military in preparation for a future assault.  This would send the wrong 
message to the communists – that they could engage in aggression without gain, but also 
without loss.  This policy would teach them nothing and encourage no change in their 
pattern of behavior.  Furthermore, Washington believed it had a responsibility to uphold 
the U.N. resolution calling for the reunification of the peninsula under a single 
government.  The original intention was for this reunification to proceed from peaceful 
negotiations, but, so the argument went, the North Korean attack now legitimized a more 
militant approach.  Thus, despite acknowledging the possibility that such a step might 
lead to a global war, Assistant Secretary of State John Allison expressed the increasingly 
common view that “When all legal and moral right is on our side why should we 
hesitate?”96 
Despite the powerful arguments that like-minded officials offered throughout 
August and September, the administration ultimately adopted a policy of caution 
designed to gauge the situation as it developed and to minimize any actions that might 
provoke Chinese Communist or Soviet intervention.  In August, Truman disavowed 
Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews’ advocacy of preventive war “to compel 
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cooperation for peace.”97  That same month, the administration chastised General 
MacArthur for his unauthorized visit to Taiwan and his subsequent decision to transfer 
three squadrons of jet fighters to the island.98  Acheson later forced the general to retract 
his message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars that contained an inflammatory and 
distorted presentation of official American views.99  When PRC Foreign Minister Zhou 
En-lai demanded that the U.N. Security Council “take immediate measures to bring 
about the complete withdrawal of all United States armed invading forces” from Taiwan, 
the State Department responded by “welcoming United Nations consideration of the 
Formosa problem,” a move that “would contribute to a peaceful rather than a forcible 
solution.”100  The administration also resisted making an early decision regarding 
whether to cross the 38th Parallel because the most appropriate course of action “must be 
determined in light of the action or inaction of the Soviet Union and the Chinese 
Communists.”101  Truman publicly reiterated the administration’s pledge to avoid both 
appeasement and preventive war.102  The initiative remained with the communists, and 
the United States would respond appropriately.   
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In September, with North Korean armies in the South decisively defeated, the 
administration now shifted attention to the second goal of the U.N. resolution of June 27: 
to “restore international peace and security in the area.”  The administration concluded 
that the communist powers would not intervene militarily to save the North Korean 
regime, though officials clearly did not attribute this to U.S. and U.N. efforts to reassure 
communist leaders.  Rather, they accepted that the U.N. had demonstrated sufficient 
determination and military power to convince communist leaders that they could not 
achieve their goals by means of overt aggression.  One official noted that the “moment 
for armed intervention was logically when UN forces were desperately defending small 
area Taegu-Pusan, when influx overwhelming numbers Chinese ground forces would 
have proved decisive factor.”103  John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff similarly 
concluded that the PRC had “declined to snatch the chestnut from the fire” and that the 
Soviets would remain uncommitted.104  Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted 
that the PRC had “made no preparations for civilian precautions in their cities,” while 
American Consul General in Hong Kong James Wilkinson reported that the Chinese 
Communists “do not intend invade Taiwan this year” and that “they may limit further 
aid to North Korea to token support.”105  Undersecretary of State James Webb similarly 
dismissed Chinese threats of intervention as diplomatic bluffs designed to dissuade India 
“and perhaps indirectly other members from support of firm UN action at this critical 
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stage.”106  Secure in the belief that Beijing would forego militant intervention and that 
World War III would not begin over the issue of Korean unification, Truman approved a 
plan to use primarily South Korean forces to establish north of the parallel a “strong 
defensive line against a renewal of the attack” that would allow a “move toward the UN 
goal of a united, free, and independent Korea.”107   
Simultaneously, the administration continued its efforts to reassure Chinese 
officials regarding American intentions.108  The lack of diplomatic relations and the 
absence of any official channel of communication between the two countries made such 
efforts problematic.  The administration had previously relied upon India or various 
European countries to act as intermediaries, but lamented that these foreign diplomats 
often conveyed a distorted message.109  Recognizing the importance of direct 
communication, administration officials now made numerous attempts to establish direct 
contact with PRC representatives.  In October, the American Ambassador in India, Loy 
Henderson, inquired of the Indians regarding the possibility of making contact with the 
PRC ambassador there, hoping that he “might be willing to talk with me or at least 
accept message from me if Peiping had sincere desire to prevent still further widening of 
breach.”110  The Chinese ambassador refused such overtures, however, citing the 
absence of formal relations and the U.S. “attitude” toward Formosa and Chiang Kai-
shek.111   
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The United Nations also made efforts to reassure the PRC.  On September 29 the 
Security Council invited Beijing to send a representative to attend the November 15 
meeting to discuss the charge that the United States had committed an armed invasion of 
Taiwan.  Anxious to demonstrate its good intentions and the international character of 
the U.S. position, the administration welcomed the invitation in accordance with its 
policy of accepting for discussion in the U.N. any grievance, no matter how false or 
outrageous American officials considered it to be.  In this way, Acheson hoped, “a 
hearing might reassure them with respect to our intentions in Korea.”112  Perhaps hearing 
this from the assembled U.N. member nations would “constitute solid guarantee” that a 
Korean peace “along UN lines” would not threaten the PRC.113  Furthermore, O. 
Edmund Clubb, the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, suggested that the 
presence in New York of the PRC U.N. delegation provided an opportunity to develop 
“an unofficial channel for bringing, where desirable, our views to the attention of the 
Chinese Communist authorities with minimum distortion.”114  The administration 
subsequently entered into discussions with its allies regarding the exact wording of a 
proposed resolution on Formosa that might help resolve that issue in a peaceful and 
mutually satisfactory way.   
The participants in these discussions all shared a common understanding and 
acceptance of Taiwan’s status.  In the aftermath of the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-
95, China gave up all rights to Formosa, allowing Japan to incorporate the island into its 
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empire.  At the Cairo Conference on November 27, 1943, Chiang met with President 
Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to discuss their general 
policies toward the Japanese Empire.  The resulting Cairo Declaration stated that “all the 
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese,” including Formosa, “shall be restored to 
the Republic of China.”115  In 1945, Japanese forces on Formosa surrendered to the 
Nationalist military, giving effective control over the island to the ROC.  When the 
Chinese Communists took control of the mainland, the British argued that the spirit, if 
not the letter, of the Cairo Declaration demanded an acknowledgment that Taiwan 
belonged to the new People’s Republic.   
The Truman administration did not disagree with the basic premise that Formosa 
rightfully belonged to the PRC.  Acheson refused to make long-term commitments 
regarding ROC recognition or Nationalist membership in the U.N. precisely because he 
accepted that the PRC should eventually take control of the island, and even future 
Secretary of State Dulles, currently tasked with obtaining support for the Japanese peace 
treaty, agreed that China should acquire Formosa “in due course.”116  The key factors 
determining the American position on the resolution, however, remained the Chinese 
Communist refusal to act appropriately toward other countries and the administration’s 
refusal to predetermine the fate of Taiwan in the absence of clear indications that the 
PRC would not use the island in a manner that would endanger regional stability.   
                                                            
115 Cairo Declaration, 1 December 1943, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46_001l.html, accessed on 7 August 2012. 
116 Memorandum of Conversation between Acheson and Dulles, et al., 23 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, VI, 
534-535; Telegram, Acheson to the Embassy in China, 14 August 1950, FRUS, 1950, VI, 436. 
81 
 
Acheson responded positively toward the initial British draft resolution, which 
called for a U.N. committee to investigate the Taiwan situation and make 
recommendations.117  In subsequent negotiations, however, the American representatives 
concluded that “there was not agreement as to the final ends which it was hoped would 
be achieved.”  The Canadian and British delegations apparently assumed that the 
proposed commission could arrive at only one possible solution, namely, “the handing 
over of Formosa unconditionally to Communist China.”118  The American Chargé in 
Taipei, Karl Rankin, warned against stepping into this trap, stating that “any morning 
people in Formosa may wake up to learn that they have been turned over to some 
international authority, with reasonable certainty that in resulting confusion Chinese 
Communists will actually be ones to take over.”119  The JCS again warned against 
allowing Formosa to fall into enemy hands, and urged that the proposed commission 
include American representatives so as to avoid that outcome.120  Similarly, Dulles, 
though accepting the validity of the Cairo Declaration, emphasized that the commission 
must attempt to discern the wishes of the Formosan people and ensure that settling the 
Formosan issue would not jeopardize peace and stability in the Pacific.  Acheson 
generally concurred with these assessments.121   
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The Chinese invasion of Tibet in early October further undermined the 
international community’s support for China, and heightened American sensitivity to 
any proposal that would enhance Beijing’s strategic position.  Previously, India had 
vigorously defended China in international forums, assuring the U.S. and its allies of 
China’s peaceful intentions.  With this new military action, however, Indian 
representatives now grew dismayed over how the PRC had misled it.122  Acheson took 
full advantage of this opportunity to point out the fallacy of India’s neutralism, arguing 
that “Tibetan developments so soon after Chinese Commie duplicity in dealing with GOI 
re Korea and in assisting Ho in Indochina shld leave no doubt re absence moral 
principles Peiping regime and its cynicism in conducting internatl relations.”123  
Henderson characterized as “deplorable” the Chinese decision to invade while a Tibetan 
delegation was en route to Beijing to negotiate, an act that served neither “the interest of 
China or of world peace.”124  India’s Minister of External Affairs Girja Bajpai now 
expressed his personal view that “Peiping was mere puppet of Moscow and represented 
grave danger Asian peace.”125 
But these international denunciations paled in comparison to those leveled 
against the Chinese Communists after they initiated a limited intervention in Korea in 
October and November.  Viewing American actions as a lawful and valid extension of 
the will of the international community, MacArthur characterized the PRC involvement 
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as an act of “outrageous international lawlessness.”126  Yugoslav U.N. Ambassador Ales 
Bebler, the November president of the Security Council, condemned China as “infantile,” 
lacking in political judgment, and viewing things in black and white terms.127  Fearing a 
connection between the intervention and the occupation of Tibet, Davies worried that 
“the Chinese Communists may be on the rampage” and noted how Beijing “has 
reconciled itself to foregoing membership in the U.N., that it is not adverse to being 
regarded as an international outlaw.”128  That week, the British Cabinet met to 
“reconsider their attitude toward the Chinese Communist Government,” and among the 
American people even those “who had previously favored the admission of the Peiping 
regime to the UN in the cause of peace had become disillusioned and were now against 
the idea.”129   
PRC resistance to dialogue in conjunction with this series of aggressions – all of 
which American officials perceived as against the better interests of China – led many 
administration officials to conclude that the Soviet Union, whether through cooperation 
with or manipulation of Mao and the CCP, retained significant influence, if not effective 
control, over Beijing’s foreign policies.  Clubb believed that the “USSR has assuredly 
played on the Chinese Communist hopes and fears as a master-violinist on a fiddle.”130  
A National Intelligence Estimate on “Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea” 
asserted that the intervention would not have occurred “without Soviet sanction or 
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possibly direction,” while U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Warren Austin warned that 
“anything which appeared to be appeasement or yielding would simply stimulate the 
enemy behind the Red Chinese to press its puppets onward to ever-expanding 
aggression.”131 
 However, while concerned about Beijing’s motives and intentions and perhaps 
because it considered the Chinese as victims of Soviet manipulation, the administration 
continued to hope that China might have only limited objectives, namely “to halt the 
advance of U.N. forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being on Korea 
soil.”132  Rusk wondered about China’s “legitimate anxieties,” and even Truman and 
Acheson, though accepting evidence that the intervention “is not merely a local action,” 
acknowledged the importance of determining whether China had intervened “out of any 
real fear that U.N. forces have any designs against China” or that the U.N. may not 
adequately safeguard “China’s legitimate interests in frontier matters.”133  On November 
16, Truman publicly expressed his determination to “take every honorable step to 
prevent any extension of the hostilities in the Far East.”  “If the Chinese Communist 
authorities or people think otherwise,” he stated, “it can only be because they are being 
deceived by those whose advantage it is to prolong and extend hostilities in the Far East 
against the interests of all Far Eastern peoples.”134   
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On November 11, Zhou En-lai officially rejected the U.N. invitation to discuss 
the Taiwan situation on the grounds that it would deprive the Chinese representative of 
the right to engage in discussions regarding Korea.  The “so-called UN command,” Zhou 
argued, “was engendered illegally by the SC under manipulation of the US, during the 
absence of the two permanent members, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 
China,” and its report of the Korean situation “is therefore not only one-sided and 
malicious, but also unlawful.”  Rather, the Security Council should discuss together the 
issues of “armed aggression on Taiwan” and “armed intervention in Korea” on the part 
of the U.S. government.135   
When the PRC delegation arrived in New York on November 24, the Chinese 
representatives repeated Zhou’s hard line.  The head of the delegation, General Wu 
Hsiu-chuan, argued that “the civil war in Korea was created by the United States, and 
was designed solely to furnish a pretext” to tighten control over Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
and the Philippines.136  Wu’s public pronouncements mirrored the delegation’s relations 
with other U.N. diplomats.  Acheson expressed how the delegation “has been completely 
intransigent and non-conciliatory,” and that it had isolated itself from all other 
delegations save that of the Soviet Union.137  At a dinner meeting with ambassadors 
from a variety of countries, the Chinese representatives again rejected the rationale for 
U.N. involvement in Korea.  When other ambassadors noted that the presence of the 
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Seventh Fleet “was as much a protection for the mainland as it was for Formosa,” one 
Chinese delegate replied that “this was simply to repeat the lies of the American ruling 
clique.”138  Such encounters led the Swedish ambassador to conclude that “Wu was only 
a megaphone for Moscow” and that it was “futile to expect anything to come out of such 
talks.”139  Secretary General Lie similarly lamented that the “Chinese Communists do 
not intend to cooperate in any way” in achieving a cease-fire agreement.140     
Administration officials in part attributed this intransigence to the enormous 
success of the massive Chinese intervention that occurred in late-November.  The same 
day that the PRC delegation arrived in New York, General MacArthur initiated a major 
offensive campaign that he claimed, if successful, would “end the war, restore peace and 
unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and 
permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and 
international equality.”141  The result of that effort, as Acheson later described, “is that 
two offensives ran into each other.”142  MacArthur reported that the new Chinese 
military effort dwarfed the previous intervention efforts, and that “All hope of 
localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops 
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with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned.”143  Once more, the 
administration detected premeditation.  The size and scope of the campaign, Acheson 
reported to Bevin, suggested that it “must, for military reasons, have been in motion for 
several days,” which removed “any question that the Chi were merely reacting to the 
U.N. offensive.”144  
In the wake of the Chinese intervention, many American officials began 
questioning the desirability of any U.N. resolution regarding the fate of Formosa while 
fighting continued in Korea.  Certain members of the American U.N. delegation rejected 
the resolution because it would make the administration vulnerable to domestic political 
attacks and would highlight disagreements with allies that the communists might then 
exploit.  The delegation also agreed with the JCS view that placing restrictions on the 
use of Formosa as a base from which to attack the Chinese mainland would restrict 
military flexibility at a time when Beijing had aggressed and may continue to do so.  
Should the U.N. call for additional measures in the event of further Chinese aggressions, 
they argued, Taiwan could prove valuable as a base from which to take action.145  Citing 
such uncertainties regarding Chinese intentions, Acheson commented that “Formosa is 
too dangerous a thing for them to have to play with.”146 
The primary concern for both the United States and the international community 
now centered on whether the Chinese and North Korean armies would stop at the 38th 
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parallel or invade South Korea.  On December 5, thirteen Asian nations, in an effort to 
resolve the crisis, issued a joint appeal for the communist forces not to cross the parallel 
and, thus, open the way for a negotiated settlement.  Acheson viewed this favorably, 
noting that in light of this demonstration of solidarity the U.N. should treat Beijing’s 
crossing of the 38th parallel as a “new and flagrant demonstration of aggression and evil 
design of reprehensible Chi Commie leaders.”  This would constitute irrefutable 
evidence of PRC unwillingness to settle the dispute peacefully and would remove the 
“reasons for treading softly and maintaining mild and conciliatory tone in UN.”147  
Indeed, many U.N. member nations reached that conclusion; the Chinese delegation had 
consistently rejected all efforts on the part of the special U.N. cease fire group either to 
meet with Wu or to obtain permission to enter China.  Citing a lack of reasons for 
remaining in New York, the Chinese delegation announced its departure on December 
16. 
When North Korean and Chinese Communist forces subsequently crossed the 
38th parallel both Truman and Acheson called for a strong and united response.  They 
asserted that 
failure of the UN to recognize the present Chinese communist action in 
Korea as aggression and to name it as such will be the beginning of the 
end of the UN just as the end of the League of Nations started with their 
failure to take any action against Japan and Italy in similar circumstances.  
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We believe that this is of utmost importance to the UN and the free world 
and to the establishment of an orderly international society.148 
Other nations continued to resist this move, however, and insisted upon one last effort to 
secure a cease-fire.  On January 13, the United Kingdom, Canada, and India submitted a 
new proposal comprised of five principles for a peaceful settlement in Korea: a cease-
fire, a political meeting for restoring peace, a withdrawal by stages of all foreign forces, 
arrangements for an immediate administration of all Korea, and a post-armistice 
conference involving the United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union, and Chinese 
Communists to discuss outstanding Far Eastern problems, including Formosa and 
Chinese representation in the U.N.  After much consideration, the administration chose 
to support the resolution “in the fervent hope and belief that the Chinese would reject it 
(as they did) and that our allies would then return (as they did) to comparative sanity.”  
Nearly two decades later, Acheson wrote that his recommendation to support the 
resolution “may well have been, even without hindsight, the wrong alternative.”149  He 
undoubtedly agreed with Warren Austin, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., that in Beijing 
“our forbearance seems to have strengthened the contempt in which this organization is 
apparently held.”150  
Four days after the U.N. approved the cease-fire proposal by a vote of 50-7, Zhou 
Enlai rejected it.  In his letter of January 17, Zhou argued that “the principle of a cease-
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fire first and negotiations afterwards would only help the United States to maintain and 
extend its aggression, and could never lead to genuine peace.”  Instead, he proposed that 
negotiations on Far Eastern problems, including the matter of Taiwan, precede a cease-
fire, that prior to the negotiations the U.N. seat the PRC, and that the negotiations be 
held in China.151  Acheson considered this response “still further evidence of their 
contemptuous disregard of a world-wide demand for peace.”  As such, “There can no 
longer be any doubt that the United Nations has explored every possibility of finding a 
peaceful settlement of the Korean question.  Now, we must face squarely and soberly the 
fact that the Chinese Communists have no intention of ceasing their defiance of the 
United Nations.”152  Zhou’s rejection surprised many American allies who genuinely 
believed that the Chinese would see the wisdom and moderation of the proposal.  
According to the Canadians, the cease-fire committee “had not only leaned over 
backwards but had practically fallen over backwards in offering cease-fire terms.”153  
Indian Ambassador Panikkar had been certain the Chinese would accept the proposal, 
but now concluded that the Chinese, drunk with success, were out of control.154  Even 
the British Foreign Office seemed to have abandoned all hope of China’s good 
intentions.155 
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The subsequent initiatives the administration took in the U.N. constitute one of 
the rare moments in which domestic politics clearly and directly influenced foreign 
policy.  Leading the Free World at this time required the administration to undertake a 
delicate balancing act.  Certain segments of domestic opinion called for more aggressive 
action in Asia while resisting efforts to bolster European defenses.  On the other end of 
the spectrum, the administration faced resistance and wavering from some of its 
staunchest allies over the perception that American policies had exacerbated the situation 
and might yet make things worse.  To maintain the integrity and value of the 
international order, the administration pushed these reluctant allies to adopt more 
assertive policies than they preferred.  But in its determination to maintain international 
solidarity against the communist menace, the administration had gone as far as the 
domestic political context allowed.   
As a result, although Truman and Acheson had supported the latest effort to 
secure a cease-fire, they refused to acquiesce in a new British plea that the 
administration not accompany a finding of aggression against the PRC with additional 
punitive measures.156  Citing the discussions already held with 45 delegations, Acheson 
added that “in order to do everything possible to keep everyone together and in going 
along on the five principles, we brought ourselves to the verge of destruction 
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domestically.”157  The administration knew of pending Congressional resolutions from 
both the House and Senate urging the U.N. to take more assertive action, and the House 
and Senate Foreign Relations Committees had scheduled Acheson to testify the 
following week on why the administration had supported the cease-fire proposal in the 
first place.   
As a result, despite the absence of support from key allies, the administration 
insisted upon including within its resolution a request for the U.N.’s Collective Measures 
Committee to “consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression,” 
and calling for a January 20 vote on the matter.158  Twenty-two nations from throughout 
the world immediately supported the “admirably restrained” resolution, and noted that 
failure to state the fact of China’s aggressive actions “would merely serve to encourage 
those who had constantly flouted the United Nations and to damage the confidence of 
millions in the United Nations and in the principles of collective security for which it 
stood.”159  Other nations received the resolution less optimistically, noting, for instance, 
that the resolution contemplated both punishment and conciliation simultaneously, and 
suggesting that China, once labeled as an aggressor, could not “be expected at the same 
time to co-operate with those who had condemned it.”160  Some minor amendments to 
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the American draft ended many of these critiques, and resulted in the final adoption of 
the resolution on February 1 by a vote of 44-7, with 9 abstentions.161 
Summing up the overall experience of U.S. relations with Mao’s regime, 
Acheson noted that from the moment the CCP gained control of China “they had every 
opportunity explore our position in talks with US officials.  Indeed, on numerous 
occasions when issues arose between us, our officials sought discussion with their 
authorities and were shunted aside.”  Since then, Beijing’s “consistent imperious 
aloofness” signified its disinclination for contact.  Rather than compromise and 
negotiation, the PRC sought to perpetuate tension and conflict.  The administration was 
perhaps not prepared to accept Clubb’s assertion that the “free world is now in the 
preliminary stage of World War III.”162  Kennan offered a more representative 
assessment, viewing the Chinese military campaign as “an affront of the greatest 
magnitude.”  This act “is something that we can not forget for years and the Chinese will 
have the worry of righting themselves with us not us with them….we owe China nothing 
but a lesson.”163   
 
To Tame the Dragon: Alternative Strategies, 1950-1953 
The Truman administration perceived the unsettled conditions within China in 
the PRC’s first year as offering opportunities to overthrow Mao’s regime in its infancy 
and to replace it with more moderate Chinese leaders – communist or non-communist – 
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who would conduct China’s foreign relations in a manner Washington considered more 
appropriate.  By late-1949, the CCP in the northern and eastern portions of the country 
had created an organizational presence that allowed them to eliminate resistance and to 
generate a considerable amount of mass support at the grass roots level.  However, the 
Chinese Communists lacked this organizational structure and presence in other areas that 
together comprised the vast bulk of the country: much of east and central China, the 
Northwest, and South China below the Yangtze River.  In these regions a diverse array 
of anti-communist groups continued to operate, including remnant KMT military forces, 
secret societies, ethnic minorities, autonomous local self-defense organizations, and 
bandit groups.  In addition to these, the CCP also had to contend with local elites who, 
protective of their political and social influence, resisted both the Party and its reform 
efforts.164  This likely prompted Acheson’s comment in June 1950 that “there was no 
evidence satisfactory to US” that the Chinese Communists controlled the mainland.165 
The CCP also faced enormous domestic economic crises hardly less formidable 
than those that had contributed to the KMT’s demise. 166  To combat these crises, Mao 
relied primarily on assistance from the Soviet Union and, in return, appeared to 
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acquiesce in intrusive Soviet control measures in the border areas of Xinjinag, Outer 
Mongolia, and Manchuria.167  Mao at one point even went so far as to suggest that he 
would allow the Soviets to incorporate Manchuria into its Union, a comment that 
infuriated the non-communist elements of Mao’s coalition.168  The Truman 
administration believed that this trend would continue, with the Soviets forcing Mao to 
accept a modern variant of the unequal treaties of the nineteenth century.  This, in turn, 
would place the Chairman in an untenable political position vis-à-vis the Chinese people 
whose “friendly feeling toward America,” the administration believed, “is deep, 
widespread, most Chinese realizing that America alone has consistently pursued 
unselfish policy toward China.”   
Though the administration perhaps exaggerated the extent to which the Chinese 
people would look to the United States as its savior, the inequitable economic relations 
between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1950s did, in fact, nurture the CCP’s 
“long-ingrained suspicions that the Soviets were trying to ride roughshod over them.”169  
The administration also heard rumors that anti-Kremlin sentiment had begun to grow 
among certain PRC generals, many of whom had defected from Nationalist ranks.  In the 
opening months of 1950, intelligence reports of internal political strife mounted, 
indicating “an impending split in the CCP over the issue of relations with the Soviets” 
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and “the desire of certain groups to obtain assistance from the United States in the 
intraparty struggle to come.”170 
Taking advantage of these conditions, the Truman administration sought to 
emphasize publicly the ways in which Mao’s relations with the Soviet Union did not 
serve the interests of China.  In part, such pronouncements helped to justify to U.S. allies 
the American approach to the PRC, but the administration also intended them as a way 
to exacerbate the domestic discontent among the Chinese people and within the CCP.  
On January 12, 1950, Acheson publicly asserted that 
Communism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that 
has ever been devised, and it is really the spearhead of Russian 
imperialism which would, if it could, take from these people what they 
have won, what we want them to keep and develop, which is their own 
national independence, their own individual independence, their own 
development of their own resources for their own good and not as mere 
tributary states to this great Soviet Union.171 
When Mao and Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and 
Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950, Acheson quickly highlighted many facets of 
the agreement he found troubling.  Soviet concessions in Manchuria could not cover the 
fact that Stalin had already deprived the region of some two billion dollars worth of 
industrial equipment.  The Soviet loan of $300 million over a five-year period seemed 
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ungenerous compared to the $400 million grant the U.S. Congress had approved for 
China in 1948.  Mao’s pledges to send food northward indicated that the Chairman was 
“heartlessly indifferent” to the famine conditions afflicting millions of Chinese.172  
Acheson also noted how the new “special rights” the agreement provided the Soviet 
Union infringed upon China’s sovereignty.  And, once more, Acheson returned to the 
notion of the Soviet Union leading the Chinese “into aggressive or subversive 
adventures beyond their borders.”  Coming well before the Korean War, this statement 
evidences the nature and extent of the administration’s fears regarding Moscow’s 
intentions.  While Acheson’s rhetoric clearly demonstrates concern that the Soviet Union 
sought the subjection of the Chinese state and population, the import of those efforts 
remained how Moscow’s influence would manifest in China’s external relations.  Such 
“adventures” that might result, Acheson concluded, would violate the “traditions and 
interests” of the American and Chinese peoples, the United Nations Charter, and “the 
peace which the Charter was designed to preserve.”173   
After fighting erupted in Korea, the administration continued to reassert both 
Mao’s submissiveness to Moscow and the genuine American interest in an independent 
China.  In his radio message on September 1, 1950 – prior to the Chinese intervention – 
Truman lamented Soviet manipulation “which has already started to dismember China” 
and expressed hope that the people of China would not allow the Soviet Union to 
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mislead them into war.174  That same day, Acheson argued that Beijing’s bitter hostility 
against the United States could “hardly be deliberate choice of Chi people as whole.”175  
Even after the intervention in November, Truman still expressed hope that “the Chinese 
people will not continue to be forced or deceived into serving the ends of Russian 
colonial policy in Asia.”176  The administration’s belief that rhetoric alone could catalyze 
the Chinese people or disaffected CCP factions to active resistance against the Maoists 
steadily deteriorated in late 1950 and early 1951 as the PRC began cracking down on 
dissent throughout the country.   
Fearing that the United States and United Nations could not muster sufficient 
military power to compel Beijing to abandon its uncooperative and uncompromising 
view of the West, the Truman administration began taking more active steps toward 
inspiring indigenous resistance to CCP control.  Although this had been a recurring idea 
since the “loss” of China in late-1949, not until October 1950 did American officials 
translate this general idea into a concerted plan of action.  That month, Clubb drafted a 
memorandum describing a plan to organize a “Free China Committee.”  The memo 
began by discussing the significant role that the support (or lack thereof) of the overseas 
Chinese communities, particularly in Southeast Asia, had played in overthrowing the 
Qing Dynasty, combating the warlords during the 1920s, and ushering in the Communist 
regime in 1949.  The “initial enthusiasm for a Chinese Communism,” however, had 
dissipated.  Considerable “disillusionment in overseas communities” had resulted from 
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the CCP’s “display of themselves in their true colors.”  From this, Clubb characterized 
as at least feasible a plan whereby the United States would nurture and guide such 
sentiments in a way that would result in the emergence of a legitimate and effective 
indigenous opposition movement on the mainland.  He especially made clear that the 
United States should exclude the Kuomintang from participation, lest the Nationalists 
attempt to co-opt the operation for their own purposes.177 
On December 12, Robert Strong of the Office of Chinese Affairs, because of “the 
possibility that consideration will be given to support and increasing the scope of 
guerilla activities on the mainland,” suggested a concerted intelligence-gathering effort 
to determine the guerilla and bandit groups’ “leaders, strength, armament, 
communications, location, methods of operation, means of supply, liaison between or 
among groups, relations with nationalists (if any) and any other pertinent data.”178  One 
week later, Rankin joined the chorus of officials calling for such a policy.  Though 
Rankin had a year earlier considered the support of resistance forces “premature,” he 
confidently asserted “the time is now.”   However, he continued, victory would occur 
only “if we exploit to the full every method which promises to help our cause,” 
including “the effective support of resistance movements inside the Iron Curtain, and 
particularly in Communist China.”179   
Although Clubb, Strong, and Rankin all made clear that their plans had little 
chance of success, the dire situation on the battlefield and PRC unwillingness to 
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negotiate an end to the hostilities compelled Acheson on December 27 to dispatch to the 
American embassies and consulates throughout East and Southeast Asia a call for “as 
full and concrete information as possible concerning groups on the mainland in armed 
opposition to the Chinese Communist regime.”  The letter lamented the lack of any 
coordinated program for reporting and evaluating such information, and requested 
specific categories of data that roughly mirrored those offered in Strong’s December 12 
memo.  Characteristically, Acheson suggested avoiding “sources known to have official 
relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Government.”180   
As the communist armies reoccupied Seoul, the administration learned that the 
war had exacerbated the factional tensions within the CCP, and that the moderate 
elements of the Party might soon take action against Mao.181  In early January 1951, the 
administration opened a dialogue with a “Chinese national identified with non-
communist elements of the Peiping regime,” which the documentary record refers to 
only as “Third Party.”182  Through this dialogue, the administration hoped to convey to 
“sympathetic elements” within the PRC government “the true attitude of the United 
States toward China,” obtain information regarding internal conditions on the mainland, 
and receive Third Party’s advice regarding how best to create a rift between China and 
the Soviet Union.   
                                                            
180 Circular Airgram, Acheson to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 27 December 1950, ibid, 609-
611. 
181 The following two paragraphs summarize points from a series of unsigned memoranda of conversations 
held on 6, 7, 12, and 13 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, Part 2, 1476-1503. 
182 The identity of Third Party or his credentials remains unclear.  However, at a 30 January 1951, meeting 
with Brigadier General Frank Roberts, who was among the staff of Special Assistant to the President W. 
Averell Harriman, Marshall “gave the credentials of Third Party insofar as he understood them.”  Roberts 
then “compared the name of Third Party with a name appearing among several words on a card put away 
in some of his papers.  He seemed reassured.”  Ibid, 1533. 
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Through a series of relayed messages, Charles Marshall of the Policy Planning 
Staff conveyed to Third Party the fundamental views underpinning the American 
approach to the Communist Chinese regime.  He emphasized especially the 
administration’s view that certain PRC leaders advanced the interests of Moscow rather 
than those of the Chinese people, and that this resulted from deliberate Soviet 
manipulation of Chinese nationalism to suit the imperial tendencies of the USSR.  From 
this, he explained, stemmed every decision of the American government, from the 
refusal of recognition and U.N. membership to the temporary defense of Formosa.  On 
this latter point Marshall stated that “We would be willing to see the island go to any 
Chinese regime not likely to use it against us.”  Similarly, “the United States would 
certainly not be rigid on the matter of recognition or continue to hold its channels to the 
Chiang Government,” but would do so only if the communist regime showed “a change 
in attitude or if the power of those in charge of it should be challenged from within.”   
Subsequent State Department meetings discussed the idea of sending a 
government representative to Hong Kong in order to establish contact and prepare the 
way for negotiations.183  Special Assistant to the President W. Averall Harriman 
“expressed greatest interest” in this general plan, while General Frank N. Roberts, one of 
Harriman’s assistants with much experience in China, commented that this “was the 
most important opportunity conceivable for the United States in the immediate future” 
and “should be played to the limit.”184  Unfortunately, although Third Party had warned 
                                                            
183 Memorandum of Conversation between Matthews, Rusk, Nitze, Davies, and Marshall, 31 January 1951, 
ibid, 1544-1546. 
184 Memorandum of Conversation between Roberts and Marshall, 30 January 1951, and Memorandum of 
Conversation between Harriman, Roberts, and Marshall, 1 February 1951, both in ibid, 1535 and 1547, 
102 
 
that a U.N. resolution branding the PRC as an aggressor would undermine the position 
of the moderates within China, events had already moved too far in that direction for the 
administration to reverse itself.185 
As the war continued with little sign of diminishing Chinese Communist 
animosity, the administration’s debates increasingly included suggestions for the more 
assertive utilization of Chinese Nationalist forces.  In mid-January, the administration 
produced a National Intelligence Estimate that sought to determine, among other things, 
“the stability of the Chinese Communist regime.”  It noted the improbability of a 
successful counter-revolution within China, arguing that “By themselves and under 
present conditions” the existing resistance forces on the mainland “do not constitute a 
major threat” to CCP control.  However, the use of such forces in combination with 
continued U.N. operations in Korea, a naval blockade, selective bombardment, and the 
landing of Nationalist forces on the mainland “would imperil the Chinese Communist 
regime.”186  The State Department rejected the JCS’ rather cavalier approach as overly 
provocative and unlikely to succeed.  It questioned the advisability of landing Nationalist 
troops on the mainland, emphasizing a number of important questions that the JCS had 
failed to address and wondering what long-term effect the unpopular Generalissimo’s 
                                                                                                                                                                               
respectively; Acheson discusses Harriman’s influence in these policy discussions in Present at the 
Creation, 410-411.   
185 Third Party’s reports had “reached the United States Government too late to make it possible to call off 
or defer the pending action on the resolution to pin the aggressor label on the Peiping Government.”  
Memorandum of Conversation between First and Second Party, 30 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, Part 2, 
1530-1533. 
186 NIE-10, “Communist China,” 17 January 1951, ibid, 1510-1514. 
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continued leadership would have “on the forces of resistance and on the emergence of 
other anti-Communist leaders on the mainland?”187 
When the NSC met on January 17 – the same day that the PRC rejected the 
U.N.’s cease-fire proposal – the assembled officials noted these uncertainties and called 
for a paper concerning the “Effect within China and other Eastern countries of United 
States backing of Chiang Kai-shek.”  Similar to prior estimates, the resulting memo 
reiterated the existence and ineffectiveness of resistance within China, but added that 
opposition “would be most responsive to the appeal of a ‘third force’ largely 
independent of both the Kuomintang and the Communists.”  Such a plan implied 
replacing Chiang and his followers, “an exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible task.”  
From these basic premises, the paper advocated a rather vague and questionable proposal 
to support a resistance movement on the mainland that “would be both a potential threat 
against the Peiping regime and would be a natural influence exercising pressure on the 
National Government on Formosa to adopt more effective policies.”  At the same time, 
the United States should “use our political influence and the leverage of American aid to 
strengthen those military and political leaders on Formosa who seem worthy of 
confidence.”188   
Such unlikely proposals reflected the increasing desperation regarding China 
among American officials in the opening months of 1951.  One manifestation of this was 
                                                            
187 Memorandum, Rusk to Acheson and attached draft of NSC 101/1, 17 January 1951, Record Group 59: 
General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to 
NSC Policy Papers, File: “NSC 101,” National Archives. 
188 Department of State memo, “Report on the Effect Within China and Other Eastern Countries of United 
States Backing of Chiang Kai-shek,” 9 February 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, Part 2, 1574-1578. 
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Truman’s decision to support what became known as “Operation Paper.”189  In the 
closing months of 1950 some 4,000 Nationalist soldiers retreated into Burma to escape 
destruction or capture.  By February, the CIA had established a supply network and 
began providing covert assistance to these forces for the purpose of conducting 
operations in the nearby southwest Chinese province of Yunnan.  Historians commonly 
interpret Operation Paper as an effort to divert Chinese forces from Korea, though in 
actuality, the planners intended the Nationalist operations to catalyze “resistance to the 
new Communist regime in a region with a long and strong tradition of independence 
from China’s central government.”  Indeed, by January 1953, this force had grown to a 
size of 18,500 by incorporating some of the kinds of resistance groups that earlier 
intelligence reports had identified.190 
In the meantime, report after report reiterated the tightening controls within the 
PRC, the improbability of regime change, and the inadvisability of using Chiang or the 
KMT to achieve these ends.  American Consul in Hong Kong, Ralph Clough, reported a 
growing feeling among the Chinese people that resistance was hopeless and commented 
that immediate action “is essential to arrest further development defeatism among our 
                                                            
189 A notable proposal at this time included General MacArthur’s assertion that because “the Chinese have 
in the past shown a susceptibility to rendering service to the highest bidder…the purchase of high 
Communist civ and mil officials might prove an economical method of assisting in disestablishing the 
present auth in China.”  MacArthur to the JCS, 23 February 1951, ibid, 1579-1581; the exact date on 
which Truman approved support for Operation Paper remains unclear, occurring sometime “in late 1950 
or early 1951.”  This general timeline nonetheless coincides with the most precarious months for the U.N. 
forces in Korea.  John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold 
War Strategy in Asia (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 149. 
190 CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith, for instance, expressed that China “had more than enough troops 
and that any activities in Burma would not divert forces otherwise destined for Korea.” Garver, The Sino-
American Alliance, 148-150. 
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potential supporters on mainland.”191  Representatives from both the State Department 
and JCS similarly agreed that “if we can’t bring about the downfall of the Peiping 
regime within a year or two, it will probably last for a long time.”192  Despite JCS calls 
that the United States should prepare ROC forces for offensive operations against the 
mainland, however, the State Department steadfastly refused.  Not only would such an 
invasion fail, State officials argued, but it would also cast the United States, even more 
than Soviet propagandists had already done, as the enemy of Chinese sovereignty and 
nationalistic aspirations – the opposite of what Truman and Acheson hoped to 
accomplish.   
When the Korean War stalemated later that year, however, the administration 
once more began to explore its earlier proposals for instigating indigenous resistance, in 
part because of the perception that the PRC’s inability to win a decisive victory over the 
U.N. Command had exacerbated criticism within China of Mao’s regime.  In response to 
Acheson’s request for information on the “attitudes of principal groups in China,” the 
American Consul General in Hong Kong, Walter P. McConaughy, Jr., replied that 
feelings among the Chinese people for the ROC ranged widely, from positive to the 
“lesser of two evils” to complete rejection.193  A significant number of PLA military 
officers were “dissatisfied with party leadership and prepared to defect under proper 
conditions,” but, he added, “There must be something to defect to.”194  Rankin agreed, 
echoing MacArthur’s earlier proposal that despite rising dissatisfaction with Mao’s 
                                                            
191 Analysis of Chinese Communist intentions drafted by Ralph Clough, quoted in Telegram, McConaughy 
to Acheson, 8 February 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, Part 2, 1571-1573. 
192 Memorandum of Department of State-JCS meeting, 6 February 1951, ibid, 1566-1568. 
193 Circular Telegram, Acheson to various posts, 13 April 1951, ibid, 1637 note 1. 
194 Telegram, McConaughy to Acheson, 20 April 1951, ibid, 1643-1645. 
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regime, no opposition force would form without an “alternative” to the communist 
government which “presents itself with sufficient outside backing to give reasonable 
promise of success.”195  U.S. Ambassador in Korea, John J. Muccio, deriving his 
information primarily from interviews of Chinese Communist POWs, noted wavering 
morale among communist soldiers and potential for defections in the event of Nationalist 
landings.196   
As a result of these appraisals, and in an important reversal of its previous views, 
the administration now began seeing value in utilizing the ROC for the purpose of 
wooing this new wave of dissatisfied, anti-Stalinist Chinese, though more through 
effective propaganda than by actually landing ROC troops on the mainland.  On April 20, 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Livingston Merchant, 
expressed the necessity of reforming the ROC; as matters stood the island could not 
garner the kind of popular support such a policy would require.197 
In line with these ideas, in mid-May Truman approved NSC 48/5, “United States 
Objectives, Policies, and Courses of Action in Asia,” which brought together the various 
strands of the administration’s policy discussions that had occurred throughout the past 
year.  Significantly, the first of the document’s immediate objectives was the detachment 
of China from Moscow and the development of an independent China that had 
renounced aggression.  To accomplish this, the United States should intensify efforts to 
“influence the leaders and people in China to oppose the present Peiping regime and to 
                                                            
195 Telegram, Rankin to Acheson, 19 April 1951, ibid, 1637-1639. 
196 Telegram, Muccio to Acheson, 21 April 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, Part 1, 374-375. 
197 Memorandum of Conversation between Merchant and Han Lih Wu, 20 April 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, 
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seek its reorientation or replacement.”  As such, the administration planned to continue 
to foster mainland resistance and to “encourage political changes in the Nationalist 
regime which would increase its prestige and influence in China proper.”198   
The day after Truman approved NSC 48/5, Rusk immediately began 
implementing its recommendations.  In a speech that Acheson later confirmed “was 
slanted in part for use in psychological warfare within China,” Rusk began by 
emphasizing the basic rationale for the non-recognition policy.199  Referring to the PRC 
as “a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale,” Rusk argued that “It is not the Government 
of China.  It does not pass the first test.  It is not Chinese.”  In contrast, the ROC “more 
authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly 
their historic demand for independence from foreign control.”  Aid to Nationalist China 
would not be decisive by itself, however.  “The decision and the effort,” Rusk concluded, 
“are for the Chinese people, pooling their efforts, wherever they are, in behalf of 
China.”200   
Opportunities for the Chinese people to resist diminished considerably by 
summer 1951.  A National Intelligence Estimate that July concluded that the PRC had 
instituted “increasingly drastic control measures” that enabled that government to 
                                                            
198 NSC 48/5, “United States Objectives, Policies, and Courses of Action in Asia,” 17 May 1951, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol. VI: Asia and the Pacific, Part 1, 36-37, hereafter cited as FRUS, 
1951, VI, Part 1. 
199 Telegram, Acheson to Gifford, 22 May 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, Part 2, 1673 note 2. 
200 Rusk speech of 18 May 1951, Department of State Bulletin, 28 May 1951, 843-848; Acheson also 
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“control the population and check the development of an effective opposition.”201  
McConaughy also noted that guerilla forces in nearby Guangdong province were “lying 
low” because their activities brought “prompt and heavy retaliation.”  He also reported 
that the completion of the Chinese Communist land program had resulted in rural 
political controls that would “make it much more difficult for resistance groups to 
operate.”202  In August, Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Troy L. 
Perkins, reported “there is no indication that any individual leader has sufficient ability 
or commands a sufficient number of Chinese to organize an effective Third Force 
Movement.”203  Even in Burma and Yunnan, the remnant KMT armies faced 
increasingly organized and effective PRC countermeasures.  
As a result, the administration continued drifting toward reliance on the ROC to 
provide the support and leadership without which such a movement supposedly could 
not succeed.204  The administration remained painfully aware that the Chinese people 
would not receive Chiang warmly, however, and, as such, it determined to convince or 
force Chiang to initiate a series of reforms that might make the ROC government more 
attractive to dissatisfied Chinese on the mainland.  Indeed, although agreeing that “we 
should not put all of our eggs in the Formosa basket,” Rankin nonetheless pointed out 
                                                            
201 NIE-32, “Effects of Operation in Korea on the Internal Situation in Communist China,” 10 July 951, 
FRUS, 1951, VII, Part 2, 1737-1743.  
202 Telegram, McConaughy to Acheson, 15 August 1951, ibid, 1787-1789. 
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that “Whatever the shortcomings of the regime on Formosa, it is evolving and, on 
balance, improving.”  Implying that Chiang would not live forever, Rankin suggested the 
United States should use its aid programs to improve ROC efficiency “while retaining 
enough individual liberty so that a genuine Chinese democracy can evolve.”  Throughout 
the Korean War, officials continued to advocate this strategy of developing on Taiwan a 
pattern of successful Chinese leadership that would offer “to the Chinese suffering 
Communist tyranny on the Mainland” a vision of a Chinese society “free of Russian 
domination” and “meeting the welfare needs of the people” – a vision that would make 
the Chinese on the mainland say “I wish I were there.”205   
For the most part, however, the Truman administration never wholeheartedly 
endorsed this scheme, and even the incoming Eisenhower administration wondered 
whether this strategy could produce results.  The prospects for developing a successful 
organized resistance movement on the mainland continued to deteriorate as the PRC 
instituted increasingly tighter controls.  Efforts to convince Chiang to liberalize his 
political system continued, but the primary motivation for such calls gradually moved 
away from courting the mainland Chinese and toward courting other non-communist 
nations whose support both Chiang and the United States relied upon to hold the line 
against the PRC.  In the summer of 1953, for instance, Admiral Arthur Radford informed 
Chiang that his “police state tendencies would have to be held in check, if not abated” in 
order to retain support of both the American people and U.S. allies, sentiments that 
                                                            
205 Memorandum, Barnett to Rusk, 3 October 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, Part 2, 1816-1827. 
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Secretary of State Dulles echoed later that year in his meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo.206  
Nonetheless, in the absence of a viable alternative, the Eisenhower administration clung 
persistently to the hope that Taiwan might yet demonstrate an “ability to command the 
respect and support of the Chinese people.”207 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
206 Radford meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, described in Telegram, Jones to State, 18 June 1953, and 
Dulles meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo, 13 November 1953, described in Memorandum written by 
McConaughy, both in FRUS, 1952-1954, XIV, Part 1, 205-210 and 251-253, respectively. 
207 NSC 146/2, “United States Objectives and courses of action with respect to Formosa and the Chinese 
National Government,” 6 November 1953, ibid, 307-330. 
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CHAPTER III 
HOLDING THE LINE, HOPING FOR CHANGE: EISENHOWER’S 
CHINA POLICY, 1953-1960 
 
Entering office in the midst of the Korean War, Dwight Eisenhower and his staff 
could hardly have viewed the PRC differently than its predecessors in the Truman 
administration.  The United States confronted what to all appearances seemed an 
implacably hostile and militarily powerful foe intent on doing its part in the broader 
communist effort to achieve global domination.  Having commanded the allied forces in 
Europe during World War II and acted as Supreme Commander of NATO forces, Ike 
found himself on familiar ground.  Once more, he headed an organization on the front 
lines of a crucial conflict that could determine peace or war, revolutionary breakdown or 
lawful stability.  Further, he, like many American officials, had come to view the PRC’s 
leaders as every bit as hostile, determined, and conniving as their counterparts in 
Moscow.  Eisenhower believed that Beijing would not negotiate in good faith and that 
Mao would adhere to agreements only so long as he could achieve the expansion of 
communism by other means.   
Pursuing a policy of containment under these circumstances might check the 
communists’ efforts, but Washington no longer believed it would suffice to achieve the 
kinds of reforms that the United States sought.  As the Eisenhower administration 
endeavored to prevent both the communists and U.S. allies from expanding hostilities, it 
continued to pursue and expand upon the variety of alternative strategies that the Truman 
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administration had pioneered.  Ike hoped that he could yet persuade the Chinese people 
to save both themselves and the rest of the world from the radical excesses of Chinese 
Communism. 
 
The Problem of Chinese Communist Militancy 
Upon assuming the presidency, Dwight Eisenhower chose as one of his first acts 
to change the mission of the Seventh Fleet from preventing attacks from both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait to only preventing attacks from the mainland against the Republic of 
China.  He did so as one part of an effort to signal Beijing that the United States would 
not tolerate indefinitely the Korean stalemate, and that failure to achieve progress in the 
armistice negotiations could have serious, perhaps even nuclear, consequences.  These 
efforts ultimately succeeded; on July 27, 1953, the fighting in Korea officially ceased 
with the signing of an armistice agreement, and the administration began to ponder how 
to handle the uneasy peace that followed.  It concluded that the end of the fighting in 
Korea “would not indicate Communist China had abandoned its basic objectives or its 
willingness seek objectives by armed force.”1  Rather, the successful defense of South 
Korea meant only that international communism would await a more advantageous 
moment and circumstances to aggress.2   
This happened much sooner than the administration predicted, for even as the 
warring sides finalized the Korean armistice, elements of the PLA began a systematic 
                                                            
1 Circular Telegram, Acheson to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 29 July 1953, FRUS, 1952-
1954, XIV, Part 1, 238. 
2 The British Charge in Hong Kong, Lionel Henry Lamb, also expressed his belief that the armistice 
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campaign to capture several of the Nationalist-held offshore islands.  Moreover, China 
and the Soviet Union continued to support the Vietnamese Communists in their 
campaign against the French in Indochina, culminating in the decisive defeat of the 
latter’s forces at Dienbienphu on May 7, 1954.  With such developments, the 
Eisenhower administration felt it must not relax its guard.  For the remainder of the 
decade, spurred on by a series of externally-supported communist insurrections and 
major international crises in both Asia and Europe, the United States pursued a policy of 
strengthening the capacity of the Free World, and particularly of the non-communist 
nations of East Asia, to deter communist aggression and to counter it effectively once 
begun.   
The sizeable military forces of the Republic of China provided many potential 
benefits in this strategy.  Throughout the 1950s, American policymakers regularly 
discussed war contingencies whereby the Nationalist Chinese military would prove “an 
important strategic reserve which could be employed when and where the interests of the 
free world indicated.”3  Taiwan’s central location would allow the relatively rapid 
deployment of Nationalist forces to Korea, Indochina, or along the Southeast China 
coast – wherever they might have the most beneficial effect depending on whatever 
aggressive moves the communists might make.4  Even in the absence of an overt 
                                                            
3 Memorandum of Conversation between officials of the departments of State and Defense, 1 June 1953, 
ibid, 198-201. 
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communist-instigated war (for Ike never believed that the United States would initiate 
such a conflict), the presence of hundreds of thousands of capable soldiers so close to 
China’s coastline would act as a powerful deterrent to any potential PRC aggression in 
other theaters.5  Administration officials occasionally raised concerns regarding the 
practicality of using ROC forces outside of Taiwan given the Nationalists’ own 
defensive needs as well as the reluctance of other nations to allow the Nationalist 
military to operate within their borders.  But the persistence of the Chinese Communist 
threat in the region dictated continuation of the general policy.6 
This fear of communist aggression was hardly Washington’s creation.  Non-
communist countries all along China’s periphery from Japan to Thailand shared these 
concerns and looked to the United States for material and psychological support in their 
ongoing efforts to defend themselves against either PRC attack or internal subversion 
they believed Beijing directed and supported.  As late as 1957, for instance, Burma and 
Indonesia expressed concern regarding Beijing’s use of its embassies in those countries 
to provide assistance to local communists, and even neutralist India grew alarmed over 
PRC efforts to arm the communist forces in neighboring Nepal.7  The Eisenhower 
administration remained extraordinarily sensitive to such concerns, fearing that the 
                                                            
5 Though certain members of the administration advocated a pre-emptive war, the more characteristic view, 
shared by Ike, Dulles, and other high-level members of the administration, was that the United States 
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September 1957, ibid, 594. 
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slightest sign of a wavering American commitment to counter communist aggression or 
to offer unwarranted concessions to an unreformed China would result in the 
disintegration of these nations’ resolve to continue the struggle.8   
By this time, the administration had added diplomatic and economic pressure to 
its existing strategy of military containment, especially since the Korean stalemate and 
economic sanctions had apparently driven the communists, at least temporarily, toward 
efforts to achieve their ends by means short of large-scale overt aggression.9  Indeed, Ike 
believed that the “existing controls on trade had been one of the main reasons why the 
Chinese Communists had sought an armistice, and it was vital, therefore, not to relax 
controls until we had achieved a settlement.”10  At a tripartite meeting with French and 
British representatives in July 1953, Secretary of State Jon Foster Dulles echoed the 
value of sanctions for facilitating a political settlement and for diverting PRC aid from 
the Indochinese communists.  The British and French agreed to maintain the existing 
sanctions and to re-examine them later “in light Chinese Communist behavior.”11   
The administration looked forward to the Geneva conference as an opportunity to 
draw the Chinese further into the more peaceful diplomatic realm as well as to determine 
whether Beijing genuinely desired to play a constructive role in settling regional 
conflicts.  Dulles refused to consider a U.S.-ROC defense treaty prior to the Geneva 
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talks lest such a move relax pressure on the communists to negotiate.12  Though the 
conference did produce a tentative agreement on the partition and eventual reunification 
of Vietnam, it failed to reach a political settlement regarding divided Korea.  In addition, 
the Vietnamese Communists continued to consolidate their position, benefitting 
considerably from the PRC’s ongoing material support that the administration 
considered a violation of the armistice agreement.13  Moreover, the PRC began a 
massive bombardment of the Nationalist-held offshore island of Jinmen in September 
1954.  The administration responded by seeking to deter escalation of Beijing’s actions 
by political means, namely by proposing a U.N.-guaranteed neutralization of the Taiwan 
Strait.14  China’s refusal to discuss this plan, however, undermined the U.N.’s 
willingness to follow through, leading both Dulles and British Ambassador Roger 
Makins to agree that “we may have to review our basic assumption” that neither the PRC 
or Soviet Union “wanted a general war at this time.”15   
But the administration believed that the Korean armistice and the Geneva 
settlement had diminished the PRC’s desire for overt military intervention in Korea and 
Indochina, thus indicating that the force of international opinion could cause Beijing to 
adopt more peaceful, cooperative behaviors and attitudes.16  Ike and Dulles now looked 
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to the political conference of African and Asian nations at Bandung in 1955 to sway 
Beijing away from aggression in the Taiwan Strait.17  Believing that Beijing had sent 
delegates to the conference in order to obtain Third World approval for their militancy in 
the Taiwan Strait and throughout the region, the administration worked diligently to 
ensure that the Chinese Communist representatives would achieve no such affirmation, 
thus keeping the Communist Bloc “psychologically on the defensive.”18   
Perhaps in part because of their efforts, leaders from throughout the Arab-Asian 
world who attended the conference openly expressed their concerns regarding recent 
communist activities.19  The Prime Minister of Pakistan warned against “opening our 
doors to a new and more insidious form of imperialism that masquerades in the guise of 
liberation.”  Prince Wan of Thailand offered a more blunt statement on the threat of 
communist “infiltration and subversion,” while the Turkish delegates blamed communist 
aggression for their country’s decision to join NATO.20  “The Conference leaders,” one 
observer noted, “have no illusions about communism, be it Chinese or Russian.”21  
Indeed, although the conference communiqué noted that “membership in the United 
Nations should be universal” and called for the membership “of all those States which 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order (Singapore: 
National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 134. 
17 Jason Parker, “The Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the 
Reperiodization of the Postwar Era,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 30, No. 5 (November 2006), 881. 
18 Memorandum, Staats to OCB, 11 January 1955, quoted in ibid, 874; The British agreed that Beijing 
sought to use the Bandung conference to “win over Asian opinion and lull Asian suspicions by appearing 
moderate,” and that the U.S. and U.K. should warn the participants “against giving the Chinese the green 
light and to urge them to press for the renunciation of force.”  Memorandum, Makins to Dulles, 16 March 
1955, 374 and Message, Eden to Dulles, 28 March 1955, both in FRUS, 1955-1957, II, 374 and 416, 
respectively.  
19 This is not to suggest that the participants feared only communist advances.  Indeed, they lumped 
together both communism and capitalism as “imperial” forces. 
20 Homer A. Jack, Bandung: An on-the-spot description of the Asian-African Conference, 13. 
21 Ibid, 37. 
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are qualified for membership in terms of the Charter,” the list of qualified nations in the 
communiqué excluded the PRC.22   
Though the conference agenda did not include it, the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait crisis 
nonetheless “loomed large” in the private discussions, as Dulles hoped it would.23  The 
Secretary of State believed his efforts succeeded; the conference had “exerted a restraint 
on the Chinese Communists” because of the conference participants’ expressions “in 
favor of peace and against direct and indirect aggression.”24  When the PRC delegates 
emerged from Bandung, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai called for an end to hostilities in 
the Strait and a new era of Sino-American relations based on “five principles of peaceful 
co-existence”: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, 
non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
coexistence.25  More importantly, Zhou also acknowledged Beijing’s willingness “to 
                                                            
22 Among those nations listed were Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, and “a unified 
Vietnam.”  Ibid, 26; Zhou does seem to have successfully alleviated the concerns that some of the 
delegations had regarding Chinese Communist intentions.  See Ang Cheng Guan, “The Bandung 
Conference and the Cold War International History of Southeast Asia,” in Tan and Acharya, eds., 
Bandung Revisited, 27-47. 
23 Jack, Bandung, 15. 
24 Dulles’ Press Conference, 26 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, II, 519; He similarly informed the Indians 
that “the opinions expressed by the delegates there must have had a moderating influence.”  Memorandum 
of Conversation between Dulles and Krishna Menon, 14 June 1955, ibid, 595.  This assessment may not 
have been entirely accurate.  See Guan, “The Bandung Conference.” 
25 The five principles predated Bandung.  They were first formalized in the Sino-Indian treaty of 1954 on 
trade and intercourse between India and Tibet, and were subsequently included in various other PRC 
international treaties.  Lee, “Treaty Relations of the People’s Republic of China: A Study of Compliance,” 
248; In another telling divergence of views between Beijing and the Asian-African world, the Bandung 
participants listed ten principles, among which included “Settlement of all international disputes by 
peaceful means.”   The State Department interpreted this difference as indicating that Zhou’s tone of 
reasonableness would likely not carry over directly into subsequent negotiations.  Kweku Ampiah, The 
Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK and 
Japan (UK: Global Oriental, 2007), 105-107. 
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strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means as far as this is possible.”26  Dulles 
looked favorably upon such indications that “the pistol had been laid down” and that the 
two sides might now resolve some of the lingering issues between them.  He nonetheless 
reiterated that “the pistol should be permanently discarded, and we hope that the trend of 
events will bring reassurance on that point.”27   
Though fearing that official contact might give Beijing an unhelpful degree of 
international legitimacy, the administration nonetheless viewed ambassadorial-level 
talks as serving important functions.  The Eisenhower administration genuinely desired 
negotiations so long as the communist side was prepared to negotiate in good faith – one 
half of the NSC 68 formula.  As an NSC policy paper noted, “The United States must 
keep open the possibility of negotiating with the USSR and Communist China 
acceptable and enforceable agreements” and must make clear to those governments that 
the resumption of normal relations “is dependent on concrete evidence that they have 
abandoned efforts to expand their control by military force or subversion.”28  As late as 
September 1958, Ike reiterated that “we must show both firmness and courage in our 
                                                            
26 The administration frequently reiterated the importance of international condemnation of PRC actions.  
In response to Belgium’s indication that it might soon recognize the PRC, for instance, Robertson 
commented that “There is no evidence that Communist China has given up her long-term objectives or 
would change her tactics except through force and pressure of public opinion.”  Citing the ongoing PRC 
military build-up in North Korea, Robertson further noted that “If there seems to be a tranquil situation 
today, this is due largely to Communist China’s realization of the attitude which the civilized world takes.  
We feel that any acceptance of Communist China’s past actions would lead to further aggression on its 
part.”  Memorandum of Conversation between Acting Secretary of State Hoover, Robertson, and Belgian 
Ambassador Silvercruys, et al, 9 September 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, III, 81-83.  
27 Dulles’ Press Conference, 2 August 1955, ibid, 5; Chen Jian argues that Beijing did not intend the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to apply to the relations between the socialist and capitalist camps 
since “crises, revolutions and wars were inevitable in the ‘Age of Imperialism.’”  Chen Jian, “China and 
the Bandung Conference,” in Tan and Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited, 135.  
28 NSC 5429/3, “Current U.S. Policy in the Far East,” 19 November 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, XIV, Part 1, 
911. 
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opposition to the use of aggressive force, combined with readiness to negotiate in a spirit 
of conciliation.”29   
Yet administration officials perceived a long history of communists violating 
their pledges, and regularly insisted that the communists must accompany their words 
with actual deeds in order for the United States to take their professions of peace 
seriously.30  In the months following Bandung, Dulles noted “a number of obvious steps” 
that Beijing could take “to clear the air considerably and give evidence before the world 
of its good intentions.”31  In the meantime, however, the United Nations should continue 
to reject Beijing’s membership “until they shall have demonstrated good behavior and 
acceptance of the principles of the United Nations Charter for a reasonable period of 
time.  This time period is not to be judged simply by the calendar but must be adequate 
to show a basic and sincere change from the Chinese Communists’ present attitude.”32  
By late-1958, however, the State Department could rattle off a long list of Chinese 
                                                            
29 Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, 11 September 1958, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX: China, 162, hereafter cited as FRUS, 1958-1960, XIX; Robert 
S. Ross contends that Dulles merely feigned interest in compromise “in an attempt to neutralize criticism 
from moderate politicians.”  Robert S. Ross, “Introduction,” Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-
Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 17. 
30 Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, 24 March 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
XIV, Part 1, 396; In the spring of 1953, State Department officials emphasized that “we must grasp our 
opportunities presented by the ‘peace offensive’ and give the Soviet Union an opportunity to demonstrate 
its sincerity.  The conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea is but a first step.  We hope that Soviet 
words will be followed by deeds but we must be shown.  Until then, we cannot relax our guard.”  
Emphasis included.  Memorandum, David Nes to Dulles, 1 May 1953, ibid, 194-195; Nancy Tucker also 
notes how Ike “pragmatically imagined a day when there would be diplomatic relations between 
Washington and Beijing.”  Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “A House Divided: The United States, the 
Department of State, and China,” in Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 
1953-1960 (1990), 55. 
31 Dulles specifically mentioned implementing a cease fire, releasing imprisoned American airmen, and 
accepting the U.N. invitation to participate in the discussions of the Formosan hostilities.  State 
Department Press Release, 23 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, II, 507 note 3. 
32 Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and British officials, 26 September 1958, FRUS, 1958-
1960, XIX, 279. 
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Communist aggressions, assistance to aggressions carried out by others, and violations 
of its pledges, all of which indicated that no basic change had occurred.33   
The perception of bad faith also affected the ambassadorial talks, particularly as 
regards the Agreed Announcement on the release of prisoners that both sides announced 
on September 10, 1955.  Significantly, the issue that emerged was not Beijing’s refusal 
to release its prisoners, but rather its refusal to inform the imprisoned Americans of their 
rights and to provide facilities to British representatives acting for the United States, 
steps that Beijing had pledged to take.34  The full rationale for China’s inaction remains 
unclear.35  Yet the motivating factors undoubtedly included anger over a dispute 
regarding the next phase of the ambassadorial talks.  Beijing perhaps contented itself that 
with the prisoner issue tentatively resolved the two sides would now move on to discuss 
other issues, such as Taiwan and a potential Foreign Ministers’ meeting.  Yet in part 
because of the importance it placed on deeds rather than words, Washington insisted that 
Beijing fulfill the Announcement’s terms as a prerequisite to higher-level talks and the 
discussion of other issues.  This infuriated the Chinese; an NCNA essay the following 
                                                            
33 Memorandum of Conversation between Robertson and Prince Sihanouk, 16 September 1958, ibid, 201. 
34 “Wang should be severely taxed with PRC non-compliance this obligation.” Telegram, Hoover to 
Johnson, 22 September 1955, ibid, 97.   
35 Robert B. Ekvall, who regularly served as American translator in dealings with the Chinese, suggests 
that Beijing’s dismay may have stemmed from a misunderstanding over the English terminology in the 
Agreed Announcement that allowed the United States to permit India to operate in the specified manner 
within the United States, rather than Beijing permitting India to act on its behalf.  This was a fine 
distinction, to be sure, yet one that allowed Washington to avoid the implication that it had voided Taipei’s 
right to speak for Chinese in the United States.  The Chinese “howled in protest” when they belatedly 
awoke to the significance of this wording.  Robert B. Ekvall, The Faithful Echo (1960), quoted in Cohen 
and Chiu, People’s China and International Law, Vol. 2, 1143-1147. 
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week lambasted Washington for “inventing new rules,” stating that the refusal to discuss 
other items “is incompatible with the canons of international conferences.”36       
The administration refused to budge.  Having experienced an array of communist 
duplicity in the past, Washington sought tangible signs of compliance that would have 
gone far toward establishing signs of good faith.  Yet the Chinese side subsequently 
validated the American concerns by frankly admitting that it continued to hold the 
remaining imprisoned Americans as political hostages whose release was contingent 
upon the settlement of other issues.  The U.S. Ambassador to the talks, U.A. Johnson, 
noted that this constituted a complete reversal of the “legalities and juridical procedures” 
that had previously characterized the PRC position.37  Under such circumstances, Dulles 
refused to move ahead on a renunciation of force agreement in December 1955.  “It is 
entirely unrealistic,” he explained, “to be formulating proposed second public 
announcement when one already made is being so flagrantly violated.”38  Thus, by late-
1956, the Agreed Announcement had moved from a practical settlement of a divisive 
issue to a contentious propaganda football.  McConaughy lamented that “The talks are 
no longer an effective means of bringing about the release of our imprisoned citizens.  
They may now have the opposite effect.”39 
Beyond the prisoner issue, the key American objective remained achieving a 
PRC pledge to renounce the use of aggressive force as an instrument of foreign policy.  
The administration frequently reiterated that it did not expect the Chinese Communists 
                                                            
36 “Geneva Talks Should Proceed to Second Item of Agenda, Says Jen Min Jih Pao,” 20 September 1955, 
quoted in ibid, 1148-1150. 
37 Telegram, U.A. Johnson to State, 25 August 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, III, 63-65. 
38 Telegram, Dulles to Johnson, 6 December 1955, ibid, 205. 
39 Memorandum, McConaughy to Robertson, 1 October 1956, ibid, 432. 
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“to abandon its claims, however ill-founded we may deem them to be,” but rather to 
renounce “only the use of force in achieving them.”40  This explains why the 
administration responded so well when Zhou acknowledged the possibility of a peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan issue in 1955,  
Subsequent efforts to arrive at a mutually-acceptable renunciation of force 
agreement ultimately faltered over disagreements regarding Taiwan’s status as either a 
domestic or an international issue.41  Dulles rejected the Chinese view of Taiwan as an 
internal affair, arguing that the “same contention could be made as to other divided 
countries,” such as Korea, Vietnam, and Germany.  Furthermore, as “a practical affair 
conflict between the contending sides in those divided countries would lead to war, and 
so the issues are international in scope.”42  The PRC, in turn, rejected the idea notion that 
Taiwan was a legitimate international concern.  Beijing noted the inherent differences 
between the Taiwan issue and that of the other divided countries.  The division of 
Germany and Korea resulted from World War II; those governments did not collapse as 
a result of civil conflict.  Furthermore, the German, Korean, and Vietnamese divisions 
all were subjects of international agreements that would have resulted in unification had 
not the American “imperialist policy of aggression” interfered.  The case of divided 
China differed, however: the Chinese people overthrew the government themselves and 
established their own government, and the international community had returned Taiwan 
                                                            
40 White House Press Release, 4 September 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, XIX, 134. 
41 The Chinese Ambassador at Warsaw, Wang Bingnan, admitted that because of the Chinese insistence on 
solving the Taiwan issue first “It was only natural that talks could not get anywhere.”  Henry Kissinger, 
On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 159. 
42 Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Lloyd, et al, 31 January 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, III, 
286. 
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to Chinese control in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 (and, thus, cannot be considered a 
lingering issue of World War II).  The logical result, the Chinese argued, is that 
Taiwan’s liberation “is purely an internal question which has nothing to do with 
international agreements and involves no international question.”43 
Beneath these legalistic arguments, however, lay an ideological view of the 
United States as aggressive, expansionistic, and fundamentally untrustworthy.  Indeed, 
according to Mao, “Although Britain and the United States also talk about peaceful 
coexistence, they merely take this as lip service, and if they are asked to take true action 
on this, they will desist.”44  This attitude, in turn, conditioned American officials to 
expect ongoing intransigence and duplicity.  As such, the Eisenhower administration 
chose not to adopt certain initiatives that may have alleviated some of Beijing’s wariness.  
As Ike explained, “some of the deportment that was once an essential part of 
international relationships cannot be faithfully and stubbornly maintained by ourselves 
when the other side insists on practicing the habits of a thug.”45     
Because the administration no longer believed that the ambassadorial talks would 
produce practical and enforceable agreements, the State Department increasingly viewed 
them primarily as a means to prevent the Chinese from using overt military force, 
particularly in the Taiwan Strait.  As Dulles noted, “as long as we are talking there is less 
                                                            
43 Shao Chinfu, “The Absurd Theory of ‘Two Chinas’ and Principles of International Law” (1959), quoted 
in Cohen and Chiu, People’s China and International Law, Vol. 1, 235-237. 
44 Quoted in Chen Jian, “China and the Bandung Conference,” in Tan and Acharya, eds., Bandung 
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risk to Quemoy and Matsu, and Formosa.”46  Beijing would pursue peaceful policies, 
however, only “as long as its objectives are acceptably served by this means.”  As such, 
if the talks broke down or Beijing perceived them as unfruitful, it might re-initiate 
hostilities.  The administration even feared that the PRC might “manufacture” wars or 
crises elsewhere along its periphery “to provide a pretext for imposing new production 
and austerity drives at home.”47   
This possibility haunted the administration, especially following Ike’s September 
1954 decision that the United States would not go to war to defend the offshore islands.  
Dulles explained that the loss of the islands and the garrisons guarding them would 
prove disastrous for morale among non-communist East Asia, and because the 
administration would not fight for the islands “the Department had to find diplomatic 
means through which to prevent a Chinese Communist attack.”48  As such, the State 
Department often prioritized the indefinite extension of the talks, even at the expense of 
progress in the negotiations.  This rationale explains, at least in part, Dulles’ insistence 
on full PRC compliance of the Agreed Announcement prior to discussing other issues.49   
The fear that failure of the talks might spark PRC aggression is demonstrated 
well by Ike’s hospitalization from September 24 through November 11, 1955, after 
suffering a debilitating heart attack.  Under such circumstances, Dulles feared that the 
                                                            
46 Letter, Dulles to Eisenhower, 1 September 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, III , 75 note 3. 
47
 NIE 13-56, “Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960,” 5 
January 1956, ibid, 230; Krishna Menon also believed that “If the talks fail, then that would mean war.”  
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Menon, 14 June 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, II, 595. 
48 Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, 5 August 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, III, 
15. 
49 Johnson expressed hope that this tactic would work, but warned that “it will also be difficult in such 
circumstances for me to avoid being too obviously in the position of simply stalling.”  Letter, U.A. 
Johnson to McConaughy, 7 September 1955, and Telegram, Hoover to Johnson, 13 September 1955, both 
in ibid, 78 and 87, respectively.  
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PRC might seize the opportunity of the commander-in-chief’s incapacitation to instigate 
a new crisis.  The Secretary thus insisted that Ambassador Johnson set the date of the 
next ambassadorial meeting “as far in future as possible” and that the talks not break 
down under any circumstances.  Indeed, not until Ike’s incapacitation did the State 
Department decide to discuss additional items at the ambassadorial talks even though 
Beijing still had failed to comply with the terms of the Agreed Announcement.50   
As conditions in the Strait stabilized, however, avoiding a break in the talks 
became less of a concern for the administration so long as the onus for such a break 
remained with Beijing.51  In February 1956, Dulles confidently asserted that the Chinese 
Communists “would not resort to force in the near future, even if the negotiations were 
broken off,” but rather would continue making “threatening noises.”52  With fear of 
Chinese aggression dissipating, the State Department’s priority shifted to using the talks 
to regain the moral high ground among its allies, particularly through its demand for a 
renunciation of force agreement.  In response, the Chinese ambassador insisted on 
linking this agreement with a U.S. pledge to hold a Foreign Ministers meeting with Zhou 
Enlai. The State Department rejected this, since it would leave the PRC free to set 
additional “conditions and prerequisites” prior to such a meeting and to resume its 
militancy in the Strait if the meeting did not result in the concessions it desired.53 
By 1957, the talks had devolved into a series of mutually acrimonious exchanges 
devoid of the possibility for practical results.  On the American side, McConaughy 
                                                            
50 Telegram, Dulles to Johnson, 26 September 1955, ibid, 102. 
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52 NSC meeting of 9 February 1956, quoted in ibid, 305. 
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argued that the United States should not “go on talking with a regime which is brazenly 
violating the only commitment they have made to us in the course of the talks.”54  While 
agreeing in general with this assessment, Dulles still perceived the talks as having value 
in preventing the Chinese from engaging in military action against Taiwan because of 
“the risk they would run of general world condemnation” and the possibility of increased 
multilateral economic sanctions.  Indeed, as McConaughy noted early in 1957, “the talks 
are precisely fulfilling the primary purpose envisaged by the Secretary” two years 
before.55   
The private talks subsequently erupted into a public war of words that may have 
contributed to Mao’s decision to adopt a hard-line approach later that year.56  When a 
temporary suspension occurred in 1958, Mao took the opportunity to renew attacks on 
the offshore islands as a way to enhance popular Chinese support for his domestic 
revolutionary program.57  In response, the State Department once again called for the 
resumption of the talks “with minimum delay” in order to draw Beijing back into the 
peaceful posture they had maintained during the previous three years.58  Washington 
thereafter once more viewed the renewed Warsaw Talks after September 1958 as a 
means to achieve a tacit cease-fire in the Strait.59  By September, Dulles had reverted to 
his earlier insistence that Ambassador Johnson “string the talks out as much as 
                                                            
54 Memorandum, McConaughy to Robertson, 1 October 1956, ibid, 432. 
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possible.”60  With neither side prepared to offer concessions the talks once more 
deadlocked.   
 
The Problem of Chinese Nationalist Militancy 
Just as the administration sought to prevent China from engaging in hostilities, so, 
too, did it seek to rein in the excesses of its more militant Asian allies, particularly 
Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee.61  The administration sympathized with the plight 
of these two leaders, but could not agree that the approach they advocated – an inflexible 
hostility toward the communist nations – was appropriate.  The administration refused to 
allow Chiang and Rhee to draw the United States into a broader war and worked to 
dissuade them from initiating policies that might provoke communist ire unnecessarily 
and upset American efforts to achieve a lasting peace.   
Rhee offered the most immediate problem during the Korean armistice 
negotiations by actively opposing any agreement that might leave communists in control 
of North Korea.  On June 18, 1953, Rhee unilaterally released some 27,000 North 
Korean prisoners of war, an act that violated the repatriation provisions of the impending 
armistice agreement that the Americans had worked so hard to produce.  The South 
Korean president also threatened to withdraw his nations’ forces from the UNC, and 
demanded that Washington agree to a formal defense treaty with Seoul prior to an 
armistice.  Years afterwards, Rhee continued his threats to incorporate forcibly into the 
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South certain portions of North Korea, a policy that the administration made clear it 
would not support.62  Communist nations derived considerable propaganda value from 
these circumstances.  Khrushchev, for instance, accused Rhee of again “preparing 
military provocations.”  “Evidently,” he continued, “someone in the US has definite 
plans once more to turn Korea into a field of bloody battle,” the responsibility for which 
“lies entirely on the Government of the USA.”63   
When Chiang defended Rhee’s call for a defense treaty, Eisenhower made his 
opposition unmistakably clear.  The United States, he wrote, “recognizes the 
responsibilities implied in its position of moral leadership, and it is our firm resolve to 
meet these responsibilities to the best of our ability.  However, you will understand that 
there cannot be leadership of those who may be determined to go their separate ways.”64  
For good measure, Ike sent an additional letter to Chiang the following week in which he 
expressed that circumstances called for “certain sacrifices and certain limitations on 
freedom of action on the part of all partners in a common effort.”  Further, in regards to 
Rhee’s call for a defense treaty, he stated that “for such an agreement to be effective it 
must of necessity be based on mutual understanding, cooperation and shared 
responsibility in achieving the common objective.”  Assuring this cooperation “is 
therefore prerequisite to the conclusion of such a pact.”65  The message was clear: adhere 
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to the American method for waging the Cold War, which meant holding firm against 
communist aggression but doing nothing to unnecessarily exacerbate tensions; non-
communist nations must not become aggressors themselves.  The administration 
reiterated this message often, encouraging the Nationalists to “accord us latitude to play 
the game as we think best.”66  American officials occasionally commented that Chiang 
behaved tolerably in avoiding major unilateral military actions against the PRC.67   
Yet the administration nonetheless understood that the Generalissimo sought to 
exploit Washington’s trust and complacence to suit his own ends.68  The earliest 
example of this occurred on June 16, 1954, when Eisenhower approved informing Taipei 
of the routes of communist tankers traveling near Taiwan with the understanding that the 
Nationalists would seize their cargoes.  On June 23, the ROC navy intercepted two 
Polish vessels and the Soviet tanker Tuapse.  This immediately placed both Beijing and 
Moscow on alert as leaders in both capitols wondered whether this seizure indicated a 
more aggressive American posture or perhaps impending Nationalist military action.  
The State Department, which had belatedly awakened to the dangers of the situation, 
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reversed its decision to provide the ROC with additional intelligence information and 
encouraged the ROC to release the tankers it had seized.69   
Tensions nonetheless continued to escalate.  Stepped-up military operations by 
both sides led to a series of minor incidents.  Throughout July and August, Chiang 
continued to hold the communist tankers in violation of international law and against the 
strong urgings of the State Department, and even claimed ignorance of the fate of the 
ships and their crews.  With the recent settlement of the Indochina situation at Geneva, 
Washington increasingly viewed Chiang as a liability, leading Secretary of Defense 
Wilson to wonder “whether we should continue supporting Chiang in stirring up hell 
with Communist China.”70  Ike agreed, and on September 26 he ordered a temporary 
suspension of U.S. encouragement of Nationalist operations against the mainland.  This 
decision came too late, however, to forestall the Chinese Communist bombardment of 
Jinmen Island that sparked the first Strait crisis.71  Realizing that it needed to do more to 
curb Nationalist militancy, the administration signed a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) 
with Chiang Kai-shek in late November.72  The treaty called for joint consultations and 
American approval prior to any major ROC military action against the mainland, thus 
giving Washington considerable leverage over the nature and scope of Taipei’s military 
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operations.  Indeed, the administration emphasized the defensive nature of the treaty, 
asserting that “we are not going to defend our partner while our partner attacks.”73   
The MDT did not end the administration’s problems.  In an August 1955 article, 
the Chinese People’s Daily pointed out the contradiction between the ongoing, small-
scale Nationalist operations and the “U.S.-supported principle of refraining from the use 
of force.”  Reports soon revealed a disproportionately high level of activity among 
Nationalist forces as compared to PRC operations, much of it occurring without the 
necessary approval of U.S. military officers.74  This, in turn, led the State Department to 
intensify its efforts to catalogue and hinder incidents of Nationalist harassment of the 
mainland.  These efforts to control Chiang’s aggressiveness did not go unnoticed in 
Beijing, and may have contributed to ending the crisis.75 
Washington’s tacit acceptance of its responsibility for Chiang’s provocative 
actions re-emerged in the internal policy discussions that took place during the second 
Strait crisis in late-1958.  While the central issue of concern remained China’s resort to 
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the use of force, what made the situation of such importance to the administration was 
the excessively large number of Nationalist soldiers Chiang had stationed on the exposed 
offshore islands.  After the 1954-55 Strait crisis Washington struggled to convince 
Chiang to withdraw his forces from these islands to more defensible positions.  
Contemporary journalistic reports as well as later historical studies suggest that the 
envoys dispatched to convince Chiang to accept this proposal – Robertson and Admiral 
Radford – intentionally sabotaged the plan by not pressing vigorously for Chiang’s 
approval.76  Robertson later denied this charge, and, in any event, Chiang would likely 
not have agreed to this plan under the terms the administration had set, regardless of who 
presented it.   
In any event, Beijing’s reversion to a more peaceful posture following the 
resumption of the ambassadorial talks removed much of the pressure on the 
administration to take more assertive action against Chiang.  This relative complacency 
allowed the Generalissimo enough freedom of action to build up his forces on the island 
despite Washington’s protests.  Thus, by the outbreak of the second Strait crisis, the 
administration found itself trapped; the loss of such a large percentage of Chiang’s 
forces might result not only in the destruction of Taiwan’s morale and military power, 
but also the weakening of the morale and strategic posture of the broader non-communist 
world.   
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Chiang responded to the PRC bombardment by increasing the tempo of his own 
military operations.  As tensions spiraled upward, CIA Director Allen Dulles reported on 
August 7 that the Nationalists’ “well-advertised attacks on Chinese Communist junks 
had supplied the Chinese Communists with a precedent for air attacks on shipping.”  
Nationalist air attacks against the PRC similarly grew “heavier and more aggressive” 
and occurred “in violation of their pledged word to us.”77  Alarmed at this turn of events, 
Dulles expressed that “It is one thing to contend that the Chicoms should keep their 
hands off the present territorial and political status of Taiwan” and “not attempt to 
change this by violence which might precipitate general war in the area.  It is another 
thing to contend that they should be quiescent while this area is used by the Chinats as 
an active base for attempting to foment civil strife and to carry out widespread 
propaganda.”78  Soon thereafter, Secretary Dulles “on an urgent basis” called for 
information on the nature and extent of Nationalist activities undertaken from the islands 
in recent months which could with justification be regarded by the Communists as 
provocative,” even going so far as to express that “we shouldn’t really expect the 
Communists to refrain from attacking the islands if they were being used as bases for 
hostile activities against the mainland.”79   
After reviewing the situation, the administration concluded it not only must 
convince the PRC to cease fire, but must also “make Chiang more flexible in his 
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approach.”80  Dulles himself took on this responsibility, travelling to Taipei to convince 
Chiang of the necessity of ceasing his provocations and of adopting a strategy more 
conducive to achieving the administration’s objectives.  In his discussions with the 
Generalissimo, Dulles laid out the variety of factors undermining both the American 
stance against China and Washington’s continued support of the ROC.  He then called 
for a “fresh approach” to the mission envisioned for Chiang and his government that 
would prevent Taipei’s diplomatic isolation while maintaining ROC capabilities.  Taipei 
could help achieve both of these goals by disproving the common perception of the ROC 
as desiring to perpetuate war and transforming “that unattractive image into one that all 
free people will welcome and support.”  As such, the ROC should end commando raids 
and overflights of the mainland, reassert that it would not invade China, and reduce the 
number of soldiers stationed on the offshore islands.81   
The Nationalists vigorously rejected Dulles’ recommendations, asserting Taipei’s 
“superhuman self-restraint in the face of Communist provocations.”  Further, the 
American proposal suggested the ROC should accept a “Two China” idea, which the 
ROC could never do.  “Any indication by this Government,” the Foreign Minister 
expressed, “which suggests its contentment with its present status of exile and its 
willingness to see such a state of affairs perpetuated could only be construed as the 
abandonment of its ultimate objective on which the Free Chinese have been pinning their 
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hopes.”82  Remarkably, despite this apparent inflexibility Dulles and Chiang had within 
two days drafted a joint communiqué that essentially achieved Dulles’ objective.  After 
asserting the “restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland” as its “sacred 
mission,” the ROC acknowledged that “the foundation of this mission resides in the 
minds and hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully 
achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s three people’s 
principles” and “not the use of force.”83   Given the continued fighting in the Strait, 
Dulles did not expect this to have immediate military ramifications.  Nonetheless, 
Chiang’s pledge to depend primarily on political ideas instead of military force to 
liberate the mainland, Dulles believed, would have “important applications over the 
future.”84  
The administration trumpeted this achievement as a landmark in the struggle for 
peace in the region.  Ike immediately wrote to Chiang congratulating him on renouncing 
force as a means to achieve his objectives.  “This free-world principle, not accepted by 
the Communists,” he stated, “sets us apart from them and morally above them.  Your 
enunciation of that principle will, I am confident, be welcomed throughout the free 
world.”85  Dulles confidently reported the contents of the communiqué to British Foreign 
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, emphasizing that “already the Government is working with our 
military advisers on plans for a substantial reduction of forces in Quemoy and Matsu,” 
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and that “there would be no insuperable obstacles on the Nationalist side to working out 
a reasonable program for tranquilizing the situation in the Taiwan area.”86  The 
following day, the State Department dispatched a similar message to all diplomatic 
missions so that they may report on the communiqué to the governments to which they 
were accredited.87  A subsequent State Department analysis noted that despite the 
“deeply disturbing reports” during the crisis that the ROC might launch independent 
military action against the mainland, Chiang “accepted calmly all the decisions we took” 
and might be “more amenable to realism and reason than we have given him credit 
for.”88 
Whether coincidental or not, on October 25, the day following the issuance of the 
joint communiqué, China announced a new policy of shelling the offshore islands only 
on even-numbered days, thus suggesting to Washington the essentially political, rather 
than military, significance of the action.  The following day, the PRC withdrew the last 
of its “volunteers” from North Korea, the end of a gradual reduction that began in 
February 1958.  On November 17, the administration reached an agreement with the 
ROC to augment Nationalist artillery strength on the offshore islands in return for a 
substantial reduction of troops stationed there, and despite some initial feet-dragging the 
ROC eventually complied.89  Furthermore, the two sides also agreed to an “Accelerated 
Development Program” designed to increase rapidly the economic potential and self-
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sufficiency of Taiwan in order to enhance its value as a “showcase” of the benefits of a 
free society.90  With Chiang at long last apparently under control and with China once 
more on the diplomatic defensive, conditions appeared now to be moving in the 
direction of an uneasy yet peaceful status quo. 
 
Pressures for Peace: Perpetuating the Alternative Strategies 
How did these efforts to curb the aggressive tendencies of both the PRC and 
ROC facilitate the emergence of the “tolerable state of order” envisioned in NSC 68?  
That document had prophesized that containment itself would suffice to compel 
communist reform so long as the United States simultaneously asserted its willingness to 
negotiate in good faith.  But neither Truman nor Eisenhower felt they could rely on this 
alone to achieve the desired results.   
In its search for a successful strategy, the Eisenhower administration began 
where its predecessors had left off: with consideration of ways to inspire an indigenous 
mainland revolt against Mao.  But the basic problems with such an approach remained.  
Six months after taking office, the administration concluded that “there was no 
intelligence to indicate the likelihood of dissension in China, and, indeed, that a rising in 
that country was the most remote of all the current possibilities.”91  Even the decreasing 
voluntary support of the regime and rising dissatisfaction within China during the first 
half of 1954 had failed to result in the creation of any effective or organized resistance to 
                                                            
90 Telegram, Embassy in the Republic of China to State, 31 December 1959, ibid, 643-645. 
91 Meeting of the NSC, 18 June 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, XIV, Part 1, 204-205. 
139 
 
CCP control.92  Within a year after entering office the administration formally 
abandoned the rollback policy that it had advocated so vigorously during the 1952 
presidential campaign.  This did not mean, however, that Eisenhower abandoned the idea 
of toppling Mao’s government – indeed, his administration regularly pursued the 
overthrow of other governments, particularly Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, through means 
short of direct American military involvement.  Rather, he chose to pursue a policy that 
would advance this goal in a manner consistent with the acknowledged limits of 
American economic and military power and with due regard for the imperative of 
preserving peace in the Asia-Pacific region.   
Ike’s solution derived from his firm conviction that the “totalitarian” communist 
regimes “were excessively rigid and have inherent weaknesses on which we should 
attempt to capitalize.”93  Other officials agreed.  Vice President Richard Nixon argued 
that “the Chinese people could not indefinitely allow the freedoms and their contact with 
the free nations to be cut off by the actions of a totalitarian government,” while Dulles 
believed that “despotisms” such as the PRC “run counter to the nature and aspirations of 
humanity.  They often have a seemingly impregnable exterior but inside they are full of 
rottenness.”94  Administration officials based this view not only on ideology, but also on 
actual historical examples.  Unbeknownst to the United States, according to Dulles, Nazi 
Germany “had already begun to crumble” in the midst of World War II, and dictators 
“may be liquidated very abruptly, as happened in the case of Beria.”  “We would want to 
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be ready,” he continued, “if the opportunity comes, to take immediate advantage of it.”95  
Administration officials even pointed to more recent changes within the Soviet system, 
noting that by 1956 Moscow had renewed relations with Yugoslavia and had consigned 
the writings of Stalin “to the ash can.”96   
The administration could not predict, however, when China might undergo such 
a change.  As Dulles explained, the United States must await “the processes of evolution, 
that it might be a five-year matter before we knew whether the Chinese Communists 
would really maintain their hold on the country or possibly break down; or on the other 
hand whether they were going to adopt standards of conduct such that they could be 
received into decent society.”97  Washington thus sought to curb Taipei and Beijing’s 
militancy in order to bide time “until the evolution of Chinese Communist internal 
policy makes the regime no longer hostile and no longer to be feared.”98  Rather than 
simply await such a development, however, the administration chose instead a more 
proactive approach whereby the United States would place additional strains and 
pressures on China beyond mere military containment that would facilitate Beijing’s 
anticipated breakdown and reorientation.  These pressures served to achieve two general 
purposes: to deny the Chinese Communists success both in conducting their foreign 
policies and achieving their domestic reforms.   
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 The military containment of the PRC emphasized to the Chinese Communists 
that they would not gain from unjustified acts of aggression, and that sooner or later they 
must accommodate themselves to the fact that the international community would not 
stand for such behavior.  The same held true for the continued denial of PRC 
membership in the U.N. and the refusal of many nations to grant Beijing diplomatic 
recognition.  Indeed, as Dulles noted, “the strongest single motivation of the Chinese in 
their international conduct was a desire to be treated like everyone else and that our 
unwillingness to concede to them in this had been the greatest sanction upon them which 
we held.”  No nation “should accede to their desire until they have earned it in the sense 
of demonstrating a determination to conduct themselves properly and in accord with 
international law and custom.”99  Throughout the 1950s, few nations extended 
recognition to the PRC, and several nations that considered doing so, such as Belgium, 
Canada, and New Zealand, ultimately acceded to American persuasion against 
recognition.100 
But depriving Beijing of these foreign policy victories also served to limit the 
examples that Mao could point to as signs of his effective leadership.  Mao and his 
comrades “fully understood that if they were able to present a strong case of 
advancement in the PRC’s international status to China’s ordinary people” this would 
place them in “a more powerful position to promote the party’s mass mobilization plans 
at home.”  Thus, for the CCP the Geneva and Bandung Conferences constituted a 
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“crucial test case that would have a profound impact upon Mao’s continuous revolution 
and China’s domestic development.”101  The extent to which the Eisenhower 
administration understood this motivational factor remains unclear, yet the policy it 
pursued nonetheless anticipated this dynamic.  Maintaining the PRC’s diplomatic 
isolation and orchestrating the failure of Mao’s foreign policies would serve to discredit 
and de-legitimize the regime in the eyes of both the Chinese people and the more 
moderate CCP officials who were anxious for leadership that could achieve China’s 
rightful place in the world after a century of humiliation and warfare.102   
The administration also hoped to exacerbate tensions between the CCP and the 
Chinese people through a consistent program of economic sanctions.  The Truman 
administration implemented these during the Korean War in cooperation with its allies 
primarily for the purpose of hindering the PRC’s ability to conduct military operations in 
the region.  The Eisenhower administration also viewed sanctions as serving this purpose, 
and the president himself believed that the economic disruptions the sanctions caused 
had been among the more significant factors convincing Beijing to participate in the 
Korean armistice negotiations.103  The administration frequently reiterated the benefits of 
continued economic sanctions in order to convince wavering allies not to relax trade 
controls.   
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But the extent of the economic sanctions against China suggest that the 
administration considered this policy as achieving something more than merely 
hindering Chinese Communist military strength.  Aside from war contraband, sanctions 
also included bans on industrial materials and tools that would facilitate China’s 
development from an underdeveloped state to a modernized, industrial power.  Lingering 
doubts regarding Chinese intentions compelled the Eisenhower administration to 
perpetuate this policy even after the end of the Korean War, arguing that because the 
U.N. had condemned China as an aggressor “there existed a legal obligation to treat 
China differently from the remainder of the Soviet bloc,” a difference known as the 
China Differential.104  Britain and other American allies rejected arguments that China 
deserved harsher trade restrictions and criticized the American defense of the 
Differential for the remainder of the decade.105   
The administration nonetheless fought vigorously against relaxing trade controls, 
with Ike at one point attributed this rigidity to domestic politics.  Indeed, beginning in 
1956 Congressional pressure to maintain these sanctions grew intense.106  Ultimately, 
however, such domestic pressures proved unnecessary; the continuation of the trade 
restrictions advanced the strategy for reorienting China that the administration had 
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already adopted.107  The most significant problem it faced was not changing its approach 
to suit its domestic constituency, but rather how to reconcile the demands for 
inflexibility emanating from Congress with the demands for relaxation emanating from 
U.S. allies abroad.   
Washington continued reiterating the effects these sanctions were having in 
terms of sowing dissatisfaction among the Chinese people.108  The fundamental dilemma 
facing every Communist economic system, the administration believed, was that they 
“could not reduce their commitments” to improving the lives of their people, nor were 
such systems capable of “increasing their resources fast enough to cover their 
commitments.”  Such circumstances, Dulles argued, had led to widespread discontent in 
the Soviet Union that had resulted in the ouster of Soviet Premier Georgy Malenkov; 
similar processes might occur in China.109  In 1954, for instance, some administration 
officials anticipated “economic chaos” in China when Beijing, lacking the resources to 
maintain its industrial development, began exporting grain at a time when the nation 
faced massive food shortages.110  In subsequent years, a series of obstacles continued to 
undermine international support for the China Differential, most especially the unilateral 
British decision to relax its trade restrictions.  Disheartened by this development, the 
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administration could do little but cooperate in a collective reduction of multilateral 
controls while perpetuating its own more rigid set of unilateral sanctions.   
This American persistence may have derived from the 1956 uprisings in Hungary 
and Tibet that some officials viewed as vindications of a policy of pressures.  As such, 
Dulles hardened the administration’s negotiating stance at the Sino-American 
ambassadorial talks in September 1956, refusing to make any concessions on trade “even 
if Chinese Communists have made firm decision suspend talks.”111  When Mao gave his 
speech on the proper handling of contradictions the following year, administration 
officials pointed out how “Mao’s concern throughout the speech with evidences of 
popular dissatisfaction with the Communist regime is quite marked,” thus amounting to 
“an admission of considerable lack of support for the collectivization program.”112  In 
the midst of a “second successive year of agricultural disaster” during which unrest was 
“virtually nationwide,” Dulles reported to Ike that the PRC had ordered all foreign 
journalists to leave the country “apparently to prevent reports of how bad the situation 
is.”113  Despite such signs, the administration’s will to defend the China Differential 
gradually broke down over the course of 1958, and ended completely when Washington 
failed to obtain international backing for even a partial resumption during the second 
Strait crisis later that year.114  This likely did not indicate the abandonment of the 
administration’s hope for a popular revolt, only the absence of one method by which it 
sought to facilitate that result. 
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The administration also felt that the Republic of China might serve a useful 
purpose in its strategy of fomenting mainland discord.  Ever mindful of Chinese fears of 
Western exploitation, the administration realized the unique advantage of having a 
genuinely Chinese alternative to the CCP.  As an early policy statement expressed, “The 
existence of the Chinese Government on Formosa offers an at least symbolic alternative 
to Communist control of the mainland, and helps to frustrate the Communist objective of 
gaining international acceptance as the sole representative of the Chinese people.”115  
With this in mind, Ike often pointed out what the United States may have accomplished 
in other situations if alternative governments had existed, such as in the case of Hungary.  
But despite its value as an indigenous Chinese government, the exact nature of Taipei’s 
role in Eisenhower’s strategy remained unclear because this depended on how events 
within China developed.  In the absence of any ability to guide internal Chinese 
developments along a more specific path, the administration could only contemplate a 
variety of possible contingencies.  In the event that popular dissatisfaction sparked a 
civil war, for instance, Nationalist forces might intervene to bolster the military fortunes 
of the moderates.  If a political collapse occurred, ROC forces might help to preserve 
stability and return the nation to orderly administration – and more cooperative foreign 
policies.  And if dissent within China reached a critical point short of a mass uprising, a 
landing of Nationalist troops on the mainland might precipitate such an uprising as the 
Chinese people flocked to the ROC banner.116 
                                                            
115 NSC 166/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Communist China,” 6 November 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, XIV, Part 
1, 300. 
116 The scenarios the paper envisioned that might justify Nationalist intervention included dissention 
among the PRC leadership, dissension among the Chinese people, and the outbreak of large-scale war.  
147 
 
In the context of the Cold War ideological struggle, this emphasis on offering a 
political alternative to communist rule made sense.  As early as November 1953, the 
NSC noted that because “the roots of Chinese Communist political power must be 
attacked by the Chinese themselves, it is essential to foster and support non-communist 
Chinese political movements.”  This would prevent Beijing from “monopolizing the 
tremendous strength of Chinese nationalism and thus converting the Chinese people into 
enemies of the free world.”  And because the ROC “represents the only effective non-
communist Chinese political force in being,” its existence “is sufficient justification for 
aiding it despite uncertainties as to its future on the mainland.”117  
For the ROC to play any of these roles, however, it had to portray itself as an 
attractive alternative to Mao and the CCP.  In July 1952, this idea found public 
expression in a Foreign Affairs article that highlighted the benefits of a “Free China 
Model” that combined “the positive elements of Chinese civilization with economic 
development, democracy, and the rule of law.”118  The incoming Eisenhower 
administration did take steps to accomplish certain political reforms in the ROC.  For 
instance, in November 1953, Dulles noted the “rough” methods that the KMT used to 
maintain its power on Taiwan, and expressed hope that Taipei would learn “to cope with 
problems of subversion, disloyalty and security without infringing on basic human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and George Yeh, et al, 10 February 1955, FRUS, 1955-
1957, II, 251. 
117 NSC staff study on NSC 146, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to 
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Part 1, 311-312. 
118 Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 230-231.  For the article, see Albert Ravenhold, “Formosa Today,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 4 (July 1952), 612-24. 
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and without denials of due process of law to suspects.”119  However, in large part 
because it prioritized Nationalist stability and military capability, the Eisenhower 
administration did not press the issue.120   
For purposes of winning the hearts and minds of the Chinese people, the 
administration considered it sufficient to propagandize, casting the ROC in a favorable 
light as compared to the policies and programs of the PRC.  The administration had an 
early opportunity to practice this psychological warfare when a massive flood caused a 
humanitarian crisis in China in mid-1954.  The State Department hatched a scheme 
whereby the ROC would make a well-advertised food offer to alleviate the suffering of 
the Chinese people.  Beijing’s expected refusal of this aid “would show that the regime 
places its political and prestige interests above the welfare of the flood victims” while 
simultaneously portraying the humane sentiments of the Nationalist government.121   
The extent to which the administration considered such measures successful 
remains unclear.  Reports frequently mentioned the rising dissatisfaction among the 
Chinese people, and policy statements spoke favorably of the effort to make the ROC 
more appealing for the mainland Chinese.  Yet information remained scarce regarding 
the influence ROC intervention might have on translating this discontent into effective 
action.  In the absence of such information, the administration remained non-committal 
to proposals for the use of Nationalist forces.  In 1956, for instance, noting recent anti-
Communist uprisings in Poland, Hungary, Tibet, and Xinjiang, Chiang encouraged 
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Eisenhower to “take advantage of this favorable development by puncturing the Iron 
Curtain at its most vulnerable spots,” after which the “enslaved peoples behind it will 
rise in revolt.”122  Ike countered by noting that “unrest in China has not yet reached a 
point comparable to that in Europe.”123  By the end of 1958, Dulles reaffirmed the 
administration’s belief that conditions in China might yet deteriorate to a point where a 
Nationalist invasion would prove fruitful.124  Indeed, the possibility of China’s social 
order breaking down may have contributed to Chiang’s rather conciliatory response to 
Dulles’ presentation during the latter’s October 1958 visit to Taipei; the Americans 
might finally undertake the course of action they had reiterated so many times, but never 
actually embraced.  Ultimately, however, the Eisenhower administration could never 
bring itself to take that final step of approving ROC military action.   
Aside from the extraordinary risk that such an enterprise might draw the United 
States into a massive land war on the Asian mainland, this reluctance might also have 
derived from the fact that the administration envisioned – and may have preferred – one 
other scenario: that the PRC government might moderate its policies without the need 
for ROC intervention.  Administration officials only implicitly suggested this possibility 
in their discussions with Chiang, in part to ensure ROC viability and in part because Ike 
and Dulles did not believe events would likely move in that direction.  Yet the fact 
remained that the administration found tolerable the reunification of Taiwan with the 
mainland in the event that the PRC cease posing a threat to regional stability and that 
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such reunification occur peacefully.  Indeed, the president, himself, acknowledged that if 
Beijing “should finally get out of North Korea, release our prisoners, and act decently” 
then the United States could not justifiably continue a policy of non-recognition.125   
As the decade wore on, Taipei grew increasingly nervous about repeated 
American statements that the United States did not expect China to renounce its claims 
regarding Taiwan, but rather only that it renounce the use of force to achieve these ends.  
The Nationalists argued that such statements produced a contradiction in American 
policy, and seemed to imply a “lurking intention” to pursue either a two-Chinas or, 
worse, a one (Red) China policy.126  However, Beijing’s rejection of a renunciation of 
force agreement, the repeated assurances of American support for the ROC, and the 
worsening domestic conditions in China all minimized Taipei’s concerns and provided 
hope that the Nationalists might yet play an active role in liberating the Chinese people 
from communist rule. 
 Ironically, just as the administration hoped for the gradual moderation among the 
leadership in Beijing, so, too, did it increasingly view evolutionary processes as working 
toward the moderation of Chiang and the KMT.  American estimates had long 
emphasized that objective circumstances would eventually end Taipei’s “return to the 
mainland” mentality, but the 1958 Strait crisis once more brought such ideas to the fore.  
Ike expressed extreme annoyance at Chiang’s continued provocations that served only to 
undermine the broader Cold War struggle.  Both he and Dulles began looking forward to 
                                                            
125 Meeting of the NSC, 9 February 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, III, 305. 
126 Telegram, Rankin to State, 26 January 1956, and Memorandum of Conversation between Robertson 
and Wellington Koo, 1 February 1956, both in ibid, 279 and 295, respectively. 
151 
 
the “natural force of evolution” – particularly the death of Chiang and the integration of 
the native Formosans into the government and armed forces – that would result in the 
Nationalists abandoning their more dangerous ambitions.  As Dulles noted that October, 
“as time passes a large number of the people on Taiwan will be wanting Taiwan to be a 
separate state,” especially the mainlanders who would “be more interested in the 
development of the island itself, having become rooted there, than in returning to the 
mainland.”127   
Ultimately, the administration pursued a policy that sought, above all, lasting 
regional stability.  Whether the administration could achieve this objective through the 
use of ROC military intervention on the mainland or through the more peaceful 
application of political and economic pressures mattered little so long as the military 
option acted in support of the Chinese people themselves in expressing their discontent 
against an ineffective regime.  Indeed, Eisenhower regularly emphasized the importance 
of determining “what the people of China wanted,” pointing out that “The Chinese 
people were not a pawn in the struggle between Mao and Chiang.”128  As such, the 
policy Eisenhower and Dulles chose to pursue reflected neither an unwavering loyalty to 
Taipei nor an inflexible animosity toward Beijing.  The administration’s 
acknowledgement of the Soviets’ relative moderation is indicative of this desire to seek a 
modus vivendi with the communist world; ideological rivals could pursue their interests 
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in a competitive, yet peaceful manner.  Yet by the end of the 1950s the United States had 
failed to convince either the ROC or PRC that this was, indeed, possible. 
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CHAPTER IV 
UNCHANGED IMPERATIVES: CHINA POLICY DURING THE 
KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS, 1961-1968 
 
 The Kennedy administration entered office in January 1961 with the same 
objective as its two predecessors, namely, a genuine desire to achieve normalized 
relations with the Chinese Communists, but to do so without abandoning the basic 
principles of non-aggression and respect for the political sovereignty of other peoples.  
Kennedy looked forward to the day when communist nations would no longer seek to 
extend their control over their neighbors through subversion or the threat of force, and he 
envisioned a future world of “independent nations, with a diversity of economic, 
political and religious systems, united by a common respect for the rights of others.”1  
Soon after taking office, Kennedy asserted his willingness to “tackle the very deepseated 
and emotional opposition throughout this country” if he discerned any possibility that 
China would accept these principles.  He quickly concluded, however, that the “Chinese 
Communists were just as hostile to the new administration as they were to the old,” and, 
thus, his China policy “remained substantially unchanged and certainly there was no 
question at all of diplomatic recognition.”2  In later months, Kennedy expressed 
considerably less confidence in his ability to expend his domestic political capital on 
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launching new initiatives toward the PRC.  Yet he nonetheless reiterated that Chinese 
intransigence remained the fundamental hindrance to improved relations.3   
Just as Kennedy shared his predecessor’s objectives, he also perpetuated their 
strategy of military containment coupled with a reluctance to grant concessions prior to 
achieving the desired Chinese Communist reforms.4  In 1940, Kennedy penned Why 
England Slept, an examination of British rearmament policy during the late-1930s that 
fit well with the Truman and Eisenhower administration’s view that the United States 
and its allies must prepare themselves to uphold – with force if necessary – the principles 
of the international order.5  While a member of Congress during the 1950s, Kennedy 
also developed a particular interest in the favored communist tactic of subversion and 
guerilla warfare that made him especially sensitive to and concerned about the expansion 
of these activities during his presidency.6 
Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, held similar ideas, describing the 
primary task of American foreign policy as “to help build a decent world order.”7  In 
large part, this perspective grew from his work with the United Nations in Truman’s 
State Department and his participation in the policy deliberations both prior to and 
during the Korean War.8  Out of public office during Eisenhower’s two terms, and 
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perhaps because of his affiliation with the Democrats, Rusk joined with many other 
foreign policy specialists during the late-1950s in calling for a more flexible China 
policy than the one Eisenhower pursued.9  This enhanced flexibility did not mean 
abandoning the basic premises on which Ike had based his China policy, however.  As 
Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman wrote in 1964, 
It was obvious that more flexibility was needed, but it was also obvious 
that firmness, and a willingness to face Chinese threats would also 
continue to be needed.  For before the Chinese Communists would be 
responsive to policy initiatives from the United States, they had to be 
convinced that continued hostility had failed and that they had come up 
against an unyielding wall of resistance.  Isolated initiatives, like lifting 
trade restrictions, would accomplish nothing and might even run counter 
to the goal.10   
The ascendance of Lyndon Johnson to the Presidency following Kennedy’s 
assassination in November 1963 did little to change this, in part because Johnson 
retained Rusk as Secretary of State, but also because Johnson could also recall the 
failures of appeasement during the 1930s.  He derived from these personal experiences a 
firm belief that the United States could – and must – exert its influence in the world for 
the sake of global peace and order.11  From his seat in Congress during the 1950s and as 
vice president in the early-1960s, he arrived at a similar interpretation of Chinese 
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behavior and of the appropriate means of dealing with it.  The fact that Johnson entered 
office at a time of increasing tensions in Southeast Asia strengthened this conviction, 
and further undermined his belief in the possibility of a rapprochement with Beijing.  
Beneath these tensions, however, remained that enduring strand of American thought 
that looked forward to an era of friendly Sino-American relations once China adopted an 
attitude that Washington considered more appropriate.  By the end of his presidency, 
Johnson and his team perceived that Beijing had begun a difficult transformational 
process that he hoped would produce a more cooperative outlook. 
 
The Sino-Soviet Split and Growing PRC Radicalism 
Kennedy’s views of China hardened prior to his presidency in large part because 
Beijing’s continued militancy compared so unfavorably with Moscow’s relative 
moderation during the late-1950s.  Ever since Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union had 
undergone a gradual shift in its Cold War outlook that by 1956 had produced 
Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign and his subsequent abandonment of the 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine of inevitable war with the capitalist world.  Rather, 
Khrushchev began to preach that the international communist movement could, indeed, 
achieve its aims by advancing communist doctrine in the context of peaceful coexistence 
with the West.  Though Khrushchev did not explicitly renounce subversion as a means 
of furthering the communist cause, he nonetheless accepted that nations should settle 
international disputes peacefully, and that the proletariat within capitalist societies could 
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achieve “fundamental social changes” through normal parliamentary procedures.12  Soon 
after Khrushchev’s 1959 visit to the United States, for instance, reports indicated that 
Moscow had begun influencing the Indian Communist Party “toward legal methods, 
away from violence and toward an identification with nationalism rather than with 
international Communism.”13  
Beijing rejected Moscow’s new approach.  In April 1960, the emerging Sino-
Soviet ideological rift exploded into a public war of words in journals and public 
statements throughout the communist world.  The United States identified three specific 
points of divergence in this public discourse: China’s insistence that war with the 
capitalist world remained inevitable, that Washington held aggressive intentions, and 
that the communist nations must reject a policy of peaceful coexistence.  Washington 
interpreted this ideological rigidity to Beijing’s disdain for a status quo that blocked 
China’s “aggressive desires.”14  By August, American observers characterized the Sino-
Soviet dispute as resembling “in important respects the state of Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations before their breaks.”15  After several more months of such heated exchanges, 
Khrushchev ordered all Soviet advisers working in China to return home.16  The Soviet 
abandonment of communist ideological purity and the subsequent criticisms of China’s 
militancy drove Mao to extraordinary efforts to ensure not only that such “creeping 
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revisionism” would not occur within China, but also that Khrushchev’s sell-out would 
not undermine the myriad other communist struggles underway throughout the world.   
This is the China that the Kennedy team encountered upon assuming power in 
January 1961, and they had no illusions regarding the prospects of establishing cordial 
relations with Mao’s government.  Indeed, despite the initial euphoria at achieving the 
long-sought Sino-Soviet rift, many officials realized that the possibility of Soviet-
inspired Chinese aggression had simply been replaced with the possibility of Beijing 
aggressing of its own accord.  Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles, for instance, 
expressed a “palpable dread” of possible PRC intervention in Southeast Asia, and in 
March 1961 Ambassador John K. Galbraith testified to Congress that Beijing must abide 
by the U.N. Charter prior to its gaining admission to the U.N.17  NSC staff member 
Robert Komer recommended that the administration disengage “from unproductive 
aspects of our China policy” primarily in order to “rationalize our posture for long-term 
struggle” with the PRC hard-liners.18  Not expecting any change in Beijing’s attitude, 
however, Komer and most other officials intended their recommendations primarily as a 
means to solidify allied and neutral support for the American position, rather as a 
genuine method of achieving a Sino-American rapprochement.19 
The continued exclusion of the PRC from the United Nations proved especially 
troublesome in this regard.  The Korean War and the Strait crises of the 1950s had 
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provided the Eisenhower administration with sufficient diplomatic ammunition to hold 
the line against seating China and excluding Taiwan.  Eisenhower continued to believe 
until the end of his presidency that China’s admission to the U.N. would not only ruin 
that organization, but would also embolden Beijing to conduct additional aggressive 
acts.20  As such, when Ike met with Kennedy on January 19, 1961, he expressed the hope 
that he could support the new president in all of his efforts, but should Kennedy decide 
to support China’s admission to the U.N., Ike would end his retirement to oppose that 
policy.21  Kennedy and Rusk do seem initially to favor a two-Chinas approach since, in 
Rusk’s view, “two Chinas had in fact emerged” after World War II.  Furthermore, even 
if one considered the current U.S. recognition of Taipei as artificial, merely transferring 
recognition from Taipei to Beijing would also create an artificial situation; the United 
States should recognize both for what they actually represented.22   
Ike need not have worried, however, for two factors made the Kennedy 
administration’s implementation of this approach impossible.  On the one hand, neither 
China nor Taiwan would accept a two-Chinas formula, a fact that Kennedy and Rusk 
acknowledged during their initial discussion of China policy in early-1961; after this 
meeting both men considered this “a dead issue.”23  On the other hand, China’s posture 
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precluded the possibility that the administration would look favorably upon such 
significant diplomatic concession.24   
Once again, the major point of contention, at least initially, remained China’s 
refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.  As an official of the Truman 
administration, Rusk had been heavily involved in the work of the United Nations and 
the deliberations leading up to the decision to neutralize the Taiwan Strait during the 
Korean War.  As a result of these experiences, he believed deeply in the importance of 
non-aggression and respect for international law in the conduct of foreign relations.25  As 
Secretary of State, he instructed Ambassador Jacob Beam, American representative at 
the Warsaw Talks, to once more emphasize that the United States did not intend for 
Beijing to renounce its claims to Taiwan, only that it renounce the use of force to take 
the island, a “fundamental ingredient in any constructive and meaningful discussions 
between us on this issue.”26  China’s refusal to accept such proposals surprised no one.  
Indeed, during these first few months of 1961, when the administration sought to solidify 
its international support, many officials advocated strategies that allies would favor but 
that China would reject, particularly regarding U.N. representation.27  As Kennedy noted 
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in April, “we could not support Red China’s admittance to the UN.  We needed to find a 
formula for keeping them from wanting to get in.”28   
Events in Southeast Asia throughout the 1960s had a considerable effect on the 
American view of China.  DRV forces in early 1961 had thrown in their lot with the 
Laotian Pathet Lao in a bid to take over the country from the established government.  
Rusk identified the central problem as North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, who Rusk 
later characterized as “a nationalist with an appetite” and who had “made clear that he 
wanted Vietnam to gain control over Laos and Cambodia as well as South Vietnam, 
even though Laotians and Cambodians sharply resented those ambitions.”29  In a manner 
similar to the previous American commitment to defend South Korea – or even Western 
Europe – from an external aggressive force, the Kennedy administration determined that 
its commitment to the defense of the nations of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), of which the United States was a member, obligated it to intervene.  And just 
as with China’s involvement in Korea, the question of whether Ho acted at the behest of 
a foreign power largely missed the point; his aggression must fail lest success encourage 
further aggressions throughout the world.  
Because of Laos’ rugged and landlocked geography and the perceived timidity of 
the Laotian people, Kennedy and Rusk rejected a military response to communist 
aggression there, and instead sought a political settlement that would ensure that outside 
forces would not continue to infringe on Laotian territory or political sovereignty.  To 
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this end, Washington entered into negotiations with representatives from the U.K., 
Soviet Union, DRV, PRC, and several other nations in Geneva beginning in May 1961.  
China’s participation in any such effort would prove crucial, and through the 
ambassadorial talks in Warsaw the administration sought to convey its views to Beijing.  
At the relatively friendly meetings that summer, Ambassador Beam asserted that the 
Pathet Lao’s receipt of outside communist support undermined its credibility as a neutral 
regime, and that the United States would not enter an agreement which was only a 
“thinly veiled screen for eventual commie takeover” of Laos.30   
Perceptions of communist duplicity and subversion undermined the progress of 
the negotiations, however.  In October, Edward Rice of the Policy Planning Council 
prepared a well-received paper on China policy that lamented the “Maoist cycle of 
infiltration and insurrection” and noted that the “instigation and support of internal 
violence of the type now underway in Southeast Asia constitutes aggression directed at 
the national independence of the states involved.”31  The following month Kennedy 
expressed concern regarding the routes Beijing might use to move its forces into North 
Vietnam, while Rusk, noting that the PRC had expressed no desire to lessen tensions in 
the region, expressed that “Southeast Asia is now exposed to a particularly vigorous 
penetration effort by the Communist bloc.”32  Three days later, an SNIE concluded that 
not only would Beijing supplement its political warfare with “guerilla and terrorist 
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action by indigenous forces,” but it also might utilize military force “to extend its control 
when it can do so with little or no risk.”33  As a result of these continuing tensions, the 
Geneva negotiations deadlocked and, in January 1962, were suspended. 
Administration officials had mixed reactions to these events, particularly 
regarding the question of whether Beijing would instigate overt hostilities using its own 
forces.  Writing to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy following the Geneva 
deadlock, Komer revealed his fears of PRC militancy by urging the administration to 
“consider any option that might prolong Peiping’s time of troubles so as to allow 
Japanese and Indian strength to grow” and “buy time” to strengthen other threatened 
areas such as Korea and Southeast Asia.34  Deputy Under Secretary of State and former 
ambassador to the Warsaw Talks U. A. Johnson recommended that the administration 
temporarily cease making overtures to the Chinese Communists since he saw “little hope 
of any useful dialogue” until “there is some change in their attitudes.”35  In contrast, 
other officials early in 1962 emphasized that Beijing’s actual behavior compared 
favorably to its bellicose rhetoric.  Among these officials included China expert Allen 
Whiting, whose 1960 book China Crosses the Yalu emphasized that Beijing had decided 
to intervene in Korea primarily for defensive reasons.36  Bowles and Deputy National 
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Security Advisor Walt Rostow similarly believed that the severe domestic problems 
facing China had “undercut both its capacity and propensity for external adventures.”37   
While administration officials debated, Beijing apparently continued to support 
communist militancy in Laos.  On May 6, 1962, the Pathet Lao and DRV initiated a 
devastating attack against the established Laotian government in violation of the May 
1961 armistice agreement, thus signifying a change in the “Communist pattern of limited 
military operations.”  Beijing unsurprisingly backed the communists, and attempted to 
portray the Laotian Communists as victims by characterizing the American plea for a 
ceasefire as a means to restrict justified Pathet Lao “retaliation.”  Increased activity at 
nearby Chinese airfields and unsubstantiated reports of PLA soldiers in Laos further 
contributed to Washington’s anxieties.  Through a series of carefully planned and limited 
military deployments, the administration strove to signal American resolve and bring the 
warring parties back to the negotiating table.38   
As part of the Geneva Accords signed on July 23, 1962, the administration 
conceded to the formation of a Laotian coalition government under the leadership of the 
Soviets’ preferred candidate, Souvanna Phouma.  To supervise the settlement, the 
conference formed an International Control Commission (ICC) comprised of Canada, 
Poland, and India.  Historian Qiang Zhai casts doubt on Beijing’s desire to uphold the 
Accords, however, suggesting that PRC leaders perceived tactical advantages in 
temporary neutrality as a vehicle to gain time for the Pathet Lao to develop its strength 
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while minimizing Washington’s role.39  Whatever China’s motivations, from the 
administration’s perspective Hanoi’s actions clearly demonstrated its determination to 
violate the Accords.  It prevented the coalition government from operating in 
communist-controlled areas, refused to allow the ICC to conduct its supervisory 
functions, and continued to infringe on Laotian territory as a means of infiltrating South 
Vietnam.  By 1965, the administration noted a clear and disturbing trend: 
Hanoi sent thousands of trained men, including more than fifty regiments 
of the North Vietnamese Regular Army, to impose its will upon the South 
Vietnamese by force.  Hanoi had more than forty thousand troops in Laos 
contrary to the Laos accords of 1962, an estimated twenty thousand troops 
in Cambodia despite the protests of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and 
Hanoi-trained guerillas in northeastern Thailand.40 
Kennedy was “bitterly disappointed” by this pattern of North Vietnamese 
aggression, and this, in turn, reinforced the president’s reluctance to re-examine China 
policy.41  The administration’s belief that China could moderate Ho’s aggressive 
tendencies if it so desired mirrored the belief among Truman administration officials of 
Soviet responsibility for PRC intervention in Korea in the early 1950s.  As such, the new 
ambassador at Warsaw, John Cabot, defended the U.S. decision to give assistance to the 
South Vietnamese government.  Noting the ICC-certified violations of the neutralization 
agreement, Cabot asserted that the United States would not need to provide aid if Beijing 
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“would discourage such intervention.”42  Washington’s hopes for relaxing tensions 
deteriorated further as U.S. officials confronted communist resistance to a proposed 
neutralization of Vietnam.  Beijing cited the unresolved Taiwan issue as a reason for its 
refusal to participate in such an agreement.43  In subsequent months, the administration 
perceived some small signs of Chinese Communist flexibility, though this period of 
apparent cordiality proved brief and unproductive.44 
Much of the administration’s remaining goodwill toward the PRC evaporated 
during the Sino-Indian border war in late-1962.45  That conflict resulted from a long 
series of increasing tensions between those two countries, and, indeed, between China 
and the non-aligned world, since 1958.  Neutral nations reportedly approved the strong 
American response to the Strait crisis in September of that year, a response that had 
“contributed to their own feeling security and of assurance as to our steadfastness.”  The 
following year, Beijing instituted a crackdown in Tibet that led to India’s decision to 
provide sanctuary for the Dalai Lama and his followers.  The brutal suppression of the 
Tibetan revolt “shocked all Asia,” and contributed to the “increasing realization” among 
even the “uncommitted” Asian nations of the “Communist menace.”46  By 1961, 
conditions in Tibet had worsened to the point where the UNGA formally condemned 
Beijing’s brutality and oppression and called for Tibetan self-determination.47  The PRC 
damaged its reputation further through its poor treatment of foreign diplomats, causing 
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much bitterness among even the relatively sympathetic Asian neutrals “at the insults and 
abuses they have encountered at the hands of Communist officials.”48  By mid-1960, 
Sino-Indian relations had deteriorated to the point of inciting border clashes that 
“shattered the appearance of cordiality between the two states,” setting the stage for 
more extensive fighting the following year.49 
In the midst of the border war of October-November 1962 and despite their 
denunciation of China’s behavior, several neutral nations strongly advocated China’s 
entry into the U.N., believing that this would provide constructive avenues for 
engagement and would chain Beijing with the moral responsibility of upholding its 
obligations under the U.N. Charter.50  Significantly, India concurred with this assessment 
even as its armies faced the prospect of a humiliating defeat and as it made desperate 
pleas to Britain and the United States for military aid.51  The British agreed as well, 
though their position on Chinese representation had undergone a curious developmental 
process during the preceding two years.52  In any event, the UNGA that year rejected 
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PRC membership by an even larger margin than it had in 1960, in part because of the 
defection of a particular bloc of African countries that did not believe that the U.N. 
should admit Beijing at the cost of expelling the ROC.53   
The international community had reservations about Beijing’s policies, calls for 
seating China in the U.N. notwithstanding.  Britain joined the United States in sending 
military assistance to India, with London expressing that it would view favorably any 
Indian request to send soldiers to help fight further Chinese incursions.  African nations, 
too, expressed concern and took positive steps toward assisting India such as holding 
blood drives, raising money, and, in the case of Nairobi, raising a small force of 
volunteers to fight for India.54  Asian neutrals hesitated to involve themselves in the 
Sino-Indian conflict, however, given the possibility of reprisals due to their proximity to 
China.55  Nonetheless, despite the two sides having signed a ceasefire, concerns about 
Beijing’s intensions lingered in several capitols.  Washington prepared for renewed 
Sino-Indian fighting.56 
Indeed, the Sino-Indian war, and especially the second phase of the Chinese 
campaign that began in mid-November, shocked even the administration’s most ardent 
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advocates of a flexible approach to Sino-American relations.57  According to historian 
Nancy Tucker, “proponents of better relations with Beijing, like Chester Bowles and 
John Kenneth Galbraith, identified with New Delhi and once fighting began they 
disregarded evidence of Indian provocation and ceased speaking out for China.”58  
Rostow similarly expressed concerns about China’s intentions.  In a policy paper he 
penned in mid-November, he argued that the question of Beijing’s complicity in 
Southeast Asia did not matter because a DRV victory “will almost certainly do much to 
revive the dimmed hopes of the Chinese leadership and elite.”59  If Hanoi achieved its 
aims violently and despite American efforts, Beijing might conclude that it, too, could 
achieve its own ends by similar means. 
In contrast, the United States and Soviet Union at this time took yet one more 
step toward friendlier relations by negotiating a limited ban on testing nuclear weapons.  
Since entering office, Kennedy had emphasized the importance of arms control, though 
his efforts to achieve a comprehensive testing ban ultimately failed to persuade the 
Soviets.  Having approached the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
however, both Kennedy and Khrushchev reflected on how close the two nations had 
come to annihilating the human race.  In January 1963, Kennedy warned of “the 
overhanging shadow of nuclear war – a shadow which will not leave mankind until 
governments recognize the limitations on the use of force in a nuclear age and move in 
the direction of settling disputes through the rule of law.”60  The administration renewed 
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efforts to draw the Soviets into negotiations on a test ban, and in July 1963 the two sides 
successfully concluded a Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) that banned testing in the 
oceans, atmosphere, and outer space, but that still permitted underground testing.   
The problem of China’s nuclear development remained.  By the end of 1960, the 
PRC had made considerable progress in its efforts to develop the capability 
independently to produce atomic weapons, with estimates suggesting that it would 
achieve its first detonation by mid-decade.61  The Eisenhower administration feared the 
ramifications of this development; Beijing’s “arrogant self-confidence, revolutionary 
fervor, and distorted view of the world” would increase the likelihood that the PRC 
would “create trouble.”62  Such concerns persisted into the Kennedy years.  In January 
1963, with the ongoing tensions in Southeast Asia and the Sino-Indian fighting still fresh 
in his mind, Kennedy expressed that Beijing’s nuclear program “was probably the most 
serious problem facing the world today” and “would so upset the world political scene it 
would be intolerable to the United States and to the West.”63   
As a result, Kennedy sought to convince Khrushchev that “relatively small forces 
in the hands of people like ChiComs could be very dangerous to us all.”  In July, the 
president pressed Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman to encourage 
Khrushchev “either to take Soviet action or to accept US action” aimed at “limiting or 
preventing Chinese nuclear development.”64  Harriman had some reason to believe that 
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the Soviets might respond favorably to such a proposal.  During a discussion with a 
Soviet official the previous January, he received the impression that with the signing of 
the LTBT, the Kremlin felt that “together we could compel China to stop nuclear 
development, threatening to take out the facilities if necessary.”65  Whatever such 
sentiments may have existed among Soviet leaders did not translate into actual practice, 
for in July Khrushchev steadfastly refused to collude with the administration on this 
issue.66  Five days later, Zhou Enlai formally rejected PRC participation in the LTBT on 
the grounds that it served only to allow the superpowers to consolidate their nuclear 
monopoly. 
Beijing’s impending nuclear weapons capability contributed enormously to 
Kennedy’s subsequent actions.  Under Eisenhower, Washington had reduced 
conventional American forces and relied instead on its nuclear arms to deter communist 
aggression, a strategy known as “massive retaliation.”  It had chosen to do so primarily 
for budgetary reasons – to get “more bang for the buck” – and to assure the long-term 
financial viability of the U.S. government and economy.  Kennedy found this 
arrangement unacceptable, for in the event of warfare with the communist nations the 
lack of conventional forces would leave the United States little choice but to respond 
with nuclear weapons.  This, in turn, might escalate into a broader nuclear war that 
would prove disastrous for all humanity.  Early in 1961 Kennedy and his advisors 
attended a presentation that contributed to such concerns by illustrating the after effects 
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of a nuclear exchange.  Kennedy’s shock at learning of these effects strengthened his 
belief that the United States must take steps to avoid this fate.   
The answer was “flexible response” – to increase the conventional military 
power of the United States in order to broaden the range of means with which the 
administration could respond to aggression.67  Initially, flexible response had been 
devised with Soviet aggression in Europe in mind, but the Kennedy administration 
extended this doctrine to East Asia because it began to question whether nuclear 
deterrence would prove effective once China acquired its own nuclear weapons.  In 
August 1963, Rusk emphasized the importance of creating adequate “conventional 
capability” so that the “free Asian nations will believe that we can assist in defending 
them against at least limited Chinese Communist attack without necessarily involving 
them in nuclear war.”68   
Events during the first half of 1963 provided additional impetus to such efforts.  
In February, the administration received “reliable reports” that Beijing continued to 
supply the Pathet Lao with arms and ammunition, and that, in violation of the 
neutralization agreement, it had deployed armed military engineers to construct a series 
of roads connecting Laos with the nearby Chinese province of Yunnan.69  Tensions 
flared that spring, and by late-April “the administration once again found itself reaching 
for military threats to stabilize Laos.”70  By June, circumstances had deteriorated to the 
point that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff once 
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more revived the notion of deploying Chinese Nationalist forces to Southeast Asia.71  
Rusk rejected this idea since this might restore the faltering Sino-Soviet alliance, but he 
agreed that Nationalist forces nonetheless constituted a vital strategic reserve that acted 
“as a deterrent and might help counter aggression if it occurs.”72  Indeed, the same day 
that Zhou rejected the LTBT, Kennedy called a special meeting of the National Security 
Council out of concern that this rejection, coupled with the “recent military crisis in 
Korea” and reports of Chinese troop movements along the Indian-Tibetan border, might 
signify Beijing’s intention to take more assertive initiatives.73  Although a May National 
Intelligence Estimate had concluded that the PRC would not use force except for 
defensive reasons, Rusk, Harriman, and Rostow all nonetheless concurred with the 
graver assessment.74 
This sense of gloom persisted throughout the remainder of 1963, despite what 
some historians view as a dramatic shift that occurred following Hilsman’s April 
appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.  Though Hilsman 
brought to his new post the conviction that communism in China was not a “passing 
phase,” he believed that the United States could not expect Beijing to change its attitude 
as a result of any American initiative short of the abandonment of its fundamental 
principles.  The Kennedy administration, he wrote, based its policy “on a willingness to 
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reach an accommodation” with Beijing “provided only that the Chinese Communist 
regime was willing to modify its hostility in the same direction.”75  Thus, whatever its 
merits as a major public reiteration of the American desire for rapprochement, Hilsman’s 
San Francisco speech in December constituted no real change in the decade-old search 
for a reformed China. 
Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 and Johnson’s ascendance to the 
presidency did little to change this state of affairs and, indeed, placed foreign policy 
more firmly than before in the hands of Rusk, Bundy, and McNamara, all of whom had 
drawn “alarming conclusions” regarding Beijing’s ideology, policies, and intentions 
throughout the Afro-Asian world.  Under Johnson, Rusk – a man “deeply hostile to any 
China policy reform” – tightened his control over the State Department policymaking 
process, thus ensuring that the administration would not pursue the kinds of initiatives 
Hilsman and others had advocated.76  Significantly, Johnson shared his Secretary of 
State’s views regarding China’s behavior and the proper way to respond; the president 
needed little encouragement to maintain a firm stance. 
Just as Johnson entered office, Zhou Enlai began a tour of Africa in an attempt to 
obtain the diplomatic and political support of the increasingly important African bloc.  
The State Department viewed the trip as a smashing success for Zhou, and lamented that 
many of these African nations had been attracted to Beijing’s vitriolic anti-imperial 
position and advocacy of violent “national liberation struggle.”77  This also improved the 
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likelihood of these nations extending diplomatic recognition to Beijing and voting for 
PRC membership in the United Nations.  With little direct interest in the regional affairs 
of East Asia, these newly independent nations welcomed China’s developmental aid, to 
which the United States had responded by engineering a joint aid program with the ROC 
called “Operation Vanguard” and other such “aggressive steps to win good will in 
Africa.”78   
Efforts to hold the line against further diplomatic concessions to Beijing began to 
crumble when, on January 7, 1964, the French government of Charles DeGaulle 
announced that it would soon extend diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communists.  
Rusk warned all who would listen that “it would be particularly dangerous for the peace 
of the world if Peiping were to be rewarded with recognition and admission to the UN at 
a time when the Chinese Communists are inciting aggression in Asia, encouraging 
rebellion in Africa and extolling militant revolution in much of the world.”79  To Rusk, 
the central concern 
is the need to influence a half-dozen key people in China on the question 
of how China is doing, and whether its present policy is or is not on the 
right track.  Such actions as the recognition of China by France or its 
future admission into the UN would, of course, be very bad in that it 
would persuade the Chinese that they were being successful.  Unless other 
things demonstrate to the Chinese that they are not on the right track we 
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will be faced with much greater danger in the future, not to mention that 
which we face today.80 
 The French decision coupled with Zhou’s vigorous African initiative marked the 
beginning of the end for the American effort to keep China out of the United Nations.  
By the end of 1964 Canada also announced that it would no longer oppose PRC 
membership in the United Nations.  Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin informed 
Rusk that “Canada would naturally want to see peace all over the world, but none of us 
can avoid recognizing that the Chinese will exert increasing influence.  This is not in 
Canada’s interest, nor is it in Canada’s interest to have a Communist regime in Russia.  
But there it is.”  Martin further argued that “Coming into the UN will not alter the 
aggressive tendencies of any state, but it will provide that much more contact.”81  Rusk’s 
retort – “the UN cannot operate as a reform school” – fell on deaf ears.82  In the 1965 
U.N. vote, supporters of seating the PRC in the General Assembly achieved parity with 
their opponents for the first time.83 
All of this occurred in the midst of rising violence in Southeast Asia.  Soon after 
Johnson’s election in 1964, DRV regulars began appearing in South Vietnam and 
contributed to Johnson’s decision to escalate American involvement.  Once again, 
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Beijing appeared complicit in communist activities in the region.  As early as January 
1964, for example, Rusk reported the discovery of seven tons of Communist Chinese-
made arms south of Saigon.84  In addition to this material support, Beijing “joined Hanoi 
in claiming that Vietnam was not a problem for the UN,” and thus blocked efforts to 
achieve a negotiated settlement.85  The increasing American involvement in the region 
coupled with the Chinese nuclear detonation in October 1964 resulted in an increasingly 
bitter and inflexible atmosphere in the ongoing Warsaw Talks.  The Chinese ambassador 
refused to budge on the nuclear issue, and vehemently protested American “aggression” 
in Southeast Asia.86  President Johnson refused to back down from this challenge, and 
even began toying with the idea of using Nationalist forces to counter Hanoi’s activities 
in South Vietnam.87  Rusk later offered a concise assessment of the situation: “war broke 
out in Southeast Asia because Hanoi and Peking supported and committed acts of 
aggression beyond their own borders.”88   
The breakdown of Beijing’s diplomatic isolation in 1964 placed enormous 
pressure on the administration to alter its hard-line policy lest it find itself at odds with 
its closest allies.  As Komer noted in November, “the real question is no longer whether 
to disengage from the more rigid aspects of our China policy but how and when.”89  
James C. Thomson, Jr., also of the NSC, noted that U.S. policy towards China would not 
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likely achieve the administration’s goal of “domesticating” the Chinese leadership.  
Arguing that a “strategy of containment plus moral preachment has achieved little 
success,” Thomson suggested that the administration implement a policy of “modified 
containment” that would include “the careful use of free world goods, people, and 
ideas – instruments which have proven their long-term corrosive value in our relations 
with other totalitarian societies.”  He then listed several policies that might bring about 
positive results, including involving the PRC in discussions of nuclear arms control, 
shifting the U.N. debate from PRC exclusion to a “one-China, one-Taiwan” stance, 
removing restrictions on Americans traveling to China, and increasing the trade of non-
strategic goods.90   
 Through 1965, such recommendations became the norm among the 
administration’s mid-level advisers.  Those who joined Komer and Thomson in their 
advocacy for a more liberal China policy included NSC staff member Chester Cooper, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy, and his Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Marshall Green.  After returning from a tour of East Asian countries 
in June, Thomson reported that among American officials both abroad and at home there 
existed “general agreement that the present climate of U.S. firmness in Asia” presented 
ideal circumstances “for such moves that might be judged superficially to be ‘soft.’”91  
William Bundy agreed with Thomson’s assessment, and both men again urged the 
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administration to take positive steps such as lifting travel restrictions.92  The 
administration also faced pressure from outside the Executive branch, as the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Senator William J. 
Fulbright, and several prominent China experts all urged a different course toward China.  
Rusk rejected their recommendations.  By the end of 1965 the State Department had 
allowed only one conciliating proposal – relaxing travel controls in order to permit 
doctors and scientists in the fields of public health and medicine to travel to China – and 
only revisited the Chinese representation issue when it realized the inevitability of an 
unfavorable vote in the UNGA.93 
 As this suggests, this policy shift above all else reflected necessity.  Many 
advisers based their proposals on the fact that the United States continued to deplete its 
influence and clout on the international scene by holding firm to what appeared an 
ideological, rather than rational, China policy.  For instance, Assistant Secretary of State 
J. Harlan Cleveland, in reference to U.S. allies’ embracing of China, emphasized that 
“what is eroding is not the opposition to Communist China’s behavior, but the support of 
our traditional tactics for dealing with it.”94  Thus, the rationale for the change derived 
not from a desire for a relationship with an unreformed China, but rather from the 
necessity of regaining the moral high ground and placing the onus for a lack of progress 
on Mao and the other hard-line Chinese Communists.   
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The PRC facilitated this strategy through the predictable animosity with which it 
responded to American proposals.  Virtually every American official who commented 
on the matter stressed that no matter what proposals the U.S. government put forward 
the PRC would reject them.  The most extreme example occurred in mid-1965 when 
Chinese Ambassador Wang Guoquan responded with scorn to American calls for a 
negotiated peace settlement in Southeast Asia.  Wang believed the American overture 
resulted from the defeats the United States suffered in its “war of aggression,” and that 
the “plot” to hold peace talks would not fool the people of the world.95  Beijing’s 
suspicion of American motives also extended to less controversial items, however, with 
U.S. Ambassador John Gronouski reporting that he “was impressed by inflexibility of 
Chinese position and their refusal to give any indication of willingness to resolve the 
Viet-Nam crisis or anything else on any terms other than their own.”96  Even Thomson 
was “under no illusion” that the policies he had suggested “would produce a change in 
Communist China’s behavior or its view of the United States.”  Rather, “these moves 
would give us a greater look of maturity and self-confidence, far greater rapport with our 
major allies, increased respect from the ‘third world,’ a greater degree of 
maneuverability, and the basis for long-term leverage with the Chicoms.”97  
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In the face of the complete collapse of its efforts to maintain Beijing’s diplomatic 
isolation, Washington held the line out of sense of its obligations as a responsible 
member of the international community to uphold the principles of the international 
order against communist violations.  However, despite all of these distressing signs and 
with the Vietnam War in full swing, Rusk reiterated in March 1966 that “there was 
nothing eternal or immovable about American China policy; we had to avoid assuming 
that current hostility meant unending and inevitable hostility.”  The United States “must 
continue to make plain that, if Peiping abandons its belief that force is the best way to 
resolve disputes and gives up its violent strategy of world revolution, we would welcome 
an era of good relations.”  But it must “do nothing which encourages Peiping – or 
anyone else – to believe that it can reap gains from its aggressive actions and designs.”98   
 
(Mis)managing the U.S.-ROC Relationship 
The Kennedy administration’s approach toward Taiwan from the outset differed 
from its predecessor’s in that whatever Eisenhower may have said about the 
Generalissimo in private his administration always treated the ROC as a partner in the 
global struggle against communism.  Over the course of the 1950s, Ike and Dulles had 
developed an effective set of practices to ensure broad ROC compliance with American 
designs.  Cognizant of the limits of its ability to force Chiang to follow the American 
lead, Ike’s State Department worked primarily through persuasion, keeping Chiang fully 
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informed ahead of time of any proposed action, consulting his government on major 
decisions, and demonstrating sensitivity to and even sympathy with his desire to free the 
Chinese people from communist enslavement.  Only occasionally had the administration 
threatened Chiang or withheld material support, and even in these instances the 
administration carefully avoided implying that the United States and ROC were anything 
less than teammates working toward a common goal.   
The Kennedy team shared Eisenhower’s view that Chiang Kai-shek’s 
overzealous ambition to return to the mainland posed a threat to both regional stability 
and to the accomplishment of its basic objectives toward China.  But the new 
administration maintained an unrealistic view of how to manage U.S.-ROC relations.  
Prior to entering office, the Kennedy administration noted a variety of ways in which the 
apparent inflexibility of Eisenhower’s China policy had undermined vital American 
support in the world and had minimized the chances of achieving a relaxation of Sino-
American tensions.  The Kennedy administration thus sought to liquidate those 
“unproductive” aspects of China policy that would solidify international support for the 
continued containment of communist aggression.  But the administration’s 
overwhelming concern with this goal blinded them to the reality that it could not simply 
dictate to Chiang, and that attempting to do so could have disastrous consequences. 
Chiang continued efforts to convince Washington that the key to resolving all of 
the problems in East Asia lay with the removal of the hard-line communist government 
in Beijing, a feat, he argued, that the Free World could best accomplish through the bold 
and effective use of Nationalist forces on the mainland.  Chiang saw the depravations of 
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the Great Leap Forward and the full-blown Tibetan insurrection in 1959 as offering the 
kind of social discontent that Eisenhower had envisioned in his policy of pressures and 
that his proposals to Chiang suggested might allow a mainland invasion to succeed.  The 
Generalissimo pressured both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations not to 
squander these opportunities, and believed that anti-communist forces in Tibet and 
Southwest China could consolidate their positions, merge, and then spread the 
movement into central China.99  To this end, in the spring of 1961 he began operational 
planning for a mainland invasion, an endeavor code-named Operation Guoguang 
(National Glory).   
Such schemes proved unrealistic.  Although famine conditions and government 
repression had provided a steady stream of recruits for the Tibetan insurgency during 
1961, the PLA retained effective control over the region.  In China proper, the 
widespread famine and social dislocations from the collectivization program had not 
converted popular dissatisfaction into active resistance to the government.  Furthermore, 
the several thousand Nationalist irregulars that remained in Burma at this time proved no 
more effective in the early 1960s than they had in the 1950s. 
The Nationalist irregulars had, however, continued to undermine the support the 
United States received from the international community.  Among his first acts as 
Secretary of State, Rusk essentially ordered Chiang to stop supporting the remaining 
Nationalist irregulars in Burma and Laos, noting how the ROC was incomprehensibly 
and recklessly creating a “situation which imposes upon itself formidable international 
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political burdens at time when it could least afford them,” and adding that Taipei “would 
make serious miscalculation if it supposes we would not back it up.”100  Similarly, when 
South Vietnamese Premier Ngo Dinh Diem in May, and again in October, requested the 
use of Nationalist soldiers to help resist the communist insurgents in his country, the 
State Department turned him down.101  Chiang likely expected such rejections and, 
indeed, had accepted such limitations on his freedom of action, however grudgingly, for 
over a decade.   
What made Washington’s new approach especially distasteful to the 
Generalissimo was that it no longer implied a genuine partnership.  Rather than 
persuasion, the Kennedy administration seemed intent on lecturing to and making 
categorical demands of Taipei.  Many administration officials who had served under 
Eisenhower and had direct experience with handling Chiang warned of the potential 
dangers of pushing the ROC too hard and too fast.  In March 1961, Ambassador to 
Taipei Everett Drumright expressed that “For the first time since I came to Taiwan three 
years ago, I sense a feeling among high GRC authorities that USG is looking for some 
way out of China impasse at their expense.”  Any movement toward a two-Chinas 
framework, he warned, “must be handled with utmost subtlety” in order to prevent 
unilateral action such as withdrawing from the U.N. of which the “leadership here is 
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quite capable” if “pushed too hard or driven into a corner.”102  In May, McConaughy, 
now Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, similarly argued that any 
movement toward two-Chinas, and particularly efforts to convince the ROC to accept 
such a policy, “would fail and have unfortunate consequences.”  Rather, he continued, 
the administration should perpetuate Eisenhower’s formula of allowing both sides to 
retain their political claims but insuring “that neither side resorts to large-scale use of 
force to realize their objectives.”103  U.A. Johnson agreed, expressing that the 
administration should not pressure the ROC to make changes “until we have some 
reason to believe that Peiping would be responsive.”  Only time could solve the political 
impasse, he argued, and in the meantime the United States should “continue to do all we 
can to prevent its exploding into hostilities.”104     
Kennedy and the newcomers in his administration either ignored these warnings 
or remained unaware of their full ramifications.  Komer was on well-trod territory when 
he noted in May that the United States was entitled to insist that Chiang “rationalize his 
position for the long pull.”105  An NIE that June, however, diverged considerably from 
Eisenhower’s approach by predicting that no matter what policy the administration 
pursued, the ROC would probably resign itself to “making the best of a future on Taiwan” 
and would “probably continue as a part of the Free World.”106  That estimate was sorely 
mistaken, or, at the very least, about fifteen years premature.  This ill-considered 
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perspective did not go unnoticed in Taipei, and by the fall of 1961 much of Chiang’s 
trust in American leadership had evaporated.  This resulted primarily from the 
administration’s handling of three specific issues – Chinese representation, Outer 
Mongolia, and Thomas Liao (Liao Wen-yi) – all of which developed simultaneously and 
exploded with great effect in the summer of 1961. 
For a decade, the United States had relied on a moratorium agreement in the 
United Nations to assure the continued inclusion of the ROC and exclusion of the PRC.  
In February 1961, however, Rusk noted that “support was running out for the 
moratorium” against seating Communist China.107  This spurred Komer the following 
month to suggest that the administration move promptly to convince the international 
community to “buy enough of a ‘two Chinas’ policy to make Peiping refuse UN 
membership,” a move that “is going to be painful as hell to us” but that circumstances 
nonetheless demanded.108  Rusk concurred, indicating that “we should try to get away 
from the present deadlock which involved a considerable risk and produce another 
deadlock but on a more advantageous position.”109  Likely the combination of the need 
to assure international support for the American position and Rusk’s genuine belief that 
two Chinas did, in fact, exist compelled him to pursue a successor state formula whereby 
the ROC would keep its seat and the PRC would have to apply to receive membership in 
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its own right.110  But because this scheme undoubtedly would prove unacceptable to 
Beijing, “the adversary would save us from its consequences by rejecting it.”111   
Throughout the spring, however, the Nationalists protested vigorously against 
this or any other proposal that smacked of a two-Chinas settlement, and accused the 
administration of not supporting the continuation of the moratorium which, according to 
Taipei, remained viable.112  The administration persisted in its efforts to advance the 
successor state option, however, since it remained the only strategy that could have 
obtained widespread and long-lasting support among the international community for the 
continued seating of the ROC.  Any other approach would inevitably result sooner or 
later in Taipei’s exclusion, since, if given a choice between China and Taiwan, “a 
majority of the General Assembly would vote to seat the Chinese Communists.”113  Rusk 
understood that any proposal that even hinted at PRC membership would encounter 
resistance from Congress, and, as such, he suggested that Kennedy emphasize to his 
domestic audience the necessity of abandoning the moratorium rather than elaborating 
on the details of alternative courses.114 
At this same time, the administration confronted a new diplomatic crisis over 
Outer Mongolia, a nation that had been the center of much diplomatic maneuvering 
since the late-1940s.  Following the Chinese Communist revolution, the Soviet Union 
obtained Mao’s acquiescence to Outer Mongolian independence despite the feeling of 
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many Chinese that that territory belonged to China.  Indeed, Chiang shared this 
perspective, which led him to view with some concern Ulan Bator’s application for U.N. 
membership in 1961.  Washington sympathized with Chiang, but because Outer 
Mongolia remained a Soviet client state, Moscow threatened to veto the admission of 
Mauritania if either the United States or ROC should veto Outer Mongolia’s admission.  
Because the newly independent African nations considered Mauritanian admission so 
important, and because the African bloc was of such vital importance in the effort to 
exclude Beijing from the U.N., Washington felt it could not afford to allow Chiang to 
make good on his veto threat.  As such, on June 1, with no prior consultation or warning, 
the Kennedy administration informed the ROC that it would enter into negotiations with 
Moscow in preparation to establish diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia, a move 
that presaged that country’s entry into the U.N.115  Four days later, the ROC Foreign 
Minister responded in strong terms, calling this a “very unfriendly act,” and urging 
reconsideration.116   
The breaking point for Chiang regarded the case of Thomas Liao, one of several 
hundred native Formosan refugees who fled from Taiwan to Japan in the late-1940s 
following Chiang Kai-shek’s brutal suppression of indigenous Formosan political 
opposition to Nationalist rule.  In 1950 Liao helped found the Formosan Democratic 
Independence Party, and five years later created and became president of the Republic of 
Formosa in exile.  Chiang regularly pressured the Japanese government to maintain strict 
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control over Liao’s activities, and covertly dispatched agents to harass Liao and other 
Formosa Independence advocates.117  Throughout the 1950s Liao sought to obtain a visa 
to enter the United States, though each time the U.S. government denied his request.  In 
March 1961, however, Senator William Fulbright personally wrote Rusk requesting 
favorable consideration of Liao’s request.  Rusk then referred the issue to the 
administration’s legal advisors who concluded in May that no legal grounds existed for 
denying the visa.  The State Department informed the ROC ambassador of its decision 
on June 13, once again without any prior notification.   
The insistence on pursuing the successor state formula despite ROC concerns 
coupled with the administration’s lack of consultation on the Thomas Liao and Outer 
Mongolian issues placed enormous strain on the U.S.-ROC relationship that undermined 
much of Chiang’s willingness to continue to cooperate with Washington.  Chiang’s 
response was swift and sharp.  On June 21, “with emphasis and at times in tone of 
indignation,” Chiang characterized the decision to admit Liao as “an unfriendly act taken 
in utter disregard of interests of friendly ally” that would “promote Liao’s scheme for an 
independent Taiwan.”118  Indeed, he continued, the administration seemed to desire a 
two-Chinas arrangement; Chiang “would have no part of such proposals and would 
withdraw from UN rather than be a party to them.”  The admission of Outer Mongolia 
similarly portended “incalculable consequences,” and “would not only be of tremendous 
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benefit to Communist Bloc but would do irreparable harm to GRC interests.”  And 
finally, Chiang lambasted the administration for its unilateralism, failure to consult, and 
lecturing which “would not be worthy of a master-satellite relationship, let alone 
relationship supposed to exist between friendly allies with mutual interests.”119  Two 
days later, Chiang Ching-kuo reiterated these points, and, specifically citing the Liao 
case as his rationale, informed Drumright that he would no longer carry out his planned 
visit to the United States in July.120 
The administration reacted to this outpouring of discontent by engaging in a 
massive blame game.  Drumright blamed Washington’s failure to grasp the extent of 
Nationalist sensitivity to the administration’s initiatives, and urged reconsideration.121  
Rusk blamed Chiang for expecting the United States to “act like a satellite.”122  Bundy 
concluded that fault lay with Rusk and the State Department; not only had Drumright 
failed to convey the administration’s positions effectively, but the Department’s 
lecturing and lack of consultation had exacerbated Chiang’s anxieties.123  Kennedy also 
participated in the accusations, though he spread the blame more broadly.  He took 
Bundy to task on the Chinese representation issue, expressed astonishment that the 
United States could not garner a simple majority against PRC admission, and called for a 
renewed estimate of U.N. voting.  As for Thomas Liao, Kennedy “was startled to see all 
that flap over one man,” and demanded to know if the decision had been made with 
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Rusk’s knowledge.  Furthermore, believing that “Drumright is not representing our view 
effectively,” Kennedy decided to recall the ambassador for consultation “preparatory to 
taking a firm position with Chiang.”124   
Kennedy had reason to worry.  In early July the administration received 
disturbing signals from both CIA and military officials that the ROC had begun 
“preparing dangerous adventures of its own, up to and including a suicidal landing on 
the mainland.”125  By the end of the month, the administration had come to believe that 
Chiang was “propelled more by a genuine ‘act or perish’ mentality and distrust of the 
Kennedy administration than by any scheme to exact concessions from Washington 
through the ‘threat’ of wild adventures.”126  This unilateralism also seemed to extend to 
initiatives in the United Nations where Chiang seemed “ready to pull the house down on 
himself – and on us in the process.”127  Simultaneously, word got out that the 
administration would pursue the successor state option in the United Nations and that 
this could, in theory, allow the seating of the Chinese Communists.  On July 25, the 
Senate voted unanimously against any such proposal, and the House of Representatives 
followed suit on August 31.  Various members of Congress added their own individual 
critiques of the administration’s policies, calls that grew more intense when they 
discovered that Owen Lattimore – a high-profile McCarthyite target of a previous era – 
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was at that moment visiting Outer Mongolia.128  This prodding was ultimately 
unnecessary in that the administration did not favor Beijing’s entry into the United 
Nations, but it did emphasize that the method that the administration had chosen to 
pursue this end was simply unworkable.   
In an effort to salvage the situation, the administration took several significant 
steps.  On the diplomatic front, the State Department accepted the reality that whatever 
the merits of the successor state formula, the costs of championing that approach 
outweighed the potential benefits.  As such, the administration abandoned it in favor of 
making the Chinese representation issue an “important question” that required a two-
thirds vote.129  Furthermore, Kennedy personally decided that “for reasons of national 
policy,” the State Department should temporarily deny Thomas Liao a visa, though this 
decision should remain secret in order to retain flexibility in the future.130  Such 
diplomatic maneuvers did not suffice to remove the threat of unilateral Nationalist 
military action, however.  To resolve this dilemma, Bundy latched onto a 
recommendation offered by the head of the CIA office in the ROC, Ray Cline.  In a 
discussion of July 6, Cline characterized a return to the mainland as the “great sustaining 
dream” of the Nationalists, and urged the administration to join with Chiang “in certain 
reconnaissance probes” that would serve to “recapture” the Generalissimo’s support and 
cooperation.131  Kennedy apparently accepted this recommendation later that month; 
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taking up an earlier ROC proposal to airdrop 200-300 teams into China, the 
administration instead accepted plans for six smaller teams numbering no more than 
twenty soldiers each.132  This would divert Chiang’s actions into safer pursuits that 
would not involve the threat of war and would avoid direct Sino-American conflict.   
The problem of Outer Mongolia remained.  In September, with the next meeting 
of the UNGA rapidly approaching, the president personally wrote to Chiang.  His 
relatively brief and straightforward message emphasized the significance of the 
Mongolian issue, but contained none of the finessed praise and rhetorical flourishes that 
had characterized Eisenhower’s correspondences with the Generalissimo.  Even worse, 
his message concluded with an implied threat, expressing Washington’s “freedom to 
pursue whichever avenue we consider best calculated to advance the objective which we 
both seek.”133  Chiang characteristically responded with his own lecture about the 
dangers of yielding to the communists’ “international blackmail” and implied that he 
would accept the ROC’s exclusion from the organization rather than abandon this 
“moral position.”134   
Rusk took considerable affront to this response, especially Chiang’s notion that 
the failure to maintain the moratorium resulted from a lack of American effort to 
persuade other countries.135  The Secretary of State pushed back hard against such 
assertions in meetings with both the Nationalist Foreign Minister and ambassador to the 
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U.N. that, coupled with the ROC’s own investigations into the probable moratorium 
votes, appear to have driven Chiang to a more accommodating position.136  Kennedy 
facilitated this by writing a more conciliatory letter to Chiang that emphasized the 
American commitment to defend Taiwan, exclude the PRC from the U.N., consult rather 
than threaten, and find a mutually-acceptable solution to the problem of Outer 
Mongolia.137  Furthermore, the president instructed Drumright to avoid the impression 
that the United States was threatening either Chiang or the ROC, and pledged to reaffirm 
publicly the administration’s opposition to Chinese Communist entry into the United 
Nations.138  In the end, Chiang agreed not to veto the admission of Outer Mongolia, but 
only after Kennedy offered a private pledge to veto China’s admission should Beijing 
ever receive sufficient votes.139  On December 15, the UNGA accepted the U.S.-
sponsored resolution that deemed the Chinese representation issue an important question 
by a vote of 61-34 with 7 abstentions.  At that same session, both Outer Mongolia and 
Mauritania became members of the United Nations; the Republic of China abstained. 
Within a month, the administration realized that its efforts during the summer 
and fall of 1961 had done little to moderate Chiang’s behavior.  The Generalissimo 
noted the auspiciousness of 1962 as the “Year of the Tiger” and pledged in January that 
the Nationalists would retake the mainland that year. He asserted that “we can no longer 
vacillate or hesitate to perform our duty to deliver our people, our nation and the whole 
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world from catastrophe.”  “There is no doubt,” he continued,” that we can annihilate the 
Communists, reunify our country, and restore freedom to the people on the mainland in 
the nearest future.”140   This prompted new debates among administration officials to 
determine the likelihood that such an invasion would succeed.   The earliest judgment 
came from Komer, who admitted in late-January that China is “feebler than at any time 
since it consolidated the 1947-49 revolution” which meant that the Nationalists could 
possibly foment an uprising.  Even if this could occur, however, “the Soviets won’t let us 
succeed” and would inevitably intervene to save the regime under such circumstances.141  
An SNIE in March went even further in its conclusion that “few people, and no 
significant military units, would be likely to join the GRC forces in the absence of clear 
military success” which the ROC could achieve only through large-scale American 
support.142   
Once again, however, Drumright pleaded for the administration not to unduly 
antagonize Chiang by rejecting his proposals outright.  Such “cold shouldering” 
constituted the “least desirable course of action and could lead to undesirable actions and 
consequences.”   Rather, the administration should engage in a concrete examination and 
appraisal of Chiang’s invasion plans and explain their viability (or lack thereof) given 
the state of affairs on the mainland and the capabilities of Nationalist forces.143  On 
March 6, he again warned that “it was utterly clear that Chiang is bent on taking some 
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kind of action this year against mainland and that it will take skillful, adept responses on 
our part to channel his actions in directions we deem appropriate to situation.144  Perhaps 
in response to this, Kennedy dispatched Harriman on “an emergency visit” to Taiwan to 
prevent an “imminent thrust.”145  Kennedy authorized Harriman to convey his approval 
of additional small-scale airdrops into China for purposes of gathering intelligence 
information, and by the end of the month had personally proposed providing planes and 
training for such drops so long as the planes remained in the United States pending “a 
further decision.”146  In addition, the administration once more denied a visa to Thomas 
Liao on the grounds that “his anticipated activities in the United States would be 
prejudicial to the national interest,” and refused to reopen the issue of Nationalist forces 
on the offshore islands lest this prompt Chiang to initiate a “suicidal landing.”147   
Far from being mollified by the administration’s actions, Chiang dramatically 
increased the pace of his military operations and other preparations for an invasion.  
Taipei increased draft calls, made military service of indefinite duration, instituted a war 
tax, placed large orders for foreign weapons, and increased coastal surveillance.  The 
Nationalists established a school near Taipei to train cadre to “reestablish GRC 
institutions in areas of the mainland liberated by invading ROC armies.”148  Taipei 
attempted to obtain at the very least the administration’s tacit support for its initiatives, 
and at most for its active involvement in the joint study of operational plans.  The 
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administration’s refusal to provide either of these plunged Chiang “into another trough 
of despair,” though he grudgingly accepted this rejection.  Although the situation 
appeared stable, Cline, on whose shoulders rested the responsibility of calming Chiang, 
expressed that “it was close thing,” and that the U.S.-ROC relationship might “come 
unstuck if not given sympathetic attention this end and tangible signs of active interest 
from Washington.”149 
Nationalist operations continued apace throughout the spring, beginning with 
stepped-up coastal raiding in April and May.  ROC officials asserted repeatedly that the 
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 infringed on ROC sovereignty and freedom of action 
and, thus, required reconsideration.150  In violation of its previous pledges, the 
Nationalists did not keep the administration fully informed of their operations, and 
continued preparations for large-scale action despite the administration’s concerns.151  
Just as had occurred in 1954, Nationalist operations and propaganda exacerbated 
Beijing’s insecurities regarding American and ROC intentions, and contributed to the 
emergence of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.  In response to the appearance of an 
impending Nationalist invasion, Beijing initiated in June the largest Chinese Communist 
troop movement since the Korean War, redeploying some 500,000 soldiers to the coastal 
regions opposite Taiwan in an effort to deter any possible invasion from across the Strait.   
The administration did its utmost to convey to Beijing via London and Moscow the 
essentially defensive American posture in the region and to emphasize that Nationalist 
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actions remained subject to the administration’s concurrence.152  On June 23, Cabot 
expressed to his Chinese counterpart that Washington “had no intention of supporting 
any GRC attack on Mainland under existing circumstances,” a message he repeated 
twice more.  Furthermore, he asserted that if the PRC build-up opposite Taiwan was 
truly defensive, “it was unobjectionable.”153  Kennedy reinforced this in his June 27 
press conference during which he reiterated the American commitment, consistent with 
the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution, to defend both Taiwan and the 
offshore islands from communist aggression.  However, he took pains to emphasize that 
the ultimate American objective in the Strait had always been to achieve a mutual 
renunciation of force agreement, and that “the purposes of the United States in this area 
are peaceful and defensive.”154  The combination of these private and public statements 
reassured Beijing and effectively ended the crisis.155 
With Beijing reassured, the administration now returned its focus to moderating 
Chiang’s aggressiveness.  To accomplish this, Kennedy appointed veteran military 
officer and diplomat Admiral Alan Kirk as the new ambassador to Taipei.  The 
administration intended the appointment of the “crusty” Kirk as a means to “lay down 
the law to Chiang Kai-shek”; that is, to utilize the Admiral’s reputation as an expert on 
amphibious warfare in order to moderate and rationalize Chiang’s demands for a 
mainland invasion and to minimize the chances that Chiang’s actions would lead to 
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additional crises.156  Kirk’s first act as ambassador, however – the first day he took up 
his post in Taipei – was to explain away Cabot’s June 22 statements to PRC Ambassador 
Wang.  When Chiang asked if Cabot had, in fact, expressed that the United States would 
not support a Nationalist return to the mainland, Kirk essentially lied, denying that Cabot 
had given any such assurance and echoing Kennedy’s public statement that the 
administration’s objective remained a mutual renunciation of force.157  In addition, 
Harriman instructed Kirk to refuse to provide additional military items to Chiang, but 
not to portray this refusal as a “final turn-down” even if the administration considered it 
so.158  
Despite these efforts, Nationalist operations continued and increased.  The ROC 
inserted hundreds of operatives onto the mainland during the latter half of 1962, often 
dressing them as PLA officers with orders to establish inland bases to facilitate 
additional covert operations.159  By September, ROC incursions had culminated in an 
all-out guerilla war in South China, including what the administration viewed as a 
disturbing program of “terrorist” activities in the vicinity of Hong Kong and Macau 
about which the authorities in those cities expressed concern.160  Though the 
administration appeared concerned about this renewed violence, the extent of these 
operations and the fact that it occurred simultaneous with the Sino-Indian border war 
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suggests at least the possibility that the administration may have supported the ROC in 
these efforts.  Indeed, Allen Whiting argues that the CIA both knew of and facilitated 
Chiang’s military build-up during 1962, but that it kept this information from the State 
Department.161  In any event, the PRC showed considerable success at repelling these 
Nationalist incursions.  In early January, Beijing gained much propaganda value from 
publicizing its defeat or capture during the previous three months of nine Nationalist 
teams totaling approximately 180 soldiers, all of whom had been armed with American-
made weapons.  Kirk grew concerned about Beijing’s broadcasts that “pilloried” the 
United States “as villain of this act with scanty attention to ChiNats” and that cast this 
activity as an example of American aggression.162   
Even the general failure of these incursions did not end Nationalist efforts.  
Instead, the focus of ROC operations shifted early in 1963 from attempted establishment 
of guerilla bases in the interior to commando raids against installations along the coast.  
The Nationalists also expanded these operations beyond the Guangdong coast in 
southern China to encompass Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shandong.163  Remarkably, 
Chiang coupled these efforts with a renewed plea to Kennedy to support a large-scale 
Nationalist landing, arguing that the Generalissimo could no longer ignore the “popular 
sentiments” in Taiwan demanding such action.164  Chiang subsequently offered a new 
plan to land two divisions of troops on the mainland and reiterated the Nationalists’ 
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sovereign right to invade, even going so far as to refer to such operations as a domestic 
affair and therefore not subject to the restrictions of the MDT.   
The administration rejected these urgings in the strongest terms, insisting that 
ROC operations against the mainland remained tied to the provisions of the MDT and 
the October 1958 exchange of notes.165  Indeed, if the administration accepted the notion 
that Taiwan’s liberation of the mainland was an internal affair, it would also have to 
accept that such a view also applied to the mainland’s liberation of Taiwan.  As U.A. 
Johnson noted in April, “I think that this, of course, was also exactly what I had heard 
from Wang Ping-nan at Geneva for three years, and was the consistent Peking line.  I 
said that I could not see how Taiwan could take this attitude without also reviewing 
whether it desired to maintain its treaty relationship with the United States.”166   
By February, Kirk’s patience with Chiang had reached its end.  He reminded 
Kennedy that Chiang had lost the mainland in the late-1940s due to his own 
stubbornness and incompetence, and bluntly stated that the United States should not seek 
Chiang’s return to power in China since “if he ever did get back on the Mainland he 
would be ungrateful to the United States, and be very difficult to handle.”167  He went 
even further, however, by indicating that Taiwan was not necessarily vital to American 
interests since the island produced intelligence of questionable value, and since any 
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American-backed return to the mainland would constitute a violation of the MDT and 
“would impugn our good faith, our honor, and our self-respect”168 
Chiang may have viewed Kennedy’s assassination as an opportunity to once 
more court Washington’s favor; after all, Lyndon Johnson had been a long-time and avid 
supporter of the Nationalists.  In April 1964, Chiang emphasized the importance of 
carrying the Southeast Asian hostilities not just into North Vietnam but into China 
proper as well.  During a meeting with Rusk, he presented a proposal whereby the ROC 
would parachute between 5,000 and 10,000 guerillas into Southwest China.  This plan 
would serve the dual purpose of facilitating anti-communist revolution in Yunnan 
Province, but also of cutting off the supply lines the North Vietnamese relied upon to 
receive Chinese Communist aid.  The following year, Chiang Ching-kuo brought this 
message directly to the United States when he visited Washington for five days of 
discussions.  Ultimately, however, the administration believed such schemes might draw 
the PRC into a Korea-style war, an outcome it desperately hoped to avoid.169   
Yet the massive American war effort in Vietnam required the use of Taiwan as a 
major logistical center for training and providing recreation for troops, transporting 
supplies, and repairing equipment, among many other important functions.  Even as 
Washington curtailed economic aid to Taiwan in 1965 it established a variety of other 
linkages that solidified the partnership.  This cooperation did not translate into American 
support of Nationalist operations against the mainland, however.  In an assessment of 
August 18, 1965, the CIA noted the “repeated failure” of small-scale raids between late-
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1962 and mid-1964 that “points up the risks of attempting coastal landings.”170  For 
reasons that remain obscure, Nationalist unconventional warfare operations against the 
mainland ended in 1966, even though joint U.S.-ROC training continued for two more 
years.171  Even if this resulted from the Washington’s influence, the Johnson 
administration seemed unable to prevent the remaining Nationalist irregulars in Burma 
in 1966 from once more engaging PRC forces in Yunnan.172  ROC operations remained 
ineffective, however, and ended in 1972 with Nixon’s opening to China. 
The necessity of maintaining Taiwan as a strategic reserve and as an important 
base from which to conduct operations in Vietnam conflicted with the necessity of 
minimizing hostilities with China.  Undoubtedly recalling the hard-won lessons of the 
Kennedy team regarding the management of U.S.-ROC relations, the Johnson 
administration set about to walk the thin line between mollifying both Beijing and Taipei.  
In a manner similar to Kennedy and Hilsman’s earlier statements, Johnson publicly 
called for reconciliation with China and carefully avoided actions against North Vietnam 
that might cause Beijing’s intervention.  Simultaneously, the Johnson administration 
approved a variety of measures – facilitating aircraft delivery, exchanging intelligence 
information and briefings on the ongoing Warsaw Talks, and extending an invitation for 
the Nationalist Vice President to visit Washington – designed to signal Chiang that the 
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American commitment to Taiwan remained firm and to prevent the Generalissimo from 
engaging in unilateral action.173   
 
The Slow but Steady Death of the Alternative Strategies 
 The Kennedy administration had no clear, united view of how it hoped to achieve 
the desired reform of PRC’s international relations.  Kennedy’s personal views remain 
obscure, in part because of the lack of an effective policymaking apparatus for much of 
his presidency that might have expressed concretely his views and decisions, and also 
because of Rusk’s obsession with secrecy in his dealings with the president that resulted 
in a lack of memoranda regarding their private discussions.174  The records of the 
Kennedy administration do, however, show traces of Eisenhower’s policy of pressures 
and the hope that this would translate into a mainland rebellion.   
The breakdown of the multilateral trade embargo that occurred during the late-
1950s had alleviated some of the pressures affecting China’s domestic programs, but 
events beyond American control had compensated for this relaxation.  Particularly, the 
rising Sino-Soviet tensions had compelled Moscow to cease providing assistance to 
China and to recall its advisors.  Similarly, Mao’s Great Leap Forward had contributed 
to Beijing’s economic problems by producing a massive famine that between 1959 and 
1962 led to an estimated twenty million deaths.175  In April 1961, a Special National 
Intelligence Estimate reported that Chinese morale “is almost certainly at its lowest point 
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since the Communist assumed power.”  Such estimates led some officials, particularly in 
the military, to advocate additional probing actions on the mainland since popular 
Chinese discontent would remain ineffective in the absence of intervention by an 
“outside force.”176  McConaughy, one of the carry-overs from the previous 
administration, similarly argued that “since PRC hostility was an inescapable fact of life,” 
the administration should maintain pressures on China in order to “exploit current PRC 
economic difficulties.”177  Among the more curious instances of this rhetoric occurred in 
the wake of the Sino-Indian border war in late-1962.  Having advocated for nearly two 
years a policy of relaxing tensions through, among other things, the reconsideration of 
trade controls and the provision of food aid, Rostow and Bowles now argued for 
“unrelenting pressure” that might “trigger a gradual erosion of the regime’s grip on the 
mainland.”178  Ultimately, however, such calls never found coherent or consistent 
expression in the administration’s policy decisions.   
Did Taiwan then have a role to play?  The Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961 
offers a starting point to determine the extent to which the administration may have 
viewed Chiang’s involvement on the mainland as useful for the purpose of inspiring a 
resistance movement.  Circumstances in Cuba mirrored those facing China during this 
time.  The CIA had trained a group of Cuban exiles that it believed enjoyed the support 
of disaffected politicos and soldiers within the regime of Cuban President Fidel Castro.  
Upon establishing a foothold on the island, these latter groups would join in the 
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movement and trigger a popular uprising that would topple the government.  Also 
similar to the China situation, the administration noted “widespread disillusionment” 
among the Cuban population that had produced a “steady stream of refugees fleeing the 
island.”  According to Rusk’s later recollections, “This gave us the impression that many 
Cubans did not like Castro and would do something about him if the opportunity 
arose.”179   
The complete failure of the operation to achieve its objectives – especially that of 
inciting the Cuban people to rebellion – must have given Kennedy and his advisers 
pause when considering similar action against China.  Indeed, Rusk later admitted that 
he had never seen “actual evidence that Cuba was ripe for another revolution,” and 
believed that the CIA’s commitment to the project distorted their judgment as to its 
feasibility.180  To a considerable extent, the subsequent American reluctance to support 
Nationalist activities on the mainland remained tied to this demand that Chiang first 
demonstrate that his landing would, indeed, catalyze the Chinese people to rebel against 
Beijing.  As Rusk explained, “we learned quickly, and there was not much chance that 
we would fall into that kind of trap again.”181  Even before the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had 
sent a message to Chiang Kai-shek in which he listed “seven points of agreement 
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regarding U.S.-ROC cooperation on activities to be carried out on the Chinese mainland,” 
though the actual contents of the message remain classified.182   
By July 1961, with Chiang on the verge of dangerous unilateral action, Cline 
strongly encouraged the administration to cooperate with Chiang “in certain 
reconnaissance probes on the mainland” for the explicit purpose of regaining the 
Generalissimo’s trust and support; tellingly, Cline did not mention the value such 
operations might have on fomenting mainland resistance.183  Kennedy’s approval later 
that month of a series of 20-man drops inside China and his approval of similar drops the 
following year undoubtedly followed this same rationale.184  On March 6, 1962, 
Drumright warned that “Chiang is bent on taking some kind of action this year,” and that 
“it will take skillful, adept responses on our part to channel his actions in directions we 
deem appropriate to situation.”  Three days later, Kennedy approved consideration of 
airdropping ROC forces into China, though he placed preference on smaller actions 
handled entirely by the ROC.  Once again, he apparently intended these more as a way 
to divert Chiang’s energies into less destructive pursuits than as a genuine effort to 
foment rebellion.   
As noted earlier, in the first half of 1962 the administration began moving toward 
acceptance of the idea that a Nationalist landing would fail to foment a popular uprising, 
and even if it managed to do so the Soviet Union would never allow the PRC 
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government to collapse under such circumstances.  Yet the hopes for a successful 
landing did not die off completely, however.  The Consulate in Hong Kong reported that 
Beijing’s massive troop transfer during the June 1962 Strait crisis stemmed in part from 
fear that popular discontent with Chinese Communist rule would, indeed, allow a 
Nationalist landing to successfully catalyze a rebellion.185  Further, the drought and 
floods wracking China at that time may have contributed to PRC Foreign Minister Chen 
Yi’s comment that millions of Chinese might now oppose communist rule and that if 
“Chiang Kai-shek drops paratroops and lands on the mainland with American support, 
these elements will come out of hiding.”186  Kennedy, it seems, also had not entirely 
written off the possibility of a Nationalist-inspired mainland rebellion.  In a June 28, 
1962, meeting with CIA Director John McCone, for instance, the president expressed 
that “he saw no useful purpose in changing United States policy until such a time as we 
had some specific reason for so doing, i.e., the possibility of deterioration on the 
Mainland to a point where it was felt desirable to support Chiang in a military 
operation.”187  Even Hilsman, among the most ardent advocates for a more flexible 
policy toward China, admitted “there was in fact some merit” to Chiang’s notion that the 
Chinese people would respond favorably to a Nationalist landing.  Although he rejected 
the Nationalists’ arguments that a landing would succeed, he nonetheless admitted that 
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“there was always some possibility that new evidence would support the notion that the 
mass of the people would revolt and no one wanted to overlook such a possibility.”188 
By mid-year, however, the administration had reached a point where it simply 
could not rely on Nationalist landings as a reliable basis from which to make policy; it 
simply lacked the Eisenhower administration’s faith in or patience for the theory of 
inevitable collapse.  Harriman offered a characteristic assessment of ROC landings that 
“the most optimistic estimate I have heard from any American is ten to one against 
achievement of its objective.”189  Indeed, administration officials expected that the 
acquisition of additional intelligence regarding mainland conditions would only confirm 
that the Chinese people would not respond to a Nationalist landing by rebelling against 
Beijing.  Thus, when Kennedy instructed the CIA to help the Nationalists engage in 
additional small-scale operations following the June 1962 Strait crisis, he did so only as 
a way to secure more intelligence about mainland conditions that would definitively 
prove this assessment and discredit Chiang’s militant proposals.  Harriman confirmed 
this the following month when he admitted that the administration approved the airdrops 
not to prepare for an invasion, but rather for the purpose of “anticipating, containing and 
diverting GRC pressures for larger-scale operations.”190  
Because the administration never wholeheartedly perceived the overthrow of the 
PRC government as a viable policy option, it increasingly relied on the notion that 
Mao’s radical excesses might provide opportunities for Washington to woo more 
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pragmatic Chinese Communist officials – a strategy that harkened back to Truman’s 
initial efforts to win over the Chinese Communist leadership in 1949 and 1950.  Most 
officials in the early 1960s perceived the failures of the Great Leap Forward as having 
created significant rifts among CCP officials that the United States could exploit through 
the effective use of certain small conciliatory gestures.  These gestures, they believed, 
might allow a “second echelon” of Chinese Communist leaders to assert a moderating 
influence on Mao’s domestic and foreign policies.  Furthermore, many American 
officials noted Mao’s advanced age and suggested that signs of American flexibility 
could have a profound influence on those officials who would take power once Mao 
died.191  In either case, the United States, lacking alternatives, should now adopt policies 
that would demonstrate a flexible approach to Sino-American relations.  
The administration took tentative steps in this direction, beginning with a 
renewed effort at the March 7, 1961, Warsaw meeting to achieve an agreement on the 
exchange of newspaper correspondents.192 Similarly, Bowles and Rostow both believed 
that famine conditions in China provided an opportunity to offer grain sales to Beijing 
“in exchange for a curtailment of its subversive activity in Laos and Vietnam.”193  These 
recommendations had some influence on the administration’s approach, for in August 
Rusk encouraged Cabot to probe his counterpart for “even smallest opportunities to 
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improve atmosphere” but without jeopardizing fundamental American principles.194  
Though historian Michael Lumbers attributes the failure of such initiatives to Bowles 
and Rostow’s lack of influence over the president and his inner circle, in reality these 
initiatives foundered primarily as a result of Beijing’s ongoing support of communist 
activities in Southeast Asia and the fact that it refused to consider such proposals until 
the United States abandoned its commitment to Taiwan.195  Mao had maintained this 
stance on Taiwan since 1958 and had “scorned evidence of American flexibility.”196  As 
such, the Chinese remained resistant to any such overtures.197   
Yet calls for a flexible approach persisted and gained new life following the 
distribution of a memorandum drafted by Edward Rice of the Policy Planning Staff in 
October.198  Rice’s paper constituted the clearest exposition to date of the NSC 68 
formula of balancing a rigid stance against aggression with demonstrations of a 
willingness to seek mutually satisfactory arrangements for co-existence.  Rice’s paper 
made such an impression that when Harriman became Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs in November 1961 he chose Rice as one of his deputies.  Indeed, 
Harriman became a powerful advocate of a flexible approach, expressing in April 1962 
that “our choice seems to be between immobility and steps which are few and small.  I 
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cannot believe that a policy of immobility can serve us well in a world where change is 
the rule.”199   
Rice’s search for a balanced approach, however, lacked novelty, and its practical 
implementation confronted the same obstacles that had confounded Truman and 
Eisenhower – namely, Beijing’s refusal to reciprocate, and the inherent difficulty in 
ascertaining which overtures Washington could make without unduly encouraging the 
Chinese Communists to engage in additional inappropriate behaviors.    As such, 
although Rusk showed some willingness to reconsider the food sales issue in the spring 
of 1962, his recommendations to Kennedy concluded by suggesting that Australia, 
Canada, and France – the other grain-exporting countries – convey to Beijing that “there 
would be a relationship between the direction of any important change in its external 
behavior and continued availability to it of non-bloc food grains.”200  Later that year, 
with mass refugees fleeing China and with the PRC about to “exhaust all substantial 
non-US sources of Free World grain,” the State Department informed Cabot at Warsaw 
to raise the issue of food sales for humanitarian reasons “as soon as it was possible to do 
so in a normal and low-key manner.”201  But again, this only went so far, for in June 
Rusk again demanded “some indication from the Chinese communists that they were 
relaxing their tactics of pressure on India and elsewhere.”202 
Rusk did seek to convey the American attitude through more conventional 
methods, however.  As noted above, during the June Strait crisis the Department 
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explicitly renounced its support of Chiang’s military maneuvers, supported the following 
week by Kennedy’s public statement to the effect that the American posture remained 
defensive and that the United States sought only a mutual renunciation of force.  In 
addition, during the negotiations for the neutralization of Laos in July, Rusk took the 
important symbolic step of exchanging handshakes and pleasantries with PRC Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi.203   
Hilsman’s appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in 
April 1963 perpetuated the emphasis on achieving a more balanced approach to China 
policy despite the apparent increase in Beijing’s militancy in late-1962 and early-1963.  
Hilsman was among those officials who believed that the lingering social disruptions 
from the Great Leap had encouraged Chinese officials to “focus on domestic concerns” 
and might yet “contribute to the adoption of a more moderate line in foreign policy.”204  
Because of Hilsman’s regular contact with the president during this time, and Kennedy’s 
apparent decision to become more directly involved in foreign policy, one can conclude 
that the chief executive remained at least sympathetic to such endeavors, even if he and 
Rusk continued to struggle with how best to implement them.  Hilsman’s efforts peaked 
in December when he delivered his San Francisco speech in which he reiterated the view 
that a policy of containment/deterrence did not necessarily preclude a policy of 
conciliation.  Nonetheless, Hilsman clearly blamed Beijing’s refusal to behave 
appropriately for the lack of progress in Sino-American relations.205 
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Much as with Rice’s October 1961 policy paper, Hilsman’s December 1963 
speech proved less revolutionary than historians subsequently claimed, since it reiterated 
the same NSC 68 formula that Ike had attempted, however imperfectly, to implement 
during the 1950s.  Nonetheless, Hilsman’s speech did include recognition that American 
actions had contributed to the perpetuation of Sino-American tension – something 
Eisenhower would never have admitted, at least not publicly.  Indeed, subsequent 
analyses suggest that Hilsman’s superiors might not have agreed with this view either.  
Historian Noam Kochavi, for instance, points out the array of factors that limited 
Kennedy and Rusk’s ability to devote sufficient attention to the speech, thus allowing it 
to clear both the State Department and the White House unaltered.  In any event, the 
Chinese Communists did not respond favorably to this most recent overture. 
By early 1966, new recommendations reiterated the need to engage with the PRC 
in a way that would lay the groundwork for a potential rapprochement once the 
generation of hard-line Chinese Communists passed from the scene.  In this new policy 
of “containment without isolation,” the “strategy of flexible initiatives is based not on 
expectation of a favorable Chinese response but rather on several near-term and longer-
term objectives,” including the desire to “gradually help to break down China’s acutely 
distorted view of the outside world that plots her encirclement and destruction.”206  
Some officials hoped that by abandoning the demand for reciprocity, the United States 
might successfully win over some of the “revisionist” Chinese that intelligence sources 
indicated did, in fact, exist within China.  However, the available information portrayed 
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as only superficial whatever discontent existed within CCP ranks.  Unable to engender 
PRC factionalism, Washington might have to wait quite a while longer for a more 
cooperative CCP leadership to emerge.207 
 Unbeknownst to the Johnson administration, however, powerful forces within 
China had already begun to create serious ideological schisms separating Mao from the 
bulk of his own party.  Washington knew very little of the internal disagreements within 
the CCP leadership that had developed since the late-1950s.  American officials had only 
recently given higher priority to acquiring solid information on the PRC and increasing 
coordination of American China policies, though by mid-1966 they had not made much 
progress.208  When the administration learned of these schisms, however, the knowledge 
forced the administration to reassess its view of the elder generation of CCP leaders and 
gave it hope for a Sino-American rapprochement now, rather than at some ambiguous, 
indeterminate future time.  This shift in the American perception of the PRC occurred 
during the second half of 1966 as Mao Zedong launched his Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution. 
 The Cultural Revolution represented the most significant turning point in the 
history of the People’s Republic, acting as a crossroads between the Maoist era of 
continuous revolution and the reformist era of Deng Xiaoping.  The Cultural Revolution 
resulted primarily from the domestic setbacks within China that demonstrated the 
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ineffectiveness of Mao’s economic policies.  By the mid-1960s, certain CCP members 
had even begun to call for a peaceful approach to foreign relations in order to focus more 
resources on bringing the socialist experiment within China to fruition.  In the midst of 
such calls for change, the Sino-Soviet split entered a new stage of heightened tensions, 
driven in part by Khrushchev’s less belligerent approach to the United States.  With his 
ideological worldview undiminished since the 1930s, the aging Mao began to see 
“revisionists” and “counterrevolutionaries” at all levels of China’s administrative 
structure, and went so far as to label his chief rival, Liu Shaoqi, as China’s Khrushchev.  
In late-1965, Mao left Beijing for Shanghai where he laid the foundation for an all-out 
ideological and political war on his own Party. 
 The first, or violent, phase of the Cultural Revolution lasted from 1966-1969 
during which Mao systematically struck at those Party members who failed to meet his 
standards of revolutionary purity.  His attacks against the CCP hierarchy spawned a 
semi-independent student movement among the nation’s educational institutions that 
resulted in mass turmoil.  Feeling confident that such expressions of the common masses 
were inherently healthy, Mao ordered the closing of China’s schools to allow the 
nation’s youth to devote their time fully to revolutionary activity.  These students in turn 
formed the Red Guards, a national movement the activities of which engendered both 
disgust and fear throughout the international community.209   
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 For Rusk, Mao’s revolution could not have come at a better time.  In April, 
Arthur Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, believed that because of 
Canadian and Japanese defections, and because of the U.S. failure to gain support among 
African countries, the effort to prevent the U.N. from seating the PRC in the General 
Assembly later that year would fail.  However, the breakdown of social order and the 
almost complete collapse of the Chinese governmental system as one official after 
another succumbed to Mao’s purges provided the Secretary with the leverage he needed 
to convince the UNGA not to grant the PRC membership.210  Indeed, during this period 
many countries that had recognized Beijing – including Burundi, the Central African 
Republic, Dahomey, Ghana, Indonesia, and Tunisia – all chose to sever their relations 
with China.  Only in 1973 did these countries begin to restore relations.211 
 Through the remainder of the administration’s term of office, Rusk sought “ways 
of stimulating” the global revulsion against the Revolution’s excesses and “giving it a 
push.”212  Rusk confidently stated that Chinese Communist “hostility to UN and to much 
of outer world has been highlighted in recent months by turmoil within China 
symbolized by emergence of ‘Red Guards’ and related activity.  Whatever final outcome 
of these developments, their present effect is to underscore militancy and unyielding 
mood of Peking’s current leaders.”213  In November 1966, the Secretary sought to sway 
the Canadian government by emphasizing that Mao remained “tenuously on top,” and 
that “at this moment what must appear to be a naked offer of membership will if 
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anything encourage the hard-liners and work against the possible emergence of different 
policies out of the present turmoil in China.”214  
 For most administration officials, however, the Cultural Revolution offered no 
clear answers about how the United States should proceed.  Rice, now the American 
Consul General in Hong Kong, produced the first major assessment of the Revolution in 
late-June 1966.  Of the possible explanations for the disturbances, the report listed three: 
a succession crisis that, if true, “was triggered by something of no mean importance”; a 
cultural purge with the “unrealistically big order” of liquidating all old ideas, culture, 
customs, and traditions “created in the course of thousands of years by the exploiting 
classes”; and a dispute over policy rooted in ideological differences and exacerbated by 
the recent foreign and domestic policy failures.  Although Rice emphasized that 
developments remained “clouded in obscurity,” he successfully discerned the general 
contours of Mao’s efforts, supported by Lin Biao and the PLA, to indoctrinate CCP 
cadres in Mao’s Thought and use them to attack “the pragmatists and revisionists who 
had been challenging Maoism as the solution of all China’s problems.”215 
 The fact that the internal CCP differences had led to such a state of affairs 
revolutionized the American perception of the Chinese Communist Movement and 
opened new possibilities for U.S. China policy.  As early as July 1966, the CIA reported 
that Mao’s Revolution “is clearly failing,” and expressed doubt that “a dynasty built on 
the sand of Maoist philosophy will take a century to fall; once begun, a decade would 
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seem too long.”216  Later that year as the Revolution deepened, the CIA again reported 
that the “recurrent trauma of government by exhortation as a substitute for effective 
policies to deal with real problems, is clearly taking its toll among the Chinese people,” 
and that Mao’s “desperate effort to reverse the tide may actually hurry his ultimate 
defeat.”217 
 With this in mind, certain American officials reasserted earlier calls for a flexible 
policy, although this time they did so because they believed that a more positive 
approach had a good chance, rather than a vague hope, of wooing the more moderate 
CCP officials.  Once again, Thomson took the lead.  Couching his proposals in the now-
standard terms of winning over allied support, Thomson nonetheless emphasized the 
need to “communicate a new and supportive message to elements within mainland China 
that are pushing for policies of pragmatism and accommodation with the outside world.”  
He concluded by stressing that “such actions could not take place at a more important 
moment in Chinese political history: the more we can do to support the mainland 
pragmatists by our actions and to cause confusion to the theologians in Peking, the better 
for our national interests and the achievement of stability and peace in Asia.”218 
 Other officials, however, raised concerns about the notion of attempting to 
strengthen the pragmatists’ position.  The most significant of these warnings came from 
a government panel of China experts, formed in December 1966, which included such 
prominent figures as John King Fairbank and A. Doak Barnett.  The panel argued 
                                                            
216 CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 25 July 1966, ibid, 364. 
217 Memorandum, CIA Board of National Estimates, 23 September 1966, ibid, 401-402. 
218 Thomson still feared the “built-in resistance to any such adjustments on the 7th floor at State.”  
Emphasis in original.  Memorandum, James Thomson, Jr., to Walt Rostow, 4 August 1966, ibid, 364-366.   
220 
 
against any attempt to guide the revolution toward a predetermined course because the 
United States “probably could not appreciably affect the outcome, and that attempts to 
do so would be counterproductive at best and dangerously foolhardy at worst.”219  Many 
officials echoed the panel’s recommendation.  Rice believed “it is against our interests to 
speak in public of any benefits to us from Maoist chaos,” and John Roche, the 
President’s Special Consultant, suggested that “the Secretary of State issue firm 
instructions to our missions not to dabble in the religious wars of the Communist 
world.”220           
 While the China panel said what the administration should not do, it proved less 
helpful in terms of offering recommendations about what it should do.  After arriving at 
four possible outcomes of the Cultural Revolution – including Mao’s reconsolidation of 
power, a compromise arrangement under Zhou Enlai, victory for the Party apparatus 
backed by the Army, and the dissolution of China into regional, militarily controlled 
units – the panel could reach no consensus as to which of the four appeared most likely, 
nor could the panel determine which was most desirable form the standpoint of U.S. 
interests.  Despite this, the China panel’s existence indicated the extent to which the 
Cultural Revolution affected Washington’s general outlook toward China.  The 
administration’s heightened interest in understanding China had not only led to the 
inclusion of advice from the academic arena, but had also convinced Johnson to 
establish a special senior-level position to advise the president on China.221  Johnson 
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further demonstrated this new attitude in February 1968 when he ordered the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff “as a matter of high and urgent priority, to undertake steps to eliminate, if 
possible,” violations of Chinese airspace.222 
 In the meantime, Zhou Enlai’s efforts to rein in the excesses of the Red Guards 
led many officials to predict that he might supplant Mao and usher in an era of 
compromise.  From Washington’s perspective, Zhou had acted as a moderating influence 
for decades, beginning with his mediation efforts during the Bandung Conference of 
1954.  In January 1967, with civil war a “distinct possibility,” Rostow wrote to Johnson 
that “Premier Chou remains the best hope of achieving a compromise in the interest of 
preserving the nation and the regime’s hard-won, limited accomplishments.”223  Soon 
thereafter, NSC staffer Alfred Jenkins, in a report tellingly titled “Ascendancy of 
Premier Chou and His Policies,” noted the premier’s attempts “to reverse the alarming 
trend toward anarchy in China,” and confidently asserted that “the actions of Chou are 
currently eclipsing the thought of Mao.”224  Though Jenkins admitted the difficulty in 
ascertaining whether “Chou is comfortably in the saddle and likely to remain there,” he 
nonetheless offered his thoughts on the policies that a more moderate CCP would pursue 
under Zhou’s leadership.225   
 Rumors of Zhou’s ascendancy proved inaccurate, however, and the 
administration soon accepted that Mao would continue to head the CCP.  Despite this, 
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several officials believed that radical Maoism as the PRC’s guiding ideological 
framework would not survive.  Rostow attributed its demise to a combination of 
“fragmented and embittered leaders, revisionist and indolent cadre, policy and personal 
differences in every major element of the society, a long list of failures in domestic and 
foreign policies, and a populace as a whole which must by now be bone weary of 17 
years of incessant ideological floggings.”226  According to some observers, this shift 
would have the most dramatic effect on China’s domestic policy, specifically a return to 
the post-Great Leap “creeping revisionism” that promoted normal economic 
development and social stability.227   
 Though uncertainty remained as to whether the pragmatist outlook would extend 
to foreign policy as well, the administration remained hopeful that a new era of 
improved Sino-American relations was within sight.  In May 1967, a National 
Intelligence Estimate on the Cultural Revolution determined that “many of Mao’s 
dogmas and practices are likely to be set aside.”228  Later that year, Rice asserted that 
“Mao cannot win and consolidate his power,” and by January 1968, Gronouski noted 
that his meeting that month with Chinese Ambassador Wang was “conspicuously 
lacking in repeated references to Mao and quotes from Mao” that had dominated 
previous meetings.”229   
 Unfortunately, at the very moment when prospects for improved Sino-American 
relations looked brightest, the Tet Offensive diverted Washington’s attention away from 
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China policy.  Within months Johnson, discredited among the American people and 
unlikely to win reelection, announced that he would not run for a second term.  Even had 
the Vietnam crisis not distracted the administration, the fight between Mao and his 
opponents remained bitter, thus presenting an ongoing chaotic situation with which few 
officials wished to interfere.  Although accepting the unlikelihood of cooperative 
relations with Mao, as 1968 came to a close Jenkins nonetheless noted that every day 
“brings added indication that something like pre-Cultural Revolution ‘normalcy’ is 
returning.”  As the newly-elected Nixon administration prepared to enter office, Jenkins 
optimistically reported that “the time may be near when we might profitably give 
another signal (a minor but clear one) to Peking that it has policy alternatives in our 
regard, when and if it is seriously ready to meet some of the prerequisites.”230 
 
 
                                                            
230 Memorandum, Alfred Jenkins to Walt Rostow, 5 December 1968, ibid, 725-726. 
224 
 
CHAPTER V 
“THE GREAT LYNCHPIN OF PEACE IN THE WORLD”: CHINA 
POLICY IN THE NIXON-FORD ERA, 1969-1976 
 
The Nixon administration hoped to begin a process of gradual change in the PRC 
mentality by stressing the geostrategic interests that the two nations had in common, 
particularly curbing Moscow’s hegemonial aspirations.  This required the Chinese 
Communists to maintain both trust and patience toward the United States, and to receive 
in return positive steps toward normalized relations.  Taking advantage of China’s return 
to relative normalcy after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and the emergence of 
actual fighting along the Sino-Soviet border, the administration succeeded in opening a 
high-level dialogue between Washington and Beijing.  With the leaders of both countries 
willing to set aside their ideological rivalry at least temporarily, movement toward 
normalization could begin in earnest.  As the years progressed, Nixon looked with 
satisfaction as Beijing appeared to move increasingly closer to accepting the validity of 
the American international perspective, so much so that in May 1973 the president 
exuberantly characterized the Sino-American relationship as “the great lynchpin of 
peace in the world.”1  
Yet if Washington had, in fact, achieved an “ideological armistice” with Mao and 
Zhou by 1972, as Kissinger later claimed, many of the still zealously ideological Chinese 
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in the PRC refused to abide by it.2  Disdainful of any form of exchanges, distrusting of 
American motives, and outraged by Mao’s courting of Washington, the radical forces 
within China immediately began efforts to counter these trends, or, at the very least, to 
utilize the new circumstances to benefit their revolutionary goals.  By the spring of 1974, 
these forces, with Mao’s tacit endorsement, had ousted Zhou and threatened to return 
China once more to a policy of hostility toward the United States and rigid opposition to 
the kind of broad collaboration with the international community that Washington 
advocated.  For his part, Mao apparently continued until his death in 1976 to walk a 
middle course that mostly left to his successors the question of China’s future approach.   
 
New Approaches, New Contacts, 1969-1971 
Any study of China policy during the presidency of Richard Nixon must begin 
with an examination of the philosophical views of both Nixon and his National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger, and the manner in which they adapted their views to suit the 
international realities they confronted while in office.  Richard Nixon had first-hand 
experience with the conditions on the ground in East Asia, the product of two trips to the 
region he conducted in 1953 and 1967 that culminated in the publishing of his Foreign 
Affairs article “Asia After Vietnam.”  Nixon asserted that the United States must find 
new approaches that would minimize the likelihood of local aggressions drawing the 
nuclear superpowers into direct conflict with one another.  To achieve this, the United 
States must work to create a new international balance of power that would prove more 
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stable than one based solely on American power.  Nixon confidently asserted that the 
strength of Western Europe had effectively checked Soviet ambitions in that theater and 
had, in fact, achieved a long-sought reorientation of Soviet foreign policy.  Asia 
remained unsettled, however, since China had yet to abandon its revolutionary objectives, 
refused to accept the responsibility of exerting a moderating influence in the region, and 
continued to encourage and support violent Third World revolutions. 
Nixon argued that a more effective Asian balance of power would achieve in 
Beijing what a strong Western Europe had achieved with respect to Moscow.  In a 
remarkable parroting of the classic containment argument dating back to NSC 68, Nixon 
argued that the United States must exert “creative counterpressure designed to persuade 
Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international 
civility.”  Indeed, far from heralding a new approach to China, Nixon bluntly stated that 
the “world cannot be safe until China changes,” and that prematurely recognizing the 
PRC, allowing it into the U.N., or offering expanded trade relations “would serve to 
confirm its rulers in their present course.”3  Thus, while Nixon acknowledged the 
importance of ending China’s isolation from the rest of the world, this did not 
automatically translate into a revolutionized vision of American China policy.  As 
historian former government official William Bundy points out, “there was a great deal 
more revived and reframed 1950s thinking in the article than any foretaste of 
communication, let alone a real easing of relations, with China.”4   
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Nixon chose Henry Kissinger as his National Security Assistant, handing to him 
an unprecedented amount of power to conduct American foreign relations.  The two men 
had not known each other previously, though Nixon had developed a favorable 
impression of Kissinger through the latter’s academic writings.5  In A World Restored 
Kissinger “showed how conservative statesmen, who sought to preserve world order, 
learned how to deal with a revolutionary nation through artfully tending to balances of 
power.”6  In this essential respect, both men agreed that in order to deter communist 
aggression effectively, the United States must encourage the growth of regional power 
blocs that would provide a more enduring and stable world order than the United States 
could provide through the unilateral exertion of its own limited power and influence.  
The American contribution to the establishment of this equilibrium, Kissinger argued, 
“will have to consist more of understanding and quiet, behind-the-scenes encouragement 
than of the propagation of formal institutional structures.”  In this way, a common 
community of interest will develop that would ultimately prove more effective in 
preserving the international order than “the elaboration of formal legal obligations.”7  
For Kissinger, as one of his biographers argues, stability results “when nations accept the 
legitimacy of the existing world order and when they act based on their national 
interests.”8 
Like Nixon, Kissinger advanced this view without abandoning the basic tenets of 
the American Cold War worldview.  In a 1968 article, Kissinger identified the “purpose 
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of American policy” as the encouragement of “a more benign evolution of Soviet 
society,” and particularly noted communist interventions in the Third World as among 
those major issues that threatened peace.9  Here, Kissinger faced the same fundamental 
dilemma that had plagued American officials since 1949 – achieving a balance between 
containment and engagement, between the necessity of preventing aggression and the 
necessity of demonstrating a willingness to engage in constructive relations.  He 
criticized both the “apostles of containment” as well as advocates of relaxation for 
failing to specify a program that the United States should pursue once it had succeeded 
in convincing the communists to negotiate.  Peace, according to Kissinger, would not 
“result from one grand settlement but from a long diplomatic process.”10   
Yet Kissinger said little about China.  One point that he did make – an insight of 
no small importance, as it turned out – was that China “has been either dominant or 
subjected,” and thus had “no experience in conducting foreign policy with equals.”  This 
anticipated Kissinger’s later dealings with Beijing by implying the existence of a 
learning curve for Chinese leaders as they accustomed themselves to the conduct of a 
normalized mode of diplomacy.  In addition, this also constituted an implicit rejection of 
Dean Rusk’s belief that the United Nations “cannot operate as a reform school.”11  Just 
as Kissinger emphasized the importance of encouragement rather than dictation as a way 
to create a community of interests among allies, so too might the United States apply a 
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similar program of gentle encouragement to its relations with the PRC.  The idea of 
approaching revolutionary communists in this manner came slowly to Kissinger; in his 
previous writings he had emphasized the futility of negotiating with revolutionary states 
that do not accept the legitimacy of the international order.12  Nevertheless, once in 
office, Kissinger gradually concluded that altering PRC policy might well lie within his 
power. 
Across the Pacific, Mao Zedong had begun contemplating the troubled 
conditions facing his own country, and, like Nixon and Kissinger, had decided that his 
fundamental objectives remained sound, but that the pursuit of them required a new 
approach.  By mid-1968, Mao made initial moves to regain control over his ideologically 
ravaged nation that remained in the grips of zealous radical forces that the Chairman, 
himself, had unleashed two years before.  When his own Red Guards resisted his efforts 
to re-establish state control, Mao turned against them.  As historian Chen Jian notes, at 
this moment and with Mao’s encouragement, references to China’s role as the “center of 
the world revolution” began to “disappear in Maoist discourse.”  But although Mao had 
implicitly acknowledged the failures of his domestic revolution and had demonstrated 
tacit “willingness to live with the yet-to-be-transformed ‘old’ world order,” he 
nonetheless retained his ideological principles that railed against capitalist-imperialist 
nations and encouraged revolutionary movements to overthrow them.13  Furthermore, 
Mao grew increasingly concerned about the precarious strategic situation facing China in 
the late-1960s, particularly as regards the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute.  Mao’s excessive 
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preoccupation with curbing Soviet aggression and his persistent ideological support of 
Third World revolutionaries served as a consistent and powerful reminder during the 
subsequent Sino-American discussions that the United States still had far to go in its 
efforts to affect a fundamental change in China’s approach to the rest of the world. 
The American effort to establish contact with Beijing in the early months of 
Nixon’s first term proved difficult.  The Vietnam War continued to rage with the PRC 
supplying large amounts of weapons to the North Vietnamese communists.  Indeed, in 
January 1969 the administration railed against the impending Italian and Canadian 
recognition of Beijing on the grounds that this would encourage the Chinese “hardliners” 
and “their friends or sympathizers” in Hanoi.”14  Conditions for a rapprochement seemed 
so dismal that a few weeks after taking office, Kissinger supposedly expressed to his 
deputy, Alexander Haig that the president “has taken leave of reality” because he “thinks 
this is the moment to establish normal relations with Communist China.  He has just 
ordered me to make this flight of fancy come true.”15  Whatever reservations Kissinger 
may have had, however, the administration’s initial round of policy reviews included 
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 14, a sweeping reappraisal of Sino-
American relations.16  That same week, Nixon expressed to Kissinger that “we should 
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give every encouragement to the attitude that the Administration is exploring 
possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese.”17   
Some prospect for renewed contact did, in fact, exist as Nixon assumed the 
presidency.  In November 1968, the United States proposed to renew the Warsaw 
Talks – suspended since the previous January – to which the PRC responded positively 
and with “unprecedented speed.”18  On February 11, Kissinger noted indications that 
Beijing desired to adopt a “softer foreign policy” that emphasized “state relations rather 
than being revolution-oriented.”  Matters came to a screeching halt, however, when 
Beijing cancelled the forthcoming Warsaw meeting in response to the American decision 
to grant asylum to a PRC defector.  The following month, intelligence estimates reported 
that Mao would likely prevent “major changes in China’s international posture,” and that 
in Beijing “there is little alternative to continuing hostility toward the U.S.”19   
This pessimism permeated the administration throughout that spring.  On March 
1, Nixon characterized recognition of China as “largely theoretical as it was difficult to 
have relations with the Chinese.”20  Several weeks later he approved military overflights 
of South China despite warnings among some of his advisors that such a move might 
undermine attempts to establish relations.21  In late-April, the administration received 
further confirmation of the enormity of its problem following the CCP’s 9th Party 
Congress.  Despite disagreements among Chinese leaders regarding the course of 
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domestic policy, the PRC’s foreign relations “will continue to be subject to the general 
Maoist position.”22  The Nixon administration consequently arrived at the same 
conclusion that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had reached: change would 
only occur once Mao and the other elder radicals passed from the scene.  And also just 
like its predecessors, the administration now began to view small, non-strategic gestures 
as a means to convince the post-Mao leadership “to reassess US attitudes and intentions 
toward China and China’s role in international affairs.”23   
NSSM 14 assumed that China’s large territory and population would inevitably 
result in the expansion of Beijing’s international involvement, thus prompting the 
question “how we might be able to bring about better Chinese behavior as they emerge 
from present isolation.”24  The final version of the paper in August argued that China’s 
policy will moderate “given an international climate conducive to moderation.”  “There 
is little reason to believe,” it continued,” that this present level of conflict and 
antagonism will endure indefinitely,” and thus the United States could set its long-term 
objectives and interests toward “the achievement of an improved and more relaxed 
relationship with the PRC.”25  The administration by this time had essentially accepted 
the notion of sacrificing short-term gain for the sake of long-term objectives.26  Well 
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before the foreign policy apparatus had produced these conclusions, however, Nixon had 
already expressed interest in “short-term steps which would not offer real prospect of 
reciprocity,” leading him in June to order the relaxation of certain trade and travel 
restrictions.27 
These measures occurred at a time of considerable restructuring of American 
strategic thought, particularly as a product of the new limitations of the post-Tet era.28  
By mid-1969, domestic pressures had compelled the Nixon administration to begin to 
withdraw American military personnel from Vietnam which led the administration to 
develop new strategies that would enable it to continue efforts to cope with communist 
aggression and subversion.  Even as Nixon announced the first small troop withdrawals 
in July, he simultaneously announced a new “Nixon Doctrine” by which the United 
States would transfer the primary responsibility for deterring or countering communist 
moves to the governments of the threatened nations.  However, if a nation proved 
incapable of defending itself either through its own actions or with the support of its 
neighbors, and if that country extended a request to Washington for support, then the 
United States would intervene.  In this way, Nixon hoped to preserve the perception that 
the United States remained both willing and able to defend the political and territorial 
integrity of nations.  However, as Kissinger lamented, the rapid pace of the American 
drawdown undermined this strategy and likely convinced the communist nations, 
particularly Hanoi, that American power and endurance did, in fact, have limits that they 
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could exploit.29  To offset this disadvantage, the administration sought to engage in 
triangular diplomacy with the Soviet Union and PRC in a way that might achieve 
concessions from one or both. 
Yet improving relations with the Chinese Communists proved possible only 
because of Beijing’s concerns about its deteriorating security situation.  American 
involvement in Vietnam constituted only one of many disturbing developments along 
China’s periphery.  Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan continued to view the PRC as a 
dangerous enemy, India had maintained its military posture since the 1962 Sino-Indian 
border war, and now, in the spring of 1969, the Sino-Soviet ideological rift erupted into 
actual fighting along China’s northern border.  In March Chinese military units clashed 
with their Soviet counterparts on the Ussuri River, an event that “immediately brought 
China and the Soviet Union to the brink of a general war.”30  In June the Soviets 
deployed bombers from Eastern Europe to Central Asia and in August launched large-
scale attacks against Chinese positions in Xinjiang.  Soon thereafter, the PRC instituted a 
general mobilization in those provinces bordering the USSR and Outer Mongolia, 
moved factories further into the interior to make them less vulnerable, and even 
dispersed its leadership around the country lest the Soviets wipe them out while 
concentrated in Beijing.  The Chinese Communists also began discussing internally the 
possibility of playing the American Card in the recently-initiated Sino-Soviet 
negotiations.31   
                                                            
29 Ibid, 236-237. 
30 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 240. 
31 Ibid, 246; Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 26. 
235 
 
The Nixon administration struggled throughout 1969 to determine how it should 
respond to the Sino-Soviet fighting, particularly which policies might best contribute to 
Washington’s long-term geostrategic objectives.  The administration recognized Soviet 
concerns about a possible Sino-American rapprochement, and Kissinger hoped to use 
this to obtain concessions from Moscow, particularly in terms of ending the Vietnam 
War.  This had enormous appeal to both Nixon and Kissinger, since over the course of 
1969 Moscow rebuffed no fewer than ten efforts to link Soviet cooperation on Vietnam 
to American cooperation on arms control.32  But even without the Sino-Soviet conflict, 
Nixon would still have persisted in efforts to improve relations with both sides; he did 
not view the Sino-American rapprochement as merely an opportunistic strategy to wrest 
concessions from Moscow, although the administration hoped it may have that effect. 
Similarly, administration officials disagreed over the extent to which the Sino-
Soviet border fighting would provide opportunities for contact with or concessions from 
Beijing.  NSC staffer John Holdridge argued that Beijing’s “concern over the Soviet 
problem may make them even more receptive to US overtures than at any time in the 
past several years.”33 In contrast, Roger Morris, also of the NSC, warned that Sino-
Soviet conflict did not necessarily mean improved Sino-American relations.  Beijing 
may “maneuver toward us,” he conceded, but “we cannot assume this will be anything 
more than shrewd short-run tactics.”34  Kissinger grew increasingly optimistic, 
expressing that the recent behavior of PRC diplomats “strongly suggests the existence of 
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a body of opinion, presently submerged by Mao’s doctrinal views, which might put US-
Chinese relations on a more rational and less ideological basis.”35  Nonetheless, since 
much of the Sino-Soviet dispute remained “shrouded,” he admitted uncertainty regarding 
the appropriate policy to pursue.36  Ultimately, he decided that irrespective of 
developments in the conflict, the United States should continue its existing policy of 
improving relations with both countries for purposes of long-term American interests. 
Nixon needed little encouragement, and, indeed, once again had moved ahead of 
his foreign policy apparatus.  During his travels through Europe in August, he held talks 
with the presidents of Romania and Pakistan, informing both that although the United 
States would continue to oppose PRC entry into the United Nations, it nonetheless 
would appreciate them mediating between Beijing and Washington.37  The following 
month, the president instructed Kissinger to deliver a message personally to PRC 
representatives if a suitable occasion arose.38  These efforts succeeded in early December 
when the American ambassador in Poland, Walter Stoessel, confronted a PRC diplomat 
at a Yugoslav fashion show and informed him of the seriousness of Washington’s desire 
for contact.  Mao and Zhou immediately and positively responded to this message, and 
punctuated their decision by releasing two American sailors captured in February.  
Kissinger interpreted this gesture as the culmination of “a series of low-key Chinese 
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moves clearly intended to signal us” that “they are interested greater communication.”39  
This proved accurate, for later that month, Zhou informed the United States via Pakistan 
that the PRC welcomed discussions, and on January 8, 1970, Stoessel undertook an 
informal meeting at the Chinese Embassy in Poland to discuss the resumption of the 
talks. 
On the verge of this breakthrough, the administration now began to contemplate 
what results it could realistically expect the talks to achieve.  A study of the Sino-Soviet 
split in October had concluded that “until a fundamental and far-reaching change takes 
place in China or in the USSR, the resolution of critical differences we have with either 
is unlikely.”40  In December, Kissinger and Nixon had both expressed doubt about the 
practical usefulness of re-opening the Warsaw Talks since “we don’t have anything to 
talk about anyway.”41  In January, however, the administration noted increasing 
pragmatism among Beijing’s “reconstituted power elite” as this group began freezing out 
the more radical PRC officials from policymaking.42  Yet even these signs could prove 
misleading.  Kissinger pointed out that Beijing had likely agreed to the talks “primarily 
for Soviet consumption,” and that the PRC’s new reasonableness would provide no 
substantial concessions.  Beijing did make one important gesture, however: the 
administration learned in early January that Beijing would not make American military 
withdrawals from Vietnam a precondition for improved Sino-American relations.43  
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Regardless of the dearth of likely concessions, however, contacts – even if unfruitful in 
the short-term – constituted an important first step in the PRC’s long-term 
transformation “into a more responsible and normal member of the world society.”44   
The two sides convened the first meeting of the resumed Warsaw Talks on 
January 20, 1970.  The Chinese ambassador made a non-polemical presentation that 
made no demands of the United States, but expressed willingness to negotiate with 
Washington on the matter of Taiwan.  This represented an important, if largely symbolic, 
departure, since Beijing traditionally had portrayed the American presence on Taiwan as 
neither legal nor subject to Sino-American negotiation.  As Stoessel characterized the 
meeting, “the Chinese wished it to be considered as a serious opening negotiations 
session in which direct bilateral issues could be set forth and general ideological issues 
set aside.”45  Such assessments failed to convince Kissinger who pointed out Beijing’s 
exclusive interest in resolving the Taiwan issue, “an area in which they want something 
from us.”46   
Chinese officials did find one aspect of the American presentation enticing: 
Washington’s willingness to send a high-level envoy to Beijing.  Again, Kissinger 
lamented the Chinese avoidance of substantial issues and their latching onto the one that 
would contribute most to the rehabilitation of the PRC’s international image and 
prestige.47  For this reason, Secretary of State William Rogers considered the proposal 
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unnecessarily generous and argued that the administration should seek further 
development of the relationship at the ambassadorial level prior to higher-level talks.48  
Nixon overruled him, however, and insisted that the State Department accept higher-
level meetings in Beijing rather than in Warsaw, an approach that would demonstrate the 
“positive nature of our approach.”49    
At this point several events intervened, causing a series of postponements in the 
Warsaw Talks and demonstrating the array of political, strategic, and ideological 
impediments to contact.  On March 18, the Cambodian government voted to depose its 
pro-communist leader, Sihanouk, and to replace him with the pro-American Lon Nol.  
Sihanouk subsequently established a government in exile in Beijing, and the pro-
Sihanouk communist forces of the Khmer Rouge, with DRV support, began attacks on 
the new Cambodian regime.  As a result of this turmoil, and also because of Beijing’s 
suspicion that the United States had had a direct hand in Sihanouk’s downfall, Mao and 
Zhou decided to postpone the next Warsaw meeting to April.  Washington immediately 
confronted the dilemma, however, that Chiang Ching-kuo would visit the United States 
that month, a fact that might poison the atmosphere in Warsaw.  The administration thus 
asked for and received an additional postponement of the next meeting until late-May.  
By that point, however, Nixon had ordered an American military incursion into 
Cambodia in response to the renewed communist fighting there.  This, in turn, allowed 
Chinese hard-liners to counter moves toward an improvement of Sino-American 
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relations.  As a result, Mao cancelled the upcoming meeting and wrote an article 
condemning the American action.50 
Nixon now concluded that because of the public nature of the Warsaw Talks and 
the tendency of both sides to cancel meetings for political purposes the two sides should 
establish an alternative communications channel that would prove stable, secure, and 
secret enough for progress to occur.  Indeed, Nixon remained sensitive to Beijing’s 
domestic political pressures emanating from the more radical elements within China, and 
conveyed through the Paris channel his pledge to maintain absolute secrecy “if the PRC 
found it necessary.”51  The PRC rebuffed Nixon’s efforts in June to establish a secure 
channel via Paris, though once Washington withdrew all its troops from Cambodia 
Beijing once more began sending positive signals, such as the release of Bishop James 
Walsh from his decade-long imprisonment.52   
The Chinese hesitated to take additional assertive steps due to political tensions 
between Chairman Mao and his chosen successor and head of the PLA General Lin Biao.  
Lin and an influential segment of the still ideologically fervent CCP saw Mao’s efforts 
to improve relations with the United States as a violation of communist principle.  In 
early July, a PRC MiG attempted to shoot down an American plane, an event that the 
administration accurately identified as an effort on the part of radical PLA officers to 
sabotage the rapprochement.  This internal political conflict lasted throughout the 
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summer of 1970, prompting Kissinger to lament that “we have made clear signals, and I 
think we have no choice but to wait and see if they are willing to respond.”53   
Nonetheless, both Nixon and Mao persisted.  That fall, American journalist 
Edgar Snow received a surprising invitation from the Chairman to visit Beijing during 
the celebrations commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the PRC’s founding.  In 
what Mao intended as a signal to both Washington and the Chinese people, Snow stood 
next to him on the walls of the Forbidden City as thousands of PRC cadres marched past.  
Mao supplemented this by granting Snow an interview in which he conveyed an 
invitation for Nixon to visit China either in his capacity as president or as a private 
citizen.  The administration missed the significance of this gesture, but Nixon had 
already begun sending his own signals.  In September, Time Magazine published an 
interview with the president in which he expressed a desire to visit China someday.  In 
late-October Nixon again asserted to Pakistani President Yahya Khan the necessity of 
opening negotiations with China, while Kissinger informed Romanian President Nicolae 
Ceausescu of Washington’s preparedness to meet secretly “free from any outside 
pressures and free from any questions of prestige.”54   
This back-and-forth signaling finally produced results in December when Zhou 
Enlai conveyed through Pakistan that the PRC would welcome an American envoy in 
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Beijing for the purpose of resolving the Taiwan issue.  Kissinger replied positively, but 
noted that the envoy would not focus exclusively on Taiwan.  Rather he insisted that the 
discussions range more broadly over a variety of bilateral issues.  When Zhou persisted 
in asserting the primacy of the Taiwan issue, Nixon feared “we may appear too eager.  
Let’s cool it.  Wait for them to respond to our initiative.”55  Kissinger agreed, hoping that 
Beijing’s recognition of the administration’s desire for productive contact would 
produce “flexibility on their side as well.”56 
By this time, the administration had undertaken  NSSM 106, a new review of 
China policy that several NSC staffers noted “in effect, poses the issue of how far we 
want to go” toward Beijing since this “must come, if at all, at some cost in our relations” 
with Taiwan.57  The initial response to NSSM 106 warned of the lingering dangers in 
giving away too much, pointing out, for instance, that the reduction of American forces 
in the region “has not produced any change in Chinese deployments directed against 
Korea, Taiwan or Southeast Asia,” and that the non-communist nations of East Asia 
continued to view “Chinese-abetted ‘people’s wars’” as a “constant threat.”58   
With this in mind, Kissinger requested studies from the departments of State and 
Defense on two specific issues.  First, noting the long-standing efforts to achieve a PRC 
renunciation of force agreement, the National Security Advisor wondered what language 
should be used in such an agreement.  Turning to the question of troop withdrawals, 
Kissinger inquired what effects the total withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan 
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would have on the broader American posture in the region.59  In response, the State 
Department suggested a renunciation of force formula “based on language and principles 
of the UN Charter” that “would be a first step toward improving relations between the 
US and the PRC without any additional commitment on the part of the US.”60  Similarly, 
the Department of Defense warned that the complete withdrawal of American forces 
from Taiwan in the absence of a PRC renunciation of force agreement would constitute 
an unwarranted and dangerous gamble that lacked “reasonable assurances which should 
be implicit in any agreement consistent with our security interests.”  Moreover, such a 
move would conflict with the basic tenets of the Nixon Doctrine.61     
The extraordinary events in April and May inspired enormous enthusiasm for and 
momentum toward Sino-American rapprochement.  On April 7, 1971, Mao invited the 
American table tennis team to visit Beijing.  The following week, Nixon implemented 
the first stage of his long-approved relaxation of trade and travel restrictions and ordered 
a new study of “next steps” toward Beijing.  By the end of the month Zhou had 
conveyed the long-sought unconditional invitation for Washington to send a high-level 
envoy to China.  Nixon approved this immediately, chose Kissinger as his envoy, and set 
about establishing the modalities and procedures for the latter’s trip.  But even as the 
administration celebrated the impending resumption of contact, it continued to doubt that 
this indicated any significant change in the PRC’s ideological stance.  Indeed, NSC 
staffer John Holdridge suggested that Beijing had invited the American ping-pong team 
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not as a sign of friendliness towards the United States but rather as part of a propaganda 
campaign to solidify international support for the upcoming United Nations vote on 
Chinese representation.62  The response to NSSM 124 submitted in late-May similarly 
warned that despite the high-profile drama of “People’s diplomacy” this “does not 
necessarily mean that the Chinese leaders have changed their hostile view of the US or 
revised their major foreign policy goals.”63 
Now on the verge of direct, high-level talks with the Chinese Communists, 
administration officials cautiously distinguished between those initiatives that the 
government could take without interfering with fundamental American imperatives, and 
which initiatives would require additional justification in the form of PRC concessions.  
Zhou did not help matters when he backtracked on his previous stance and informed 
Nixon that he expected the settlement of the Taiwan issue to precede discussion of other 
questions during Kissinger’s trip.  But by this point Nixon, perhaps propelled by the 
euphoria of recent events, informed Zhou that Kissinger would soon travel to China.  
The president’s message, however, omitted any reference to Zhou’s demands regarding 
the primacy of the Taiwan issue.64  In a move that confirmed the seriousness with which 
Nixon viewed Kissinger’s trip and that infuriated the Nationalist Chinese, the president 
ordered an end to the unilateral trade restrictions against China.65 
This in no way implied that Nixon had determined simply to capitulate to 
Beijing’s demands, however.  The defense of Taiwan continued to constitute a central 
                                                            
62 Memorandum, Holdridge to Kissinger, 9 April 1971, ibid, 289. 
63 Response to NSSM 124, 27 May 1971, ibid, 323-331. 
64 Message, Zhou to Nixon, 29 May 1971, and Message, Nixon to Zhou, 4 June 1971, both in ibid, 332 
and 340, respectively. 
65 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 3 June 1971, ibid, 334-339. 
245 
 
component of the American posture in Asia, not only in the value of the island as a 
logistical base in support of the ongoing war in Vietnam, but also in its considerable 
psychological and political value in the ongoing struggle against communist expansion 
and global disorder.  Concerns of American credibility remained alive and well, the 
extension of the fundamental objective of nurturing an international community guided 
by respect for one’s obligations.  Washington considered the commitment to Taiwan as 
not only moral but also legal, given the existence of the Mutual Defense Treaty.  Nixon 
would move gradually away from that commitment, but only to the extent that he could 
ensure a peaceful resolution of the issue, or, barring that, alternative arrangements that 
would perpetuate the island’s security.  Indeed, on the eve of Kissinger’s departure to 
China, Nixon expressed concern that Kissinger’s negotiating position was too 
forthcoming, and that he should avoid giving up too much of the administration’s 
support for Taiwan unless absolutely necessary.  Furthermore, Nixon had some of his 
own conditions for Beijing, particularly the release of American POWs and progress on 
ending the Vietnam War.66  The task of convincing Beijing that the American 
perspective had merit fell largely to Kissinger during his two trips to China in 1971. 
 
Kissinger’s Re-Education Campaign: The 1971-1972 Sino-American Talks 
While Nixon focused on establishing contact as a step toward a global 
geostrategic realignment, the administration also contemplated utilizing these contacts 
for the purpose of reorienting Beijing toward an approach to international relations that 
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reflected Washington’s own views.  Kissinger hoped to utilize geostrategic arguments to 
convince the PRC that it shared certain interests in common with the United States, 
believing that the most stable and durable international arrangements resulted from the 
confluence of national interests.  But he nevertheless understood the limits of this 
strategy given the revolutionary principles to which Mao and his associates continued to 
adhere – principles that even in the context of a Sino-American alignment against the 
common Soviet threat might yet cause the two nations to fall once more into a pattern of 
hostility.  But even if the rapprochement could not compel Beijing to abandon its 
ideological foreign policy views in the short-term, it would at the very least buy time – 
perhaps decades – during which other factors might precipitate such a change.  The 
administration took for granted that China and not the United States would have to 
undergo this change; as Kissinger noted, “For us, a rapprochement is a matter of tactics, 
but for them it involves a profound moral adjustment.”67  In this respect, Kissinger’s 
efforts mirrored those of previous administrations that had viewed with equal dismay the 
potential for achieving such change, and that had striven with equal vigor to create 
conditions that would maintain the peace until more favorable circumstances emerged.   
Kissinger’s academic writings had long warned that stability would result only 
“when nations accept the legitimacy of the existing world order and when they act based 
on their national interests.”  In contrast, stability “is threatened when nations embark on 
ideological or moral crusades,” a message that applied to China as much as it did to the 
                                                            
67 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 29 October 1971, ibid, 518. 
247 
 
United States.68  Thus, Kissinger sought to “coax” Beijing away from its revolutionary 
aims by granting it a “stake in the legitimacy of the international system.”69  Renewed 
discussions, even if Beijing proved unwilling to discuss matters of substance, thus 
constituted a necessary first step in transforming China “into a more responsible and 
normal member of the world society.”70  Kissinger’s presentation to the Chinese during 
his two trips to Beijing in July and October 1971, and Nixon’s discussions with Chinese 
leaders in February 1972, in essence constituted an introduction to the fundamental 
principles underlying the American worldview, and an adept effort to characterize – 
either explicitly or implicitly – the adoption of these principles as in Beijing’s best 
interests.   
From Washington’s perspective, the Sino-American talks proved of such value 
because they facilitated the geostrategic realignments and stability that the 
administration intended the Nixon Doctrine to produce.  But neither Nixon nor Kissinger 
felt that this transition should occur quickly; as Kissinger informed Zhou, “Sometimes 
even correct things must be done gradually, because if done too quickly they have a 
shocking impact and create an opposite effect from what one intends.”71  This was as 
true for the dramatic global drawdown of American military forces in the world as it was 
for the political circumstances in places like the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, and 
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the Taiwan Strait.  The administration did not oppose change, but felt that it should 
occur at a non-disruptive, gradual pace – that is, peacefully and by means of either 
negotiation or an electoral process, depending on the issue.  Convincing Beijing to 
accept this notion would go far toward obtaining its assistance in carrying out the 
development of stable political and military arrangements in East Asia. 
This imperative of gradual change heavily influenced the manner in which 
Kissinger dealt with Chinese leaders during his two trips to China in July and October 
1971.  For instance, the administration committed itself to a process of normalizing 
Sino-American relations that it hoped to achieve in a step-by-step manner rather than all 
at once.  That this would likely result in eventual formal recognition of the PRC 
government did not mean that the administration would not demand, or at least expect, 
reciprocity.  As early as January 1970, Kissinger noted that China should cease 
supporting insurgencies, “participate responsibly in supranational endeavors,” and “take 
a less hostile view of non-Communist governments.”  Kissinger believed that under 
present conditions the United States could not achieve in the short-term these changes in 
the Chinese outlook.  Rather, the administration would engage Beijing on a variety of 
what he called transitional issues – including economic and cultural exchanges and “a 
détente in the Taiwan Strait” without sacrificing the ROC – “in which our purpose is not 
to arrive at important practical agreements, but rather to continue to shape a climate in 
which they will evolve in a desirable direction.”72  
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This gradualist approach resurfaced in more elaborate form in the NSC’s April 
1971 response to the latest review of China policy, NSSM 124.  The paper identified fear 
of the Soviet threat as a key commonality between the United States and China, and 
argued that cooperation on this issue might provide a springboard “toward mutual 
accommodation in areas of disagreement.”  The administration counted on these forces 
to bridge the Sino-American gap regarding the fate of the ROC, since Beijing “cannot 
expect much on the government-to-government front if it requires first that the United 
States sever its ties with Taiwan.”  Indeed, the final disposition of Taiwan and the related 
issues of American credibility and diplomatic recognition constituted important 
signifiers of U.S. approval for the PRC and the legitimacy of Beijing’s foreign policies.  
As such, the administration divided the array of potential initiatives it could implement 
into three categories, moving from innocuous unilateral concessions to “steps we should 
take only as merited by other developments, especially (but not exclusively) PRC 
reactions to our earlier moves.”73 
Successfully convincing Beijing of the value of the administration’s gradualist 
strategy depended upon two key, interrelated factors.  First, Nixon and Kissinger had to 
convince Chinese leaders that they could trust the administration’s word, for without 
such trust Beijing would view an American proposal for gradual movement toward 
normalization as merely another capitalist-imperialist ploy.74  As Kissinger later wrote, 
“The underlying challenge of the secret visit was to establish enough confidence to turn 
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a first meeting into a process.”75  Second, the administration understood it must make 
certain concessions regarding Taiwan that would establish this trust but that would 
simultaneously conform to American principles.  Zhou had made repeated reference to 
the primacy of the Taiwan issue in his correspondence with the administration prior to 
Kissinger’s secret trip.  When the two men met in July, Zhou expressed that if the United 
States genuinely desired normal relations, it must “recognize the PRC as the sole 
legitimate government of China” and acknowledge unreservedly that “Taiwan is a 
Chinese province, is already restored to China, and is an inalienable part of Chinese 
territory.”  Furthermore, the administration must withdraw all of its troops from Taiwan, 
end its “illegal” Mutual Defense Treaty, and do nothing to move toward “two-Chinas,” 
such as supporting the Taiwanese Independence Movement.76   
The solution to this dilemma emerged not from the mind of Henry Kissinger, but 
rather from the State Department’s internal discussions during the spring of 1971 
regarding the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations.77  Though the 
administration had succeeded in preventing Beijing’s entry into that organization during 
the recent UNGA session, estimates showed that the administration would likely face 
defeat during the next session if it pursued this course.  To stave off defeat, the 
administration advocated a dual representation strategy that emphasized ROC 
inclusion – broadly popular among the international community – rather than the less 
popular exclusion of Beijing.  When Kissinger sat down with representatives of the State 
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Department to discuss specifics on March 9, the latter advocated a position “that merely 
says there will be two delegations,” and that “the question of who rules China is one for 
the two governments to work out.”  In this way, “both regimes can claim to be the 
government of China.”  Furthermore, this strategy would not prejudice an eventual 
political settlement that, in theory, might produce either a “one China” or a “one China, 
one Taiwan” solution.78   
The supposed concessions Kissinger made to China during his first trip have 
been subject to much mischaracterization; Kissinger did not simply capitulate to 
Beijing’s demands.  His first “concession” regarded American forces in Taiwan.  Noting 
that the administration had already removed a small number of troops from the island – a 
good faith indication of the general direction of its policy – Kissinger expressed the 
administration’s willingness to remove the two thirds of its troops on Taiwan that 
Washington stationed there in support of its ongoing operations in Vietnam.  However, 
this withdrawal would begin “within a specified brief period of time after ending of the 
war in Indochina,” with the removal of the remaining one third subject to subsequent 
general improvements in Sino-American relations.  Moreover, in his October discussions 
with Zhou, Kissinger expressed that the Mutual Defense Treaty would lapse only when 
the PRC and ROC had achieved unification by peaceful means.79  The president agreed; 
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on the eve of his February 1972 visit to China, Nixon privately expressed that until 
Washington and Beijing completed the normalization process the absence of American 
troops on the island would not affect Washington’s commitments under the MDT.80   
For his next concession, Kissinger pledged that the administration would not 
actively seek a “two-Chinas” or a “one-China, one-Taiwan” arrangement.  Kissinger 
informed Zhou that the gradual political evolution of PRC-ROC relations would likely 
produce unification, and that the United States would “not stand in the way” if this 
should result.  But this did not mean that the administration would actively oppose a 
“two-Chinas” solution, either.81  Fundamentally – and much like the rationale behind the 
Nixon Doctrine – Kissinger sought to remove primary responsibility from Washington 
and give it to the peoples most directly involved.  As a result, when negotiating the 
language of the Shanghai Communiqué Kissinger rejected a Chinese formulation by 
which the United States would “express the wish that a one-China solution be brought 
about by peaceful means,” as this might prejudice the ultimate outcome.82  Similarly, 
even as the administration determined not to provide any official encouragement of the 
Taiwanese Independence Movement, Kissinger nonetheless expressed to Nixon two 
weeks after the President’s February 1972 trip that if the people on Taiwan chose to 
secede, “that’s their business.”83   
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The inescapable conclusion of this analysis is that the administration did not 
consider Taiwan “expendable,” to use historian Nancy Tucker’s term.84  Nixon and 
Kissinger both privately affirmed their belief in Taiwanese self-determination and their 
resolve to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese Communist attack.  The negotiated 
settlement with Zhou in July preserved these principles.  Kissinger phrased his position 
in such a way that PRC officials could read into it tacit American consent for their 
demands, but while retaining Washington’s flexibility.85  As such, when upon his return 
from China Kissinger met with ROC Ambassador James Shen, the National Security 
Advisor technically did not lie when he said that the United States would not “betray old 
friends, or turn anyone over to communism to ease our problems.”86   
The extent to which Zhou Enlai recognized the true nature of Kissinger’s 
proposal remains unclear.  Most likely, Zhou understood that given the power disparities 
and the overwhelming trend toward international diplomatic engagement with Beijing 
ROC officials would sooner or later find themselves compelled to rejoin the mainland.  
Historian Jay Taylor suggests that Zhou may even have established a semi-official 
dialogue with Taipei during the period 1969-1971, perhaps in the hope of enticing ROC 
officials toward unification.87  Regardless of what Zhou may have felt privately, 
however, he ultimately conceded that the American presentation sufficed for Beijing to 
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partake in the gradual evolutionary process that Kissinger had described.  Zhou affirmed 
that resolving the Taiwan issue “will need time and we agree,” and that the 
establishment of diplomatic recognition need not occur prior to, or even during, Nixon’s 
upcoming visit so long as the two sides had established “the general direction.”88  Indeed, 
during the October discussions to determine the language of the Shanghai Communiqué, 
Kissinger assessed that “the Chinese are willing to pursue their objectives by banking on 
the thrust of history.  They will continue to be tough, but they essentially accept our 
arguments that we can often do more than we say, that the process must be gradual, and 
that some issues must be left to evolutionary pressures.”89 
Along these lines, Kissinger noted that the administration could complete its 
troop withdrawals by the end of 1972 “if the war in Southeast Asia is ended,” and that 
the two sides could achieve the remaining political question – apparently a reference to 
formal recognition – “within the earlier part of the President’s second term,” which, in 
practical terms, meant prior to 1975.  The fact that the administration could not achieve a 
ceasefire in Vietnam prior to January 1973 naturally extended this timeline beyond what 
Nixon and Kissinger had envisioned.  Indeed, in March 1972 Kissinger explicitly 
prohibited the reduction of American forces on Taiwan until the war ended.90  Yet in the 
summer of 1971, the direction of Sino-American relations had been set to the 
satisfaction of both sides, and Kissinger could now focus on achieving Beijing’s willing 
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participation in what Washington considered an appropriate and constructive manner of 
conducting foreign relations.  
The crux of the problem lay in the different lenses each side used to interpret the 
major crises and conflicts that existed throughout the world.  The Nixon administration 
considered irrelevant the reasons why these conflicts had originally occurred.  The focus 
should rest instead with ending them peacefully and ensuring the creation of new 
conditions in which nations respect the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
other nations.  The fact that the United States had spurned the 1954 Geneva Accords, 
therefore, should not now prejudice efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in either 
Korea or Vietnam.  Similarly, however Washington became Taiwan’s defender, this 
should not prevent the achievement of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.   
The PRC rejected this view.  For Zhou and Mao, historical blame had a direct 
bearing on any effort to determine the justice of a given course of action, particularly in 
those cases where “imperialist” powers had unjustifiably intervened, or continued to do 
so, in the affairs of smaller states.  Capitalist-imperialist interventions and subversions 
since 1945, according to Zhou, had produced a series of “powder kegs” in the world that 
aggressive powers like Japan, India, and the Soviet Union, might exploit for their own 
benefit and to the ultimate detriment of local independence.91  Because the French and 
Americans had so clearly violated the sovereignty of the Indochinese states and had 
rejected previous efforts to achieve political settlements, the United States had the 
primary responsibility for making amends.  Zhou rejected Kissinger’s insistence on 
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preserving American honor and dignity, since this demonstrated a lack of sympathy for 
the honor and dignity of aggrieved smaller nations.  Zhou also considered inappropriate 
Washington’s continued support of its “puppets,” such as the governments of South 
Vietnam and Laos.  As a solution, the United States should withdraw unconditionally 
and immediately from those nations.  This would facilitate the removal of dangerous 
points of conflict between the United States and the peoples of the Third World, hinder 
the efforts of other imperialist powers to gain influence in those regions, and allow the 
peoples of those nations to resolve their own differences in their own ways and with 
their own resources. 
Three interrelated factors made these positions irreconcilable.  First, the Nixon 
administration continued to adhere to the principle that allowing aggressions to occur 
without consequence would set a dangerous precedent that would result in additional 
aggressions throughout the world; it would enhance, not minimize, militarism and 
conflict.  Second, the administration placed enormous value on its commitments, pledges, 
and treaties, many of which it would violate by abandoning the governments in question.  
Just as in the case of unopposed aggressions, the administration believed that failure to 
uphold its obligations in this regard would set a dangerous precedent.  Kissinger made 
this point explicit in refusing to accept the North Vietnamese demand that the 
administration overthrow the regime of Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam as part of a 
peace settlement.  The principle of standing loyally by your commitments had 
implications for American reliability towards its other allies as well, and, indeed, even 
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for the broader course of Sino-American relations.  As Kissinger explained to Zhou, “it 
is in your interest that we are a reliable country.”92 
The third major point of philosophical contention regarded the question of great 
power “interference” in the affairs of other nations.  Among the most fundamental tenets 
of the communist ideological worldview included the belief in the inherently imperial 
nature of capitalist systems, an imperialism that, if not overtly militant, might take the 
form of exploitative economic penetration.  China’s own historical experiences bolstered 
this ideological worldview.  By the 1970s, Beijing had come to view Moscow as the 
primary threat to China’s foreign policy objectives due to its having adopted a socialist 
form of imperialism.  Yet this in no way let Washington off the hook; as a capitalist state, 
the United States remained a threat to Beijing’s revolutionary agenda.  Viewed in this 
light, ongoing American military and economic assistance threatened the independence 
of Third World nations.   
Beijing also derided other kinds of economic and diplomatic pressures for the 
purpose of compelling states to adopt policies that they might not otherwise favor.  This 
form of influence constituted the primary point of disagreement during the 1971-72 
Sino-American discussions.  The United States believed that in certain cases the exertion 
of such influence could benefit international peace and stability – indeed, the entire 
notion of collective security was predicated on the notion that such pressures constituted 
a legitimate means by which the international community could coerce deviant nations 
to conform to appropriate standards of international conduct.  This had also constituted 
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one of the most significant motivating factors in U.S. efforts throughout the world since 
World War II; that is, the United States, having the power to exert influence for this 
purpose, had a responsibility to do so.  The history of Washington’s relations with its 
East Asian allies clearly demonstrates the centrality of this concept to American Cold 
War strategy.  As previous chapters have shown, the United States struggled constantly 
to reign in the excesses of its more aggressive Taiwanese and South Korean allies, and to 
guide them toward peaceful methods of achieving their objectives.  By and large, it had 
striven to do so by means of persuasion and logic rather than through unilateral decree.  
Yet what Washington considered the responsible management of world affairs 
Beijing characterized as superpower “bullying” that unjustifiably interfered with the 
sovereign affairs of smaller nations.93  Once more attempting to link American principles 
to Chinese interests, Kissinger emphasized that exerting influence over wayward allies 
served China’s security needs.  He pointed out to Zhou that “our defense relationship 
with Japan keeps Japan from pursuing aggressive policies,” that a “heavily rearmed 
Japan could easily repeat the policies of the 1930s,” and that Japanese troops in Korea 
would undoubtedly concern the PRC more than the ongoing presence there of American 
troops.94  Under Nixon’s emphatic urgings, Kissinger continued during his October trip 
to hammer home the notion that the United States had a legitimate role to play in Asia.95   
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Kissinger asserted that similar efforts on the part of Beijing to encourage its allies 
toward moderation would also serve world peace and stability.  In the case of Korea, for 
instance, Zhou initially broached the topic by insisting that the United States withdraw 
all of its forces from the peninsula, arguing that Pyongyang had a right to feel threatened 
because of the ongoing American presence.  Kissinger responded with the same rationale 
he had used in the case of the removal of forces from Taiwan: the administration had 
already begun to reduce its forces, but would remove them entirely only “as political 
relations in the Far East improve.”96  Further, Kissinger pointed out that Pyongyang “has 
been very harsh in its military measures against South Korea,” and emphasized that “it 
would help maintain Asian peace if you could use your influence with North Korea to 
not use force.”97   Zhou rejected this view in July, resulting in further and less pleasant 
discussions of this topic during Kissinger’s October trip.  Zhou conveyed a message 
from Pyongyang that included what Kissinger characterized as “a generally abusive 
series of demands upon us” that he found completely unacceptable.  Kissinger rejected 
Pyongyang’s unilateral demands upon the United States, repeated the American desire to 
work gradually toward a mutually acceptable solution, and declared the importance of 
North Korea showing “some of the largeness of spirit of its large ally.”98  Kissinger then 
bluntly explained 
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that if their goals were to bring about stability in the peninsula, avert war, 
and lessen the danger of the expansion of other powers, then Chinese and 
American interests were quite parallel.  If, on the other hand, their goals 
were to undermine the existing government in South Korea and make it 
easier for North Korea to attack or bring pressure upon the South, then a 
different situation existed.99 
Kissinger nonetheless apparently made some headway in convincing Beijing of 
the validity of the American position.  Under Kissinger’s strong rebuttal on the Korean 
issue, Zhou conceded that “both of us should use our influence with our friends to keep 
them from military adventures.”  He cautioned, however, that though China could be 
patient about Taiwan “it was harder for their smaller friends to be patient.”100  Yet Zhou 
also seemed forthcoming as regards the American military presence in Japan.  Kissinger 
believed that Zhou “recognized the validity of our arguments, but obviously had 
difficulty acknowledging the virtues of a U.S.-Japanese defense relationship.”101  Indeed, 
in a rare exclamation from the stoic National Security Advisor, Kissinger reported that 
Beijing tacitly approved of the American military presence in Taiwan “so as to keep the 
Japanese forces out!”102   
Zhou proved less forthcoming on what both sides considered the most important 
and immediate issue between them: Indochina.  Just as with Taiwan and Korea, 
Kissinger pledged that the United States sought merely to allow events in Indochina to 
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develop along a peaceful path free from outside intervention.  Yet Zhou and Kissinger 
held differing views on what exactly constituted outside interference in the case of the 
Indochinese states.  The American position remained that the North Vietnamese 
communists had set themselves on a course of regional domination by illegally venturing 
into or supporting the insurgencies within the neighboring countries.  Kissinger noted, 
for instance, that “a curious thing about Laos is that most of the Laotian freedom fighters 
whom we find speak Vietnamese,” and argued that “if North Vietnam withdraws 
genuinely its forces from Cambodia and then the civil war is fought only by Cambodians, 
it’s not an international problem.”103   
Beijing did not consider the issue so clear cut.  The struggle in question was one 
of the Indochinese people in general against the interventions of the Western powers.  In 
this view, the United States had forced them to fight among themselves, and thus the 
burden for ending the war fell on the United States – that is, by an unconditional 
withdrawal.  In taking this stance, Zhou was almost certainly influenced by an agreement 
of April 24-25 – over which he presided in Beijing – by which the DRV, National 
Liberation Front, National United Front of Kampuchea, the deposed leader of Cambodia 
Prince Sihanouk, and the Laotian communists all pledged to fight against the American 
intruders.  After the war, Zhou explained, “questions of peace will be settled by the 
people of those countries themselves and territorial limits restored to what they were 
beforehand.”104  The DRV’s presence in either Laos or Cambodia thus did not constitute 
an external act of aggression so long as it served the cause of expelling the Americans 
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from South Vietnam.  As such, Zhou rejected Kissinger’s request that Beijing might 
“help” influence Hanoi’s perspective “so that they understand that some political 
evolution is necessary.”105  
In part, this reluctance also stemmed from concerns that by urging moderation in 
Hanoi, Beijing might inadvertently facilitate Soviet efforts to gain influence over the 
DRV, the latter of which appeared independently intent on establishing hegemony in the 
region after the successful conclusion of the war.  Because the Soviet Union had 
provided the majority of Hanoi’s military assistance needs since the late-1960s, Beijing 
viewed the extension of North Vietnamese influence in Laos and Cambodia as 
essentially the extension of Soviet influence.  Ironically, China now faced virtually the 
same situation the United States had confronted in 1948-49: the fear that the Soviet 
Union might use a proxy to extend its influence at the expense of the political 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations which might then allow it to threaten 
the security of China.  As such, just as Washington had done in the 1940s, Beijing now 
sought to break Moscow’s hold over that proxy.  In this regard, the American refusal to 
withdraw was counterproductive, for it merely provided a pretext for Moscow to deepen 
its ties to Hanoi, and for Hanoi, in turn, to deepen its interference with its neighbors.  In 
the meantime, Beijing focused its diplomatic efforts on shoring up its ties with the DRV 
as a means of curbing Soviet influence there, a policy that Beijing intended its vigorous 
denunciation of the United States to serve. 
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When discussions resumed in October, Zhou therefore reasserted China’s support 
for North Vietnam and rejected Kissinger’s proposal for an Indochina-wide ceasefire.  
Kissinger responded testily, expressing that “there would not be any need to arrange a 
ceasefire if North Vietnamese troops would withdraw and let local forces determine their 
own future.”  He repeated American good intentions, and pointed out that while “the 
PRC did not trade in principles” the American proposals “would end the war on a basis 
that would not require it to do so.”106  The PRC disagreed.  When the Paris Talks broke 
down in January 1972, Beijing sided wholeheartedly with Hanoi, characterizing U.S. 
proposals as a fraud, and lambasting the American “war of aggression against Vietnam.”  
Furthermore, regardless of what Kissinger had professed to Zhou in October, the United 
States clearly desired China to “abandon principles and exert pressure on the Vietnamese 
side on behalf of the United States.  This is absolutely impossible.”107 
Despite these disagreements, the administration could look upon their efforts 
during 1971 with much satisfaction.  High-level contact and a degree of mutual 
understanding and respect had been established between the two long-estranged nations.  
The American and Chinese representatives for the most part had conducted civil and 
constructive discussions free of the invective that had too often characterized the 
ambassadorial talks during the two preceding decades.  The administration had achieved 
Beijing’s tacit approval of a gradualist approach to global changes and the legitimacy of 
an ongoing American military presence in East Asia.  Zhou had even begun moving 
toward the view that China should exert a moderating influence on its overzealous North 
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Korean allies.  Furthermore, the administration believed that Mao and Zhou had 
committed their prestige to the successful continuation of the relationship, and that “Any 
reversal of the direction in which the PRC leadership is moving would at this point 
probably involve serious domestic repercussions” for Zhou and “the other senior 
personalities who have joined with him in this endeavor.”108 
The administration perceived China’s entry into the United Nations in October 
1971 as facilitating this reorientation.  Although Chinese representatives at the U.N. 
would continue placing “ideology and propaganda ahead of practicality,” nonetheless 
“the need to achieve results should eventually force the PRC to adopt more pragmatic 
bargaining positions and become more willing to reach compromise settlements, 
especially when such settlements are acceptable to the Third World.”  The 
administration thus should encourage Beijing’s involvement in multilateral issues and 
discourage it “from looking at these institutions from a purely political and propaganda 
point of view.”109  By the end of the session in mid-January 1972, administration 
officials reported hopefully that “In all, the Chinese demonstrated considerable 
flexibility” in that “they were willing either to vote in favor of or abstain on not-totally-
acceptable resolutions, making an explanation of vote to record their reservations.”110  
Moreover, the Chinese delegation asserted the importance of U.N. resolutions as 
international obligations to which member nations must adhere; the U.N.’s decision to 
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seat Beijing had apparently imbued these resolutions with a legality that the Chinese 
Communists had previously claimed they lacked.111 
The relative moderation of the Chinese U.N. delegation paralleled indications of 
a similar shift in China’s involvement with the Third World, particularly the African 
liberation movements.  Together, these suggested that a process of socializing Beijing 
into the international system had already begun.  The key aspects of this new approach 
included an acceptance of the possibility for the peaceful transition to socialist systems, 
an emphasis on revolutionary efforts of nations rather than peoples, and an effort to 
mobilize the collective diplomatic force of the Third World to affect revolutionary 
change aimed at the economic and political systems of the superpowers.  This approach 
thus remained inherently revolutionary.  However, “insofar as the new line implies an 
acknowledgment by Peking of the need to adopt – even for ultimate revolutionary 
purposes – the conventional practices and norms of the international system, it also 
implies an acceptance of the need to conform to the rules of the game of international 
society.”  China had accepted membership “in something which in Marxist terms simply 
does not exist: a social system of states with its own rules, norms, and acceptable 
patterns of behaviour.”112 
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 Thus, with immense satisfaction tempered by a cautious pragmatism, Nixon 
embarked on his own trip to China in February 1972.  During five days of meetings both 
sides covered much the same ground that Kissinger and Zhou had during the former’s 
1971 visits.  At his initial meeting with Mao, Nixon proclaimed that “we can find 
common ground, despite our differences, to build a world structure in which both can be 
safe to develop in our own ways on our own roads.”113  But, as subsequent discussions 
once more revealed, the problem lay not in the threat that China and the United States 
posed to each other’s development, but rather with the broader perspectives of 
international relations to which the two sides adhered.  On this score, Nixon could only 
express to Zhou that “we tried to find common ground, and as time goes on, we will try 
to find more common ground.”114   
    
International Order and the Normalization Process, 1972-1976 
Both Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon characterized the Sino-American 
relationship of the 1970s as based upon a shared animosity for the Soviet Union and its 
hegemonial ambitions.  Yet Moscow’s activities constituted only the most dangerous of 
many threats to international peace and stability that Washington felt compelled to 
confront.  From 1972 to 1976, the Nixon and Ford administrations sought to engage 
Beijing’s help in resolving these threats, but regularly faced resistance rooted in the 
Chinese leaders’ enduring ideological interpretation of American actions and intentions.  
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The following analyzes several major international crises and issues that collectively 
demonstrate a gradual meeting of minds between officials in Washington and Beijing 
despite lingering differences.  Discerning the extent to which the Sino-American 
rapprochement affected each of these will help illustrate the extent of Beijing’s 
acceptance of Washington’s perspective.  Though lingering differences did not affect the 
American intention to normalize, they did affect the pace by which normalization 
occurred.  
The most remarkable fact of American diplomacy during these years is the extent 
to which the Nixon and Ford administrations insisted on carrying out normalization 
despite the annoyance and frustration that many officials – Kissinger included – 
frequently felt regarding their dealings with Chinese officials.  The reasons for this 
persistence are crucial to understanding the most fundamental rationale for American 
China policy under Nixon and Ford: that perhaps the greatest threat to international 
peace and order lay in allowing an ascendant China to remain isolated and antagonistic 
to the United States.  Nixon set the tone for this in his 1967 article in which he warned 
against allowing the Chinese people to remain in “angry isolation.”  Following his 
groundbreaking trip to China in 1972, this view continued to define his and Kissinger’s 
assessment of the importance of improved Sino-American relations.  In May 1973, 
Nixon referred to relations with China as the “critical problem of our age,” emphasizing 
that continuing the policy of “silent confrontation” would ultimately “reap a nuclear war.  
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No question.”115  Even as Nixon concluded that Watergate might soon force him from 
office, he confided to Kissinger the necessity of staying the course on China policy in 
order to ensure global peace and freedom for the next 30 or 300 years.116 
The development of the Sino-American relationship during these years – the 
series of high-level meetings, exchange programs, and tacit, if uneven, cooperation on 
third country issues and against Soviet expansion – did serve to minimize the possibility 
of future military conflict between the two nations.  And yet, Kissinger explicitly and 
frequently noted the inherent impermanence of this situation so long as Beijing retained 
its revolutionary foreign policy outlook.  Cooperation against the Soviet Union would 
produce “tacit cooperation for at least several years,” but as the Soviet danger faded or 
as China’s strength increased, Kissinger admitted, “the Chinese could follow an 
antagonistic policy with the same single-mindedness” with which they pursued their 
conflict with Moscow.117  In 1975, Kissinger again expressed that “we shouldn’t delude 
ourselves.  In five years if they become strong they could just cold-bloodedly push us 
away.  Someday they may treat us like the Soviet Union, like an enemy.”118  Kissinger’s 
diplomacy thus reflected in remarkable ways the Eisenhower approach of diplomatic 
engagement for the purpose of postponing conflict and hoping for some eventual 
fundamental change in the Chinese approach.  Judged in this way, this policy succeeded, 
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for even if domestic issues constituted the core of Chinese internal political tensions 
during these years, the rapprochement and progress toward normalization during the 
mid-1970s provided an alternative international context within which the Chinese 
Communists could pursue their domestic agenda. 
Beyond this longer-term objective of staving off Sino-American conflict lay the 
more immediate imperative of moderating the revolutionary excesses of Soviet foreign 
policy by means of a triangular geostrategic structure that would compel Moscow to 
adopt a more accommodating posture.  In March 1973, Kissinger noted that “our 
opening to Peking has paid us substantial dividends with Moscow.”119  A breakthrough 
in the negotiations for a strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) occurred in May 1971 
with agreements formally signed one year later.  These negotiations also prompted the 
two sides to agree on a new series of discussions for the reduction of conventional forces 
and other means of minimizing the possibility for conflict in Europe. 
By 1973, however, both the United States and China believed that Soviet actions 
now more than ever indicated a desire within the Kremlin to pursue a policy of 
aggressive expansion.  Leaders in both Washington and Beijing also shared the belief 
that they must not allow the Soviets to succeed or to gain undue strategic advantage.  For 
Kissinger, the problem remained the still powerful domestic consensus that the United 
States must limit its role in the world to those issues of vital interest to American 
security, and that it must not exacerbate tensions through the unthinking application of 
American force, such as many members of Congress believed had occurred in Vietnam.  
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As a result of this attitude, Congress placed significant limitations on the 
administration’s freedom to apply military force as a counter to communist aggressions 
in Cambodia in 1973 and Angola in 1975.  For the next forty years, Kissinger continued 
to maintain that China’s reluctance or outright refusal to cooperate with the United 
States on a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues during these years resulted 
directly from this appearance of American impotence in the face of the Soviet threat.   
To minimize Chinese concerns of American geostrategic reliability, Kissinger 
explained to virtually every Chinese leader with whom he met that entering into 
negotiations with the Soviet Union provided a way to obviate Congressional interference 
in the event that future Soviet actions required an assertive response.  For instance, he 
characterized the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) discussions as a way 
to reduce a certain number of American forces in Europe through negotiation with the 
communist nations in order to stave off a unilateral Congressional demand for even 
deeper reductions.120  More importantly, Kissinger argued, in order for the United States 
to maintain an assertive presence in the world it must enter into agreements with the 
Soviet Union that would provide legal justification for American intervention if and 
when Moscow violated them.  Nixon and Kissinger both insisted that only in such cases 
of Moscow’s clear violation of its treaty commitments could the administration 
overcome the isolationist tendencies of the American left and mobilize support against 
violators of the peace.   
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The primary vehicle for this strategy was the Agreement on the Prevention of 
Nuclear War that the United States and Soviet Union entered into on June 22, 1973, a 
treaty that, according to Kissinger, provided a legal basis to challenge Soviet aggression 
even “in areas where we have no formal obligation.”121  Beijing immediately and 
vociferously denounced the agreement.  On June 26, Zhou emphasized that the United 
States could not trust the Soviets to live up to such agreements, and that the American 
decision nonetheless to enter into them served only to appease Soviet aggression while 
simultaneously lulling Western Europe into a dangerous false sense of security.  Zhou 
also suggested that Washington might desire through such means to involve China in a 
war against the Soviets, a charge that Mao later repeated.122  For the next three years 
Kissinger continued to rebut such notions with only limited success at convincing 
Chinese leaders of Washington’s sincerity and determination to stand up to the Soviet 
military threat.123 
In large part, Beijing’s view apparently resulted from the enduring ideological 
perspective among Chinese officials that cast the United States as an imperialist 
superpower fully capable – perhaps likely – to collude with Moscow in a bid for shared 
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global domination (albeit, for the purpose of gaining strategic advantage over each other).  
Indeed, this constituted an important theme in the Sino-American discussions of the mid-
1970s.  Chinese officials often implicitly accused Washington of attempting to “set the 
Soviets and Chinese against each other in a war designed to destroy them both.”124  PRC 
public rhetoric went beyond implications, however, casting explicit accusations.  During 
his September 26, 1975, speech to the United Nations, for instance, Foreign Minister 
Qiao Kuanhua referred to détente as a calculated fraud and the SALT agreement as a 
pact designed to increase, rather than reduce, the superpowers’ strategic arms stockpiles.   
     Despite both Beijing’s refusal to accept the administration’s protestations at 
face value and its apparent dismay at Washington’s unreliability as a counterweight to 
Soviet aggression, Kissinger nonetheless believed that neither of these conditions 
changed the basic fact that China had no alternative to ongoing cooperation with the 
United States.  Even accepting the validity of this assessment, however, this appears 
insufficient, or at least incomplete, as an explanation for the extent of China’s non-
cooperation with the United States on a variety of issues pertinent to Washington’s goal 
of maintaining a stable international order.  Even as Nixon prepared to go to China, 
Beijing demonstrated that whatever minor concessions Zhou had made to Kissinger 
during their 1971 discussions, China’s ideological worldview would continue to limit 
Beijing’s willingness to cooperate in international endeavors on Washington’s terms.  
This attitude contributed significantly to the prolongation of the normalization process. 
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The ongoing war in Vietnam provided the most immediate issue on which 
Chinese and American global perspectives collided.  One month after Nixon’s return 
from his China visit, the DRV launched a spring offensive.  In Paris, the American and 
North Vietnamese negotiators failed to overcome the impasse between them, a 
circumstance that resulted in Kissinger once more conveying to Beijing his belief that 
the powerful nations of the world had a responsibility to exert a “moderating influence” 
over those nations that chose conflict over peaceful negotiation.  Kissinger attempted to 
explain to Zhou the American bombing and mining campaigns as a justifiable response 
to ongoing DRV aggression compounded by Hanoi’s cancellation of the upcoming 
negotiating session.  Zhou rejected this explanation and denounced the apparent 
American attempt to sabotage the peace talks.125  Under increasing domestic pressure to 
end the Vietnam War, Nixon grew testy at this lack of cooperation, especially after such 
a promising beginning to a new era of Sino-American relations.  When Kissinger warned 
Nixon that his upcoming Moscow trip would shake up the PRC, therefore, Nixon 
responded, “Good, so let them shake.”126   
Despite this underlying bitterness, Nixon nonetheless joined his National 
Security Advisor in patiently elaborating to Chinese officials throughout the spring and 
summer the reasons for the ongoing American activity in Southeast Asia.  The 
administration particularly stressed the intention of allowing the emergence by 
evolutionary processes of a communist government if the Vietnamese people so desired, 
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and the inability of the United States to overthrow an allied regime.127  Kissinger viewed 
these efforts as having achieved a measure of success.  Despite PRC complaints, 
Beijing’s response to the American position had been “moderate,” while an NSC paper 
prepared in June reported that the Chinese appear quietly sympathetic to and 
understanding of U.S. efforts in Vietnam.128  Beijing apparently believed that 
Washington genuinely wished to withdraw; China would not allow Vietnam to stand in 
the way of the rapprochement.129 
 Whatever hope Nixon and Kissinger may have harbored regarding Beijing’s 
willingness to influence Hanoi ended painfully in the closing months of 1972 as the 
Paris talks came close to achieving a negotiated settlement.  Regarding Beijing, the 
administration had two basic goals.  First, Washington insisted that the PRC cease 
providing Hanoi with military assistance after the conclusion of an armistice 
agreement.130  More immediately, however, Kissinger hoped that Beijing would use its 
influence to convince Hanoi that the United States genuinely intended to withdraw from 
Vietnam and allow the Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs free of outside 
control.131  In the context of the particularly acrimonious discussions in Paris in October, 
Chinese officials refused to place such pressure on the DRV.  Instead, Beijing accused 
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the administration of lacking good faith and intensified its public and private 
condemnation of both the United States and its South Vietnamese puppet.132   
Increasingly desperate at this critical moment in the negotiations, Kissinger 
raised the stakes.  During the 1971-72 discussions in Beijing, Nixon and Kissinger had 
implied a linkage between the end of hostilities in Vietnam and progress toward Sino-
American normalization.  On November 3, Kissinger made that link explicit.133  When 
the negotiations again hit a stumbling block in early December, Kissinger once more 
informed the Chinese that DRV stubbornness will jeopardize normalization, adding that 
the war’s prolongation would also affect Washington’s ability to counter Soviet 
hegemonial aspirations elsewhere in the world.134  Even after Hanoi agreed to the 
American terms later that month, Kissinger kept the pressure on lest the North 
Vietnamese renege.  On January 3, he re-emphasized the need to free up American 
forces for use against Soviet expansion and supplemented this warning with Nixon’s 
own message to Zhou that same day stating that the president would happily send 
Kissinger to China to discuss Sino-American relations – after the war ended.135  
Throughout this process, the administration lived up to its own rhetoric by placing 
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enormous pressure on its difficult South Vietnamese ally to agree to the negotiated 
settlement, threatening a separate peace if Thieu refused to comply.136 
The administration perceived that its effort to draw Beijing into a more active 
role in the Paris Talks had produced results, despite Beijing’s strident rhetoric in defense 
of its North Vietnamese allies.  In mid-November 1972, following his statement linking 
normalization and Vietnam, Kissinger reported that a remarkable change had occurred.  
Chinese officials now apparently favored a quick settlement.  “It’s the softest I’ve ever 
heard them on Vietnam,” Kissinger noted, adding that “They as much as said they would 
use their influence to keep things quiet in Cambodia.”137  Recent studies of Sino-DRV 
relations support the view that Beijing did, in fact, urge Hanoi to accept as genuine the 
American pledge to withdraw completely from Vietnam, and to drop its insistence on the 
removal of Thieu from power as a prerequisite to a negotiated settlement.138  Zhou even 
explicitly endorsed Kissinger’s plan to achieve a political settlement in Vietnam in the 
post-armistice period, a three-staged process that moved from the withdrawal of troops 
to general elections and, finally, to reunification. 
Yet, as historian John Garver points out, although Beijing might have urged 
Hanoi to compromise with the United States, it did not actively apply pressure to achieve 
that result.139  Furthermore, despite Zhou’s assurances to Kissinger, Beijing apparently 
did not consider the Paris Accords as a first step toward the peaceful reunification of 
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Vietnam, but rather as allowing Hanoi to prepare for the military conquest of the South.  
Zhou conveyed to Hanoi his assessment that after Washington’s withdrawal “it would be 
difficult for the United States to barge in.”140  Indeed, the successful conclusion of an 
armistice agreement in late-January did not immediately end tensions between 
Washington and Beijing over the fate of Vietnam.  In March, Kissinger noted that the 
PRC continued sending the DRV military aid, despite “insulting” claims to the contrary.  
The administration could understand providing such support during wartime, he 
admitted, but “to keep pouring in military supplies at a time when there is supposed to be 
peace cannot be considered a friendly act.”141  Further, the administration’s reappraisal 
of U.S. Asian strategy in August still called for “a combined conventional defense 
against a joint PRC / Communist ally attack in either Northeast or Southeast Asia.”142   
Nonetheless, the end of the war removed the most significant issue hindering the 
continuation of the normalization process.  In accordance with its earlier pledges, the 
administration now began to discuss the pace at which it would remove the two thirds of 
the troops on Taiwan that were directly related to military operations in Southeast Asia.  
Nixon also ordered the administration to conduct a series of NSSMs on establishing 
cultural, economic, and scientific exchanges with China.  Most significantly, during 
Kissinger’s February 1973 trip to China, the two sides agreed to establish liaison offices 
in each other’s capitol – a considerable concession given the PRC’s prior refusal to send 
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high-level representatives to Washington so long as the ROC maintained an official 
presence there. 
The apparent spirit of cooperation in the Sino-American relationship also 
manifested in the discussions on Korean reunification.  In his June 1972 meeting with 
Zhou Enlai, Kissinger pledged that the administration would “go along with any 
agreement that the two Koreas make with each other,” and Zhou replied by emphasizing 
his desire for “conciliatory contacts between the two.”143  Yet disagreements soon 
emerged over how exactly to proceed toward that goal.  Beijing had never accepted the 
legitimacy of the United Nations Committee for the Unification and Rehabilitation of 
Korea (UNCURK), the body responsible for encouraging and overseeing steps toward a 
political settlement on the peninsula, considering it external interference in the internal 
affairs of the Korean people.  For essentially the same reasons, Beijing disliked the 
United Nations Command (UNC), the multi-national military force tasked with 
preserving the independence of South Korea against communist aggression.144  For the 
sake of moving Seoul and Pyongyang toward peaceful negotiations, the administration 
demonstrated willingness to dismantle these two structures, so long as this occurred in a 
gradual, step-by-step manner that would not destabilize conditions on the peninsula.  
Zhou Enlai also expressed the hope that the American withdraw would occur gradually, 
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though more as a way to prevent Japan from entering the vacuum than to ensure peaceful 
reunification.145     
Kissinger’s proposal essentially followed the same guidelines that determined his 
approach to other major issues at this time – that is, to create conditions conducive to a 
political settlement by the parties directly involved without undermining the geostrategic 
conditions that preserved regional stability.  Thus, in the summer of 1973 Kissinger 
submitted a proposal for the dissolution of UNCURK at the upcoming UNGA session.  
As for the fate of the UNC, the administration sought to defer discussion until the 
following year, perceiving conditions between Seoul and Pyongyang as currently too 
volatile for the two sides to arrive at a mutually-acceptable alternative security 
arrangement.  In its August letter to the PRC, the administration welcomed “Efforts of 
the Chinese side in behalf of this objective.”146  According to one administration official, 
the PRC “played an important role in managing the Korean issue at the General 
Assembly session in November in such a manner that UNCURK died a quiet death.”  
However, Beijing’s helpfulness in ending the UNC on American terms remained less 
certain.147   
With UNCURK dissolved, the administration turned to the more difficult 
problem of replacing the UNC with an alternative means of preserving peace on the 
Korean peninsula, since an end to the UNC would remove the legal basis for the Korean 
armistice and, thus, open the door to possible military conflict.  In March 1974, the 
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administration produced National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 251 which 
laid out the administration’s intention to pass the duties of the UNC to the United States 
and South Korea, obtain Pyongyang and Beijing’s tacit acceptance of a continued 
American troop presence pending stabilization of the security situation, orchestrate a 
non-aggression pact between the two Koreas, and secure Security Council endorsement 
of these measures.  In his April 14 meeting with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, Kissinger 
emphasized the importance of both the United States and China remaining parties to the 
armistice “in order to influence our friends in this situation.”  Deng made no comment 
and quickly changed the subject.148  Indeed, Beijing had already heightened the stridency 
of its rhetoric on this issue and declared wholehearted support for Pyongyang’s demands 
that the administration found unacceptable.149  One month after the administration 
formally conveyed its proposal to Beijing, Washington had still received no response.150   
On August 16, the chances of achieving a negotiated settlement plummeted as 
Algeria, Syria, and several other nations friendly to North Korea inscribed an item on the 
UNGA agenda calling for the removal of all foreign troops in Korea that served under 
the U.N. flag.  To stave off an unhelpful public debate, Kissinger dropped his insistence 
on a non-aggression pact and communist acceptance of an interim American troop 
presence, but the damage had been done.  Although denying complicity in or advanced 
knowledge of the Algerian item, Beijing nonetheless chose to join with the Third World 
nations that supported Pyongyang’s firm stance against the UNC.  In two separate 
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speeches to the U.N. in September and October, PRC officials blasted American 
“interference and connivance” for the “reign of terror” perpetrated by the “fascist 
dictator,” South Korean President Park Chung-hee.151  Privately, Qiao gave no ground, 
insisting that the PRC must respect the views of its Korean allies.  In response, Kissinger 
repeated again what he and Zhou had tentatively agreed in 1971 – that both sides should 
influence their Korean allies.152  Two days later, Kissinger lamented “It is possible, but 
not at all certain that the PRC is somewhat more disposed than is North Korea to seek 
middle ground.”  At the very least, compromise during the current UNGA session 
remained “doubtful.”153 
Despite Beijing’s reluctance to help achieve a permanent resolution of these 
issues, the administration concluded in November that the PRC would “tolerate the U.S. 
troop presence as a means of preserving stability on the peninsula.”154  The following 
year, Beijing’s actions strengthened this assessment.  With the governments of South 
Vietnam and Cambodia falling to communist militancy, North Korean President Kim Il-
sung journeyed to Beijing where he publicly called upon the communist world to support 
his bid to reunify the Korean peninsula, by force if necessary.  Chinese leaders rejected 
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this view, however, and apparently forced Kim upon his return to Pyongyang to once 
more adopt the language of peaceful reunification.   
Yet before the end of April, Beijing issued a joint communiqué with its North 
Korean allies once more denouncing the UNC and declaring Pyongyang the sole 
legitimate government of Korea.155  Tensions over this issue continued to simmer for the 
next year and a half, with both sides accusing the other of delaying tactics and 
provocative actions.  Administration officials suggested linking progress on the UNC 
issue with progress toward normalization.  Kissinger agreed; in his May 1975 
discussions with Beijing’s U.N. ambassador, Huang Chen, he “obliquely got across that 
we were looking for more Chinese cooperation – or at least less unhelpfulness – on third 
country issues.”156  This had little effect on Beijing, which continued throughout the rest 
of 1975 to stand steadfast in its support of Pyongyang’s demands.  Just as with its 
defense of the DRV, Beijing would not endanger its position of leadership in the Third 
World or its revolutionary credentials for the sake of encouraging a lasting solution to a 
critical international problem.   
The same held true of the Chinese Communist view of the “oil weapon” in the 
aftermath of the 1973 Israeli-Arab conflict.  Beijing made no secret of its support for the 
Palestinian people in their “just” cause against the Israeli “aggressors,” yet Kissinger 
found common ground with Chinese officials regarding the necessity of eliminating 
opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.  Zhou proved helpful in 
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late-1973 in conveying to the Egyptian government that the United States genuinely 
sought a negotiated settlement.  Kissinger expressed the hope that Beijing would 
continue such efforts, which “would be very helpful to our common approach.”157  To 
Kissinger’s delight, Deng pledged to do so.158  
Yet the Yom Kippur War had profound consequences that extended beyond the 
Middle East as a result of an oil embargo that the Arab nations of the Oil Producing and 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) enacted against those nations that had supported Israel.  
Kissinger later characterized this as one of the 20th century’s most pivotal events, a 
“colossal blow” to the developed nations’ “balance of payments, economic growth, 
employment, price stability, and social cohesion.”159  The embargo also caused 
considerable economic disruption in the industrialized world.  This provided a 
considerable impetus for the Nixon administration to end that conflict swiftly and on 
terms that would satisfy the Arab world.  By March 1974 Kissinger had succeeded and 
the embargo ended.  As disruptive and disturbing as the oil embargo proved to be, 
however, the use of a natural resource as a weapon had broader and dangerous 
implications, coming at a time when the nations of the developing world, egged on by 
Beijing, had begun to flex their collective diplomatic muscle against what many of them 
perceived as an exploitative, Western-dominated international political and economic 
system.  As a result, even though the embargo had ended six months before, Qiao 
addressed the UNGA, praising the use of oil as a political weapon as a “historic 
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pioneering action.”  Independently developing and controlling their natural resources, he 
argued, would empower the nations of the Third World, facilitating their struggle against 
“imperialist plunder and exploitation.”160   
The administration viewed this advocacy with alarm, for Beijing’s actions 
threatened international order in several critical and interrelated ways.  As already noted, 
Kissinger considered the oil shock as a pivotal, transformational event in the world that 
fundamentally altered the domestic structures of all nations, breeding social unrest and 
instability.  Indeed, Kissinger pointed out the irony of the non-oil producing Third World 
states who suffered tremendously from the embargo railing against “their fellow victims 
in the West,” attributing this to either helplessness or “decrepit ideology.”161  Such 
strident support for the use of oil as a weapon might open the door for other developing 
nations to conduct the same kind of economic blackmail using other commodities, with 
the same devastating consequences for international stability and the civil conduct of 
foreign relations.  On a geostrategic level, Kissinger warned Deng in November 1974 
that these destabilizing effects on the developed world had undermined the strength of 
the United States, Japan, and the nations of Western Europe, and their capability to 
prevent Soviet expansionism.  “At some point,” Kissinger pointed out, “a contradiction 
develops” between Beijing’s ideological solidarity with the Third World and “the 
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necessity of achieving a common front against the threats to international security.  It is 
up to the People’s Republic to decide where this point is reached.”162   
Similar disagreements emerged in 1974-75 over how to resolve several problems 
in southern Africa.  Following a communist coup in Portugal, the new government 
granted all of its remaining African colonies independence.  As rival factions in those 
colonies vied for power, the Soviet Union dispatched considerable aid in support of the 
Marxist groups.  Fearing the broader ramifications of this for the Cold War, Washington 
began diplomatic efforts to bring the rival factions together in coalition governments that 
would retain national independence free from Moscow’s influence.  China needed little 
encouragement to curb Soviet influence on the continent, having been working toward 
that goal for years.  The communist military intervention in Angola in late-1975, 
however, raised the stakes considerably.  The Ford administration struggled to 
orchestrate an international response, but faced powerful opposition from Congress in 
the form of a resolution preventing the government from sending military aid or 
deploying troops.  With the communist forces now operating with impunity, Washington 
turned to Beijing for assistance.   
The discussions over the appropriate response to the Angolan crisis illustrate 
both the similarities and the differences in the Chinese and American approaches.  
Because of its inability to apply counterforce, the Ford administration concluded that it 
must support and rely on other governments in the region, including South Africa and 
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Rhodesia whose white minority governments had earned widespread international 
condemnation.  The United States and China both committed themselves to encouraging 
the liberalization of those political systems.  Yet the United States prioritized curbing the 
militant communist expansion underway in the region, a goal it believed that the 
temporary support of the South African and Rhodesian governments would facilitate.  
Only after the Soviet threat had ended should the United States put pressure on those 
governments to liberalize their political systems.  This view posed considerable 
problems for Beijing as adoption of this approach would imply approval of the 
repressive white regimes, cast China as an imperialist accomplice, and undermine its 
support among the Third World.  Indeed, as it turned out, even the administration faced 
difficulties from Congress and other allies over the notion of muting, even temporarily, 
its criticism of apartheid.   
The one issue that proved most difficult, however, was the question of the 
methods that China should employ to achieve the reunification of Taiwan with the 
mainland, an issue that Beijing passionately considered its internal affair and that 
Washington viewed as intricately linked with the principle of peaceful resolution of 
disputes and the preservation of American credibility in a volatile world.  Credibility in 
Sino-American relations served primarily to reassure Beijing that the American pledge 
to move towards normalization was not a trick.  But despite the importance he placed on 
the Sino-American relationship as means of achieving stability in the long-term, 
Kissinger considered paramount in the short-term, during the tumultuous events of the 
mid-1970s, for the U.S. to leave no doubt in the minds of friends and enemies alike that 
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the United States would stand by its commitments, particularly those involving the 
deterrence of military conflict.  Washington felt it could not afford to acquiesce in a 
militant conquest of Taiwan while it sought to avoid precisely those kinds of solutions in 
other global conflicts.  Indeed, the Nixon administration had envisioned the Sino-
American rapprochement as serving precisely this purpose, and had repeatedly urged 
Chinese officials to exert influence to ameliorate the militancy of its allies.  The fact that 
Beijing and Washington had agreed that the Taiwan issue was secondary to the 
overriding objective of countering Soviet expansionism in no way ameliorated the basic 
dilemma that the PRC refused to limit its options for “liberating” Taiwan.   
As difficult as this disagreement was in preventing the two sides from moving 
more quickly toward normalization, the most important underlying problem remained 
the prism through which the Chinese Communists perceived Washington’s motives.  
Though rooted in the Chinese experience of foreign exploitation, this perspective must 
surely have included an element of ideological rigidity in which the United States, from 
the Chinese perspective, remained an imperialist aggressor that sought a Sino-American 
partnership as a temporary expedient – much as Mao, himself, had done in order to 
counter the primary threat from Moscow.163  Mao, Zhou, and the other advocates of 
rapprochement confronted considerable domestic problems from the CCP’s more radical 
elements during the mid-1970s.  The various exchange programs that occurred following 
Nixon’s 1972 trip introduced a variety of foreign culture and ideas into China, a process 
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against which many ideologically fervent cadres protested vigorously.  These same 
forces also opposed the effort of Zhou and the moderates to impose order and structure 
on the Chinese economy, an apparent abandonment of Mao’s revolutionary line that had 
featured so prominently during the Cultural Revolution.  Furthermore, the 
rapprochement had failed to bring the American commitment to Taiwan to an end, thus 
calling into question both the wisdom of engaging with Washington and the competency 
of those Chinese officials who chose to do so.   
The combination of these factors produced a “sharp leftward movement” in 
Chinese domestic politics that placed the advocates of moderation in a difficult 
position.164  In December 1973, Mao forced Zhou to undergo “struggle sessions” in 
order to justify to the Politburo his “too accommodating” approach to the United States.  
Though unaware of this, Kissinger throughout 1974 nonetheless noted the conspicuous 
absence of both Zhou and even references to the premier during his discussions with 
Chinese officials; as Kissinger later noted, “No Chinese official referred to him 
again.”165  That year, Beijing’s rhetoric noticeably hardened.  Qiao and Kissinger offered 
competing toasts during the latter’s November 1974 visit to Beijing; Qiao emphasized 
the virtue of “the great turmoil in the world” while Kissinger rejoined that “this change 
must lead to a new and better order for all the peoples of the world.”166  The following 
day, Chinese officials explicitly charged the administration with deliberately creating 
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barriers to the settlement of the claims and assets issue.167  More significantly, Deng and 
Qiao took a rigid line on Taiwan, rejecting both Kissinger’s suggestion for retaining a 
liaison office in Taipei and the possibility of peaceful reunification, as well as suggesting 
that Chinese patience on this issue had limits.  The following month, Beijing extended 
their efforts into the public realm in what appeared an “orchestrated campaign” against 
the slow pace of normalization.168  By June 1975, China had extended invitations “by the 
dozens” to Senators and Congressmen to visit the PRC liaison office in an apparent 
effort to heighten the domestic pressure on the administration.169 
At the height of this hardening of Beijing’s stance, international events 
compelled the Ford administration to place even greater emphasis on the necessity of 
preserving Taiwan’s security.  In April 1975, a North Vietnamese offensive campaign 
toppled the South Vietnamese government.  Several weeks earlier, the government of 
Cambodia fell to Hanoi-backed communist rebels.  Many observers predicted that Laos 
would soon follow and the administration grew concerned about heightened bellicose 
rhetoric emanating from Pyongyang.  From his post in the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, 
George H. W. Bush commented that “the domino theory is alive and well.”170  Later that 
year, the American credibility crisis intensified due to Washington’s inability to counter 
Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola, a situation that the administration feared 
would result in all of Africa looking elsewhere for leadership and support.  Kissinger 
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viewed this with alarm; “coupled with Indochina,” he emphasized, “it is not a trivial 
thing which is happening in Southern Africa.”171   
To offset the dangerous effects of these events, Ford publicly reaffirmed on May 
6 the American commitments to the threatened nations of Asia, including Taiwan.  
Although Kissinger later claimed that this comment was inadvertent, the administration 
clearly sought any opportunity to hold the line against further disruptions.  Nothing 
demonstrated this as much as the administration’s response to the Cambodian seizure of 
the Mayaguez, an American merchant vessel, on May 12.  Having attempted and failed 
to achieve a diplomatic solution – in part because of Beijing’s refusal to become 
involved – Ford quickly decided forcibly to retake the vessel.172  This demonstration of 
American strength and resolve went far toward re-establishing American credibility 
throughout the world, even as it attracted vehement protests from Beijing and the other 
communist nations.   
The upcoming presidential campaign season and the rising tide of Republican 
support for Taiwan did clearly provide a domestic political rationale for a hardened 
position against China and a strengthened defense of Taiwan.  Yet, as the foregoing 
makes clear, compelling reasons for a more assertive stance on Taiwan’s security and 
peaceful reunification already existed from a geostrategic standpoint.  While Sino-
American normalization remained important “for the longer term restructuring of great 
power political and military relationships,” that objective, Kissinger’s advisors informed 
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him, now conflicted “with the immediate need to reassure key allies (and warn possible 
adversaries) in the wake of our Indochina setbacks.”173  After the spring of 1975, with 
American capabilities widely discredited, and with Washington desperate to re-establish 
its credibility, the administration felt it simply could not afford to leave Taiwan in a 
situation in which its security from aggression was not assured.174     
The events of that spring revived much of the Sino-American tension and 
mistrust that had subsided during the previous four years.  In the waning days of the 
Vietnam debacle, Washington abandoned hope of convincing Beijing to assist with 
either an evacuation or political solution, and had turned instead to consultations with 
Moscow.175  In the wake of the Mayaguez incident, Beijing sided wholeheartedly with 
Cambodia, describing the American response as “an outright act of piracy” and accusing 
the ship of conducting espionage.176  By July, Kissinger’s team had concluded that 
recent PRC behavior on a range of international issues gave “little prospect that after 
normalization we might expect to work positively with Peking in coping with a range of 
third country questions”; they recommended linking these issues with progress toward 
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normalization.177  Kissinger went so far as to completely reverse his previous views on 
the necessity of rapid normalization.  Previously, he believed that both countries must 
institutionalize the relationship lest leadership changes undermine it.  That July, however, 
he explicitly rejected the notion that normalization had to occur prior to Mao and Zhou’s 
death, since “they haven’t offered us a better deal.”178   
Relations continued to sour in the latter half of 1975.  In August, Beijing chose to 
support Cuba’s U.N. initiative decrying American colonialism in Puerto Rico, and soon 
thereafter rejected a delegation of American mayors on the grounds that it included the 
mayor of San Juan.  Later that month, Beijing also protested the existence of a Tibetan 
office in New York, insisting that the administration force it to close and prevent it from 
carrying out its cultural activities.  Even more disturbing, Qiao’s September 26 speech to 
the United Nations “pulled no punches when attacking the US generally and specifically,” 
and strongly suggested “that the US and the PRC have few if any common interests.”179  
In his subsequent discussions with Qiao and Deng, an exasperated Kissinger emphasized 
that “we have resisted Soviet pressures whenever necessary while the Chinese do little 
more than dish out tough rhetoric while carping from the sidelines.”180  The Chinese 
remained unapologetic.  Even worse, Chinese officials spoke broadly to American allies 
in Europe, noting American appeasement of Moscow and adoption of a “Dunkirk” 
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strategy in Europe.  On this latter score, the Chinese referenced the U.S. “departure from 
Vietnam after losing only 50,000 men” as evidence that Washington would abandon 
Western Europe in the face of a determined Soviet assault.181   
The Chinese also apparently had no interest in arriving at a mutually acceptable 
communiqué for Ford’s upcoming trip in December.  Kissinger found the Chinese 
draft – which they provided only hours before his scheduled departure from China – as 
“completely unacceptable, even as a basis for discussion.”182  Indeed, Kissinger wrote to 
Ford that the Chinese, “by their insolent behavior and self-righteous lack of 
responsiveness in discussing international and bilateral issues, seemed to be daring us to 
postpone your visit,” a dramatic step that the administration chose not to take.183  Rather, 
the administration downgraded the visit from seven days to four in order to convey its 
displeasure.   
During his discussions with Chinese leaders in Beijing that December, Ford 
repeatedly defended American efforts to combat Soviet expansionism, and expressed 
puzzlement as to why the PRC found it necessary to criticize the United States.184  The 
president highlighted the difference between rhetoric and genuine effort, stressed the 
need for “parallel actions” throughout the world, and urged the Chinese to clarify “what 
your country is doing to meet this challenge.”  Deng responded that China had made 
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“preparations for ourselves” and had fired “some empty cannons,” which he argued were 
necessary to maintain influence in the Third World.185  Ford’s meeting did nothing to 
resolve the tensions in the Sino-American relationship, however.  Nor did resolution of 
the remaining problems appear likely at the end of 1975.  The domestic political 
conditions in both countries by that time ensured that no progress would occur through 
at least the end of 1976. 
This general review of the Sino-American rapprochement from 1972-1976 
reveals that the United States did achieve a degree of Chinese cooperation that indicated 
that Beijing had adopted certain aspects of Washington’s international perspective.  The 
PRC placed curbs on North Korean aggression, used its relationship with Egypt to 
facilitate an end to the Middle East war, delivered approximately thirty tanks to Angola 
in response to Ford’s appeal, and in the summer of 1975, in an “unprecedented assurance 
to a non-Communist government,” pledged to assist Thailand militarily if Vietnam 
should attack that country in force.186  Similarly, even as domestic conditions in China 
deteriorated in 1976, Beijing re-established ambassadorial-level contact with India and 
entered into a military assistance agreement with Egypt, moves that indicated a proactive 
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approach to curbing Soviet influence.187  Even in the case of African independence and 
black majority rule, Beijing and Washington agreed on the necessity of achieving those 
ends, even though Beijing continued to doubt American sincerity.  The remaining 
disagreements primarily regarded prioritization of goals, the appropriate pace for 
pursuing them, and the extent to which powerful nations should exert influence over the 
course of events – points that in some cases Washington considered just as important as 
commonality of ultimate purpose.   
Yet underneath all of this apparent agreement and cooperation lay deep 
uncertainty.  Kissinger surmised that Zhou Enlai may have considered the Sino-
American relationship as a permanent feature rather than as a tactical phase, as Mao 
perceived it.188  Yet Zhou’s dominant role in Chinese foreign policy had long since 
ended, and no American could predict how long Beijing’s cooperative attitude might last.  
Furthermore, Mao’s impending death provided no guarantee that the successor regime 
would not revert to the level of radicalism prevalent during the Cultural Revolution.  
Such a reversion did, indeed, appear to occur in 1974-76 as Beijing’s public and private 
rhetoric on a variety of issues grew increasingly militant and uncompromising, 
particularly on the one issue that Kissinger considered most important: achieving an 
accurate Chinese understanding of American intentions.  This is where matters stood as 
the eras of Mao, Chiang, and Kissinger all came to an end.189
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CHAPTER VI 
THE SETTLING DUST: NORMALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
UNDER CARTER, 1976-1979* 
 
 The Carter administration swept into the White House on a wave of domestic 
American resentment at the apparent lack of integrity that many believed had 
characterized the realpolitik diplomacy of the Nixon-Ford years.  In contrast, Carter’s 
team sought to base its foreign policy on a solid moral foundation, believing that 
upholding American values throughout the world would prove a more potent and 
effective means of achieving its objectives than the exertion of military power. As part 
of this approach, the administration became a more powerful advocate for the demands 
and aspirations of the Third World, and viewed American military interventions as a 
factor that more often exacerbated rather than resolved global and regional tensions.   
This prevailing critique of Carter’s predecessors, however, did not prevent the 
incoming administration from acknowledging the very real benefits that the United 
States derived from the alterations that Nixon and Ford had made to the international 
order, and the additional benefits that would result from perpetuating and nurturing 
certain elements of that approach.  On the most fundamental level, the administration, 
just as its predecessors had done, sought a stable international order characterized by the 
non-use of force and respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity.  It 
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continued the policy of détente, removing where possible those points of contention that 
could lead to superpower conflict and working toward mutually-acceptable reductions in 
conventional and nuclear weapons.  It sought to replace the American presence in the 
world with alternative means of stabilization, particularly through its support of, but not 
active involvement in regional organizations.  It perceived China as a potentially 
important factor contributing to the achievement of all of these goals.   
 By 1976, important transitions were underway in both China and Taiwan that 
affected the administration’s view of those countries.  In Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo 
recognized the inevitability of normalization and grasped at whatever opportunities came 
along to ensure the continued security and separate legal existence of the ROC, 
regardless of the broader international implications of its moves.  In China, Deng 
Xiaoping emerged victorious from a vicious period of political instability prepared to 
lead the People’s Republic on a new course premised on modern economic development 
rather than continuous ideological struggle and revolution.  In pursuing their respective 
goals, Chiang and Deng set their countries squarely on opposite ends of the well-
established American matrix of international order: Taipei became the destabilizing 
threat while Beijing demonstrated its capacity for cooperative and pragmatic 
engagement.  These shifts in the American perception of these two countries facilitated 
considerably the normalization process. 
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Transitions: Taipei, Beijing, and Washington on the Eve of the Carter Presidency  
 During the mid-1970s, major transitions occurred in the leaderships and policies 
of all three capitols that played important roles in the normalization drama that unfolded 
during the first two years of Carter’s presidency.  Taipei’s leadership transition occurred 
over the course of a decade as the Generalissimo gradually handed over power to his son, 
Chiang Ching-kuo.  In part, this reflected Kai-shek’s advanced age and his increasing 
inability to perform his responsibilities as president.  The younger Chiang essentially ran 
the ROC as early as 1965.  He formalized his leadership position over the course of the 
next decade, becoming Deputy Premier in 1969 and Premier in 1972.  By that time a 
series of health problems had made Kai-shek an invalid, after which he stopped seeing 
foreign visitors and no longer participated in decision making. 
Ching-kuo abandoned the hope of mainland recovery in the 1960s, although he 
continued dutifully to convey his father’s military plans to American officials.  He also 
recognized early on the gradual and inexorable disintegration of both Taiwan’s 
international status in general and the American commitment in particular.  In an effort 
to curry favor among the international community, Ching-kuo joined with other flexible 
KMT officials in liberalizing the ROC political process, thus increasing native 
Taiwanese participation in both the military and government.1  Simultaneously, he 
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explicitly rejected as “suicidal” Deng’s overtures for a peaceful, negotiated 
reunification.2 
Yet, by the time Ford entered office in 1974, Ching-kuo had recognized the 
inevitability of Sino-American normalization.  He therefore devised a policy designed to 
exert Taipei’s remaining influence toward the perpetuation of Taiwan’s separation from 
the mainland and the preservation of its sovereignty and independence.  To accomplish 
this he implemented a two-track approach to curry favor not just in Washington but also 
to bolster Taiwan’s ties with other countries whose continued support Chiang would rely 
on to prevent further slippage in Taipei’s international status.  The latter objective 
proved relatively easy, requiring the utilization of the ROC’s economic vitality – 
arguably its most important asset – to create a “web of relationships” with other 
countries interested in mutual investment.3  The United States supported and facilitated 
these initiatives, producing a “quantum leap” in Taiwan’s global economic ties.4  But 
such a straightforward economic approach proved insufficient to halt Washington’s 
march toward normalization.   
The State Department concluded hopefully that the “leaders and people of 
Taiwan will try to make the best of situation, and with typical Chinese determination, 
will probably be able to get along quite well.  Our relationship with them will continue, 
because they have nowhere else to go.”5  The Nixon and Ford administrations 
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understood that the Taiwan issue, just as with other major conflicts in the world, 
required a gradualist approach that would prevent such destabilizing outcomes as a 
breakdown of social order on the island, unilateral Nationalist military action, or, worse, 
an accommodation between Taipei and Moscow.6  Normalization therefore required a 
“conditioning process” for the Nationalists whereby the administration would take small, 
careful steps away from a formal U.S.-ROC relationship in order to avoid these pitfalls.  
Early efforts along these lines began in January 1972 when Nixon emphasized to the 
Generalissimo that normalization “will move us all in the direction of a stable and 
enduring international order.”  “I look forward,” Nixon added, “to your continued 
understanding of our purpose.”7  In the difficult months that followed, Nixon and 
Kissinger met personally with Ambassador Shen informing him of the ongoing 
American effort to achieve a renunciation of force agreement, encouraging the ROC to 
“remain calm and not do anything rash,” and suggesting that Mao and Zhou’s deaths 
might yet alter circumstances in Taipei’s favor.8   
Although acknowledging Washington’s inexorable drift toward normalization, 
Ching-kuo did not remain idle.  In discussions with American officials, the Nationalists 
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adopted a new tactic, pointing out their many economic and, increasingly, political 
accomplishments as reasons why it deserved continued American support.9  In his 
September 1974 letter to Ford, for instance, Ching-kuo compared Taiwan’s progressive 
society favorably to that of the repressive communist regimes, and cast the ROC as an 
excellent example of economic development that other nations should emulate.10  ROC 
officials similarly urged other nations not to de-recognize Taipei.  In doing so, they 
abandoned the juridical claims on which they had previously relied and chose instead to 
base their pleas on past friendly relations and appeals to both national and regional 
security.  The Nationalists even endorsed the Shanghai Communiqué “largely because of 
concerns the US will advance beyond it.”11  
These assessments did little to alleviate Kissinger’s concerns; he continued 
efforts to prevent Taipei from derailing Sino-American relations.  The National Security 
Advisor bent the truth slightly in his February 1973 meeting with Shen regarding his 
discussions with Beijing on troop withdrawals.12  He clearly lied to the ambassador 
several months later, however, when he told him that the United States would not 
recognize Beijing unless the PRC “recognizes your separate existence.”13  Kissinger 
chose to meet with the American ambassador in Taipei, Walter McConaughy, as a way 
                                                            
9 Memorandum of Conversation between Nixon and Yen Chia-ken, 5 January 1973, ibid. 
10 Letter, Chiang Ching-kuo to Ford, 20 September 1974, NSA, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign 
Leaders, 1974-1977, Box 1, Folder “China, Republic of – Premier Chiang Ching-kuo,” NLF. 
11 Telegram, Embassy in Taipei to Kissinger, 14 August 1974, NSA, Presidential Country Files for East 
Asia and the Pacific, Country File, Box 5, Folder “China, Republic of – State Department Telegrams to 
SECSTATE – EXDIS (1),” NLF. 
12 Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Shen, 21 February 1973, FRUS, 1969-1976, 
XVIII, 197.  
13 Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Shen, 6 August 1973, ibid, 308.  Kissinger had no 
intention of making this a precondition.  Shen later elaborated on his experiences with Kissinger and 
apparent American duplicity.  James Shen, The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out its Ally 
(Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1983). 
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to strengthen Chiang Ching-kuo’s domestic political position; ignoring Chiang’s 
domestic political problems, the ambassador warned, might “lead Taiwan to pursue a 
more independent foreign policy.”  At that meeting, McConaughy, citing Nixon’s 
“repeated statements,” identified his role as “hand-holding” and “reassuring” the ROC.  
Kissinger assured him that, rumors to the contrary, the administration would replace 
McConaughy following the ambassador’s rapidly-approaching retirement.14  The 
administration carried out this pledge, appointing the experienced career diplomat 
Leonard Unger, an official of such reputation that his appointment reassured Taipei as 
much as it caused consternation in Beijing.15  The administration allowed the ROC to 
open a new consulate in New York in 1973, even after Zhou complained that this 
signified a reversal of the U.S. commitment to normalization.16  By spring 1974, these 
moves had resulted in a level of ROC confidence “probably higher than at any time since 
our China initiative of July 1971.”17  Given this favorable atmosphere, Unger suggested 
that the administration could now proceed a step further toward disengagement. 
Yet Unger also warned that careful attention to internal ROC politics remained 
necessary.  Chiang must be able to demonstrate “his close working relations” with 
Washington as a means to restrain the extremism of “die-hard KMT elements” and to 
obtain their cooperation for Chiang’s “effort to develop rational and practical response” 
                                                            
14 Notes on a Conversation between Kissinger and McConaughy, 3 October 1973, ibid, 323; Unger also 
understood his primary function as keeping Taipei “on the reservation.”  Memorandum of Conversation 
between Leonard Unger and Brent Scowcroft, et al, 12 April 1974, ibid, 472. 
15 Unger also understood his primary function as keeping Taipei “on the reservation.” Memorandum of 
Conversation between Scowcroft and Unger, 12 April 1974, NSA, NSC East Asian and Pacific Staff Files, 
(1969) 1973-1976, Box 2, Folder “China, Republic of (2),” NLF. 
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to Taipei’s “creeping international diplomatic isolation.”18  In line with this thinking – to 
maintain Chiang’s domestic position while continuing the conditioning process – the 
administration sent a presidential message from Ford that affirmed the American 
commitment to Taiwan’s security, but intentionally excluded reference to the Mutual 
Defense Treaty.19  Similarly, the administration rejected Chiang’s January 1975 request 
to replace Ambassador Shen, fearing that this might have an adverse reaction in Beijing 
at a time of cooling Sino-American relations.20  Even in this, Unger urged the 
administration to portray this decision as one intended to preserve the state of U.S.-ROC 
relations.21 
Whatever value the administration attributed to Chiang’s leadership, it 
nonetheless recognized that his overwhelming priority remained ensuring Taiwan’s 
future security.  In this the Nationalists apparently rejected the notion, encouraged by 
American officials, that political deterrents to Chinese military action would suffice as a 
substitute for an ongoing American troop presence.  This difference of opinion had two 
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important ramifications for ROC policy: the effort to obtain an independent nuclear 
capability and the rejuvenation of intensive ROC lobbying efforts targeting the 
American public and Congress. 
Beginning in 1965, the ROC, on Ching-kuo’s authorization, pursued an 
independent nuclear capability.  It did so in response to Beijing’s first atomic detonation 
the year before, and also due to the perceived deterioration in the willingness of the 
United States to deter communist Chinese aggression.  For the rest of that decade, the 
ROC worked to obtain nuclear facilities, materials, and advice from the United States, 
Canada, West Germany, France, South Africa, and Israel, with the first reactors 
becoming operational by 1973, and the construction of other important facilities 
reaching completion by the beginning of Carter’s term.22  The Sino-American 
rapprochement marked an important moment in this regard, for, having broken relations 
in favor of recognizing the PRC, many of the nations that had provided this support now 
lacked the ability officially to negotiate safeguard inspections to insure that the ROC 
would use its nuclear program only for peaceful purposes.  Beijing compounded these 
problems by insisting in 1972 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also 
break relations with Taiwan, thus removing that organization’s ability to monitor 
Taipei’s activities.   
                                                            
22 David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, vol. 54 (January/February, 1998), 57; the best summary of the new wave of literature and 
released documentation on the ROC nuclear program is William Burr, ed., “New Archival Evidence on 
Taiwanese ‘Nuclear Intentions’, 1966-1976,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 19, 
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The CIA infiltrated the ROC’s nuclear program in its earliest stages and knew of 
Taipei’s desire to weaponize its nuclear program.23  Yet the administration concluded in 
1972 that although the ROC might soon have the capability of producing nuclear 
weapons, it would refrain from testing or stockpiling them for fear of adverse 
international repercussions.24  Perhaps because of this assessment, the United States 
continued to supply Taiwan with nuclear material as late as 1974 under the condition 
that the ROC use this material for civilian purposes only.  That year, however, the CIA 
concluded that “Taipei conducts its small nuclear program with a weapon option clearly 
in mind,” and predicted that the ROC would develop a nuclear capability within five 
years.25   
In part, the administration intended its efforts to bolster both ROC morale and 
confidence in the United States as a means of preventing Taipei from intensifying its 
nuclear program.26  These concerns proved justified, for on March 18, 1975, the 
Australian Ambassador in Beijing informed Ambassador Bush that the ROC did, in fact, 
actively seek to obtain nuclear weapons.27  The collapse of non-communist Indochina 
and the resulting perception of American impotence resulted in Ching-kuo’s decision to 
speed up ROC nuclear weapons development, and to expand research efforts to include 
missile delivery systems.28  Kissinger subsequently began pressuring Chiang to cease 
                                                            
23 Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son, 275. 
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November 1972, FRUS, 1969-1976, XVII, 1114. 
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such actions.  Noting that Taipei had sent fifteen engineers to MIT to learn about missile 
technology, the State Department convinced the university to cancel the program, and in 
June Kissinger obtained Chiang’s pledge that the ROC would not “take any action to 
engage in the production of nuclear weapons.”29   
Yet Nationalist efforts nonetheless persisted into 1976.  In May, an intelligence 
analysis reported that Taipei had achieved “some success in its nuclear, missile, and 
chemical warfare programs,” including the “capability to fabricate nuclear devices.”30  A 
major IAEA inspection of ROC nuclear facilities in July 1976 lent support to these 
warnings, and prompted fear among U.S. officials concerning Taiwan’s intentions.31  
Once more responding to State Department pressure, Chiang reasserted in September the 
peaceful nature of Taiwan’s nuclear program.32  However, the NSC soon thereafter 
noted that Taipei might reconsider this position in a post-normalization context.33 
While this nuclear drama unfolded, Chiang explored other opportunities to 
reverse the deteriorating American commitment to Taiwan’s security.  On April 5, 1975, 
Chiang Kai-shek died, prompting much discussion within the American government 
regarding the proper level of representation the administration should send to the funeral.  
Ford and Kissinger selected Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz to attend because his 
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relatively low rank would not unsettle Beijing.  This decision, however, set off a 
firestorm of dissent.  Both Chinese and Americans in Taiwan bombarded Unger with 
protest letters at this insulting decision.  In the United States no less a figure than 
Reverend Billy Graham urged the administration to send a more prominent official.  
Protests also poured in from Congress, most notably from Senator Barry Goldwater who 
intimated that he would derail Sino-American normalization if Ford did not increase the 
level of the American delegation.  Such complaints pointed out that the administration 
had sent Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as its representative to the funeral of Saudi 
Arabian King Faisal, the “leader of a country that has shown such contempt for our 
nation and the principles for which we stand.”34  If such a high-level official could attend 
that funeral, so too should he attend the funeral of the last of the Big Four leaders of 
World War II.  After a week of such pressure Ford capitulated, sending Rockefeller to 
Taipei.  
Simultaneously, the Ford administration faced the collapse of the non-communist 
governments in Indochina and Congress’ collective refusal to authorize military 
assistance or intervention to salvage the situation.  As described earlier, Ford and 
Kissinger sought to counter the image of a paralyzed American foreign policy through 
such actions as the Mayaguez rescue operation and public reaffirmations of 
Washington’s defense commitments.  Though Congress had contributed to the problems 
plaguing the administration through its restrictive legislation, some legislators began to 
sympathize with the administration’s predicament, particularly as it affected alliances 
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with the more reliable East Asian governments in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  The 
net result of these events was somewhat paradoxical.  Congress clearly did not wish to 
see the United States militarily involved in East Asia, yet a vocal minority had managed 
to exert considerable and successful pressure on the administration to alter the makeup 
of its delegation to the Generalissimo’s funeral.  Taipei apparently concluded that with 
sufficient effort, the ROC might yet convert this display of sympathy for Taiwan into a 
bolstered American commitment to the island’s security. 
Taipei now intensified its lobbying.  These efforts had begun by August 1974, 
and, indeed, the administration had predicted that the ROC would eventually engage in 
an intensive lobbying campaign targeting both Congress and the American people.35  
From late-1974 through mid-1975 the ROC achieved meager results, having obtained 
supportive resolutions only from the Georgia state legislature in March.  Beginning that 
summer, however, this changed considerably.  Ching-kuo personally approved the 
assignment of thirty additional intelligence officers to the ROC embassy in Washington 
and increased the number of consulates throughout the United States.36  By the end of 
1975, the state legislatures of Missouri, Michigan, Illinois, and Arizona, as well as the 
cities of Memphis, Knoxville, and Honolulu had all passed resolutions supporting the 
ROC.   
By the summer of 1976, Taipei had won over the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Taiwan which submitted a list of technical and legal problems in 
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maintaining post-normalization relations with the ROC and argued that only 
perpetuating the MDT and securing American economic interests in Taiwan would make 
normalization worthwhile.37  The NSC viewed this as a product of Nationalist lobbying, 
since Taipei had provided its own “remarkably similar list.”38  The ROC also expanded 
its connections through sister city programs.  In June, Knoxville, TN, sent an official 
delegation to its new Taiwanese sister city, Kaohsiung, and requested that the 
administration provide a letter to the mayor of Kaohsiung to commemorate the occasion.  
Ford refused.39  That summer, Goldwater and other pro-Taiwan politicians placed 
additional pressure on the administration by including within the 1976 Republican 
platform a provision calling for the support of Taiwan.  Outraged that the Republican 
Party now officially and explicitly supported Taiwanese independence, Kissinger 
commented that “it would have been better to have said that Taiwan is the legitimate 
government of all China,” and concluded that “we will just have to ignore the 
Republican platform.”40   
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At this time, Beijing underwent an even more important transition than that 
occurring in Taiwan: the succession crisis that swept through China in 1976 and 1977, 
the culmination of the tumultuous internal debates that had wracked the country since 
the beginning of the decade.  Mao had managed to deflect opposition to his decision to 
engage with the United States, staving off challenges from Lin Biao and other officials 
who preferred a hard-line policy.  Despite Zhou’s fall from grace in early 1974, Deng 
Xiaoping and other relatively moderate Chinese leaders remained in influential positions.  
Yet during his last year of life, the Chairman seemed unable or unwilling to set himself 
squarely in one or the other camp, thus allowing the more radical factions to maintain 
pressure on the policymaking apparatus.41 
Though Mao purged Deng during the Cultural Revolution, he restored him to his 
posts in 1973 as a sort of replacement for Zhou and a check on the radicals’ excesses.  
Soon thereafter, Deng publicly admitted China’s need for scientific exchanges and 
learning from the Western world – the first Chinese official to do so.42  Far removed 
from Zhou’s philosophical style, Deng’s attitude, Kissinger later wrote, “was that we 
were both there to do our nations’ business and adult enough to handle the rough patches 
without taking them personally.”43  Indeed, Deng’s political rebirth prompted a 
considerable amount of hope among American officials.  In the summer of 1975, for 
instance, American Consul in Hong Kong Charles Cross enthusiastically reported that 
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Deng’s “era in Chinese politics has arrived,” an era in which Beijing would pursue 
Deng’s “line” of domestic stability, world peace, and economic construction.44  Such 
assessments proved premature, however, for as long as the Chairman remained alive and 
in control Deng continued to face resistance to his program. 
 Zhou Enlai’s death on January 8, 1976, marked the beginning of the end for the 
Maoist line.  Popular mourning for the premier erupted throughout the country, 
culminating in early April with the gathering of 100,000 people in Tiananmen Square to 
lay wreaths in honor of his memory.  When the crowd turned violent the following day, 
Mao’s radical wife, Jiang Qing, convinced the Chairman that Deng had caused this 
“counterrevolutionary” turbulence.  As a result of her efforts, the CCP held a leadership 
meeting that same day and once more purged Deng of all his positions.  The radicals 
followed this move several days later with a staged parade in the capitol numbering 
nearly two million people, many of whom carried signs denouncing Deng and the 
moderates.45  Yet the Tiananmen gathering was not an isolated incident.  Similar events 
occurred in other cities throughout China, signifying broad disapproval of the Maoist 
revolutionary line and support for the more moderate policies that Zhou and Deng 
represented.46  
 The Ford administration had mixed assessments of the manner in which these 
events would affect Sino-American relations.  In June, the CIA predicted that based on 
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present evidence, the result of China’s domestic political turmoil “probably will be less 
revolution and more realism.”47  The following month, however, yet another high-
ranking CCP official died – the founder of the PLA, Zhu De – thus further reducing the 
central leadership and giving “the left a chance to reassert itself against Zhou and Deng’s 
moderation.”48  Subsequent Sino-American discussions appeared to verify this 
assessment.  During his trip to China in July, Senator Hugh Scott spoke with Vice 
Premier Zhang Chunqiao, a member of the radical faction known as the Gang of Four, 
who took an unusually hard line on Taiwan.  Zhang noted recent PRC military 
maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, asserted the impossibility of peaceful liberation, and 
characterized Taiwan as a “noose around the neck of the US.”  He proclaimed that the 
PLA would “cut it off” if the American people were not prepared to do so.49  Scott 
described this presentation as “rather chilling,” and Kissinger later noted how these 
statements were “quite at odds with what Mao had told us.”50  Indeed, the new Chinese 
leadership displayed none of Zhou’s willingness to contribute to progress in the 
relationship, particularly regarding the claims-assets dispute and other lingering issues 
hindering normalization.51 
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Mao’s death in September prompted a new wave of political maneuverings 
between the moderate and radical factions of the CCP.  The Chairman’s successor, Hua 
Guofeng, attempted to walk a middle path between the two groups but ultimately sided 
with the moderates.  This decision culminated the following month with a nationwide 
campaign to arrest Chinese radicals aligned with the Gang of Four.  The Ford 
administration struggled to gather information – mostly rumors and secondhand stories – 
about what exactly was occurring in China.  By October 18, the situation had clarified to 
the point where the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing could report definitively on the arrest 
of the Gang of Four, an event that cleared the way for Deng’s final re-emergence in 1977. 
  Washington underwent its own transition during the mid-1970s as the American 
people and Congress lost faith in both their government and its foreign policy.  Jimmy 
Carter believed that he could rectify these problems.  He decided to run for president 
sometime around 1972-73 and declared his candidacy in late-1974.  During these years a 
variety of events, ideas, and personalities had a considerable formative influence on 
Carter’s developing worldview.  Two of these influences stand out as particularly 
important in shaping Carter’s views of China and Taiwan, the proper policy to adopt 
regarding those countries, and their place in the world order: his experiences as a 
member of the Trilateral Commission and the prevailing critique of American foreign 
relations during the Kissinger era. 
Carter’s views on foreign affairs began taking shape as early as 1973 when he 
was asked to join the Trilateral Commission, an organization that brought together 
business, political, and intellectual leaders from the world’s major developed regions in 
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order to foster a dialogue on problems of common interest.  Carter took the opportunity 
to immerse himself in the Commission’s many discussions and debates to prepare for the 
task of guiding both the country and the world into an era of enhanced international 
cooperation.  Carter’s involvement with this group gave him vital foreign affairs 
experience and brought him into contact with numerous intellectuals, many of whom 
later held important positions in his administration, including Vice President, National 
Security Advisor, and cabinet positions for State, Treasury, and Defense.52  The 
Commission reports from 1973 to 1977 emphasized the need for enhanced international 
cooperation to resolve a myriad of issues from energy development to nuclear 
nonproliferation to the law of the seas.  One of the earliest reports highlighted a “Crisis 
of International Cooperation” that demanded “new forms of common management” in a 
world of increasingly complex relationships.53   
Within this overall framework, ideology played a noticeably minimal role.  Task 
Force Report 13, “Collaboration with Communist Countries in Managing Global 
Problems,” for instance, outlined a pragmatic approach that sought Soviet and Chinese 
assistance in managing the world’s problems.  The report noted that cooperation with the 
Soviet Union held greater promise than cooperation with China given the intense 
political turmoil within the PRC following Mao’s death.  However, China’s capabilities, 
the report continued, would eventually improve to the point where it would take a more 
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active role in world affairs, likely becoming both “a potential nuclear supplier” and “a 
maritime nation.”  Similarly, Task Force Report 14 declared that the international order 
that emerged in the 1940s “is no longer adequate to new conditions and needs.”  Nations 
must tighten “the web of interdependence” requiring “creative innovation comparable to 
that after World War II.”  The report noted that the deep rift in East-West relations, 
despite détente, perpetuated an antagonistic rather than cooperative global balance, and 
suggested that steps taken to improve conditions “often must fall short of the ideal,” but 
“may still facilitate necessary cooperation now and improve the chances for better 
working relations in the future.”54 
Carter’s adherence to this trilateral, interdependent approach to world affairs was 
reinforced by his early and regular correspondences with Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had 
presided over the Commission and later served as Carter’s National Security Advisor.  
Following Carter’s 1974 candidacy announcement, the future president invited 
Brzezinski to submit to him papers from time to time on a variety of topics; he 
frequently did so, winning Carter’s appreciation and admiration.  As Carter explained in 
his memoirs, “I would study his position papers on foreign affairs in order to develop 
answers to those questions all candidates had to face.”  Brzezinski frequently visited 
Carter in his hometown of Plains, GA, and helped prepare the governor for his televised 
debates with Ford.55   
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The second major influence affecting Carter’s approach was the critique of 
Kissinger-era policy that prevailed throughout the country, particularly from the 
Democratic members of Congress, but also emanating from the more moderate factions 
of the Republican Party.  As the Democratic presidential candidate, Carter could not help 
but share many of the concerns of such ranking Democrats as Senators J. William 
Fulbright and Mike Mansfield who had long wondered what vital interests the American 
military involvement in East Asia served and lamented how the foreign policies of 
Nixon and Ford had apparently lacked any principled foundation.  The opening of China 
in the early 1970s and the realization of China’s progress in many areas strengthened the 
views of such individuals that American bellicosity had hindered rather than facilitated 
desirable international transformations, and, indeed, had proved counterproductive in 
certain cases, most especially in regards to the questionable practices of the South 
Vietnamese government and, later, the increasingly repressive policies of South Korean 
President Park.56  As such, while Congress approved a variety of humanitarian and 
economic aid to afflicted countries during the Nixon-Ford era, it overwhelmingly 
opposed military assistance or the application of American military force.57 
Carter shared these views, believing that the United States could no longer afford 
to continue uncritically coddling its traditional friends, especially when those nations 
                                                            
56 Seoul and Taipei shared concerns regarding the American disengagement from East Asia, and they both 
responded to that development in similar ways.  For Park’s approach and domestic American criticism of 
it, see William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 12-16, 20-22. 
57 According to the 1976 Democratic Platform, which Carter’s close supporters heavily influenced, “The 
intensity of interrelated problems is rapidly increasing, and it is likely that in the future, the issues of war 
and peace will be more a function of economic and social problems than of the military security problems 
that have dominated international relations since 1945.”  Democratic Party Platform of 1976, 12 July 1976, 
PPP.  
317 
 
sought to perpetuate regional tensions.  For instance, Park’s human rights violations that 
had become such a hot topic of debate in Congress and the view that the American 
presence in Korea had hindered progress toward reunification likely resulted in Carter’s 
1975 announcement that if elected president he would withdraw all troops from the 
peninsula.58  The Arab-Israeli conflict prompted similar criticism of American support of 
Israel, the government of which seemed disinterested in a peaceful settlement of regional 
issues.  Condemnation of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin for his unbending 
militancy – especially as compared with the apparent reasonableness and flexibility of 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat – constituted a regular feature of Carter’s daily 
presidential diary.  When both leaders received the Nobel Peace Prize following the 
signing of the Camp David Accords, for instance, Carter bluntly wrote “Sadat deserved 
it.  Begin did not.”59  Similarly, the Carter administration believed that Ford and 
Kissinger had failed sufficiently to support the aspirations of black Africa against the 
minority white governments of Rhodesia and South Africa.  Carter placed considerable 
pressure on those governments to liberalize their political systems and end a recurring 
source of conflict. 
The Carter administration applied these same general ideas to Taiwan, a country 
that consistently refused to enter into negotiations with Beijing to resolve the 
reunification issue peacefully and conducted a potentially destructive and destabilizing 
foreign policy.  Upon his return from China in July 1976, Senator Scott wrote a lengthy 
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memo to Ford stressing that although the PRC should not use force to take Taiwan, the 
ROC “is not doing its share in contributing towards what it was the intention of the 
Shanghai Communiqué to achieve.”  He then implicitly attributed PRC bellicosity to 
ROC intransigence by noting that “the Chinese were ready at any time to talk with 
representatives of Taipei and to trade with Taiwan.”  The Ford administration rejected 
Scott’s recommendation that it do more to push the ROC to accept cross-strait 
negotiations, since this went beyond the American position in the Shanghai 
Communiqué – that document had absolved Washington of ultimate responsibility in the 
matter.  Yet Scott’s view remained consistent with the general worldview that Carter and 
his advisors brought with them to Washington in 1977.  Administration China specialist 
Michel Oksenberg summed up this perspective well in describing the “manipulation of a 
dependency relationship” as a “classic East Asian ploy.”60 
 
The Carter Administration and Normalization 
Carter’s campaign rhetoric regarding the desirability of normalized relations with 
China essentially mirrored the approach that the Nixon and Ford had adopted.  In an 
interview he gave to Time magazine in August 1976, Carter described normalization as 
“an ultimate goal, but the time is undefined.”  Also like his predecessors, he identified 
PRC concessions regarding the ROC as the key factor in allowing the two nations to 
move forward, calling for assurances that the people of Taiwan “be free of military 
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persuasion or domination from mainland China. That may not be a possibility; if it is not, 
then I would be reluctant to give up our relationship with the Republic of China.”61  Yet 
for all of this campaign rhetoric, the Carter administration had already developed an 
unfavorable view of the ROC government as a destabilizing influence that would take 
advantage of any opportunity to secure Taiwan’s independence at the expense of 
Washington’s objectives. 
One such opportunity involved Washington’s complicity in the development of 
Taiwan’s nuclear program, which Taipei hoped would lead to an independent nuclear 
weapons capability despite the ROC having signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.  
Nuclear nonproliferation – an effort to control the spread of this “most ominous of all 
threats” – represented one of Carter’s most ardent policies.62  The president first targeted 
the Republic of China; within two months after taking office, Carter demanded that the 
ROC put an end to its weapons program, and by April 13 the ROC had acquiesced “in 
principle” to this demand.63  By this time, Carter had already decided to make 
normalization one of his priorities, but these events weakened the ROC’s already tainted 
reputation, thus making the administration less ardent in its efforts to defend Taiwan 
against Beijing’s demands.  
Another opportunity for Taipei involved its propaganda experience aimed at 
manipulating the mass media.  ROC news agencies had a notorious reputation for 
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distorted reporting for propaganda purposes.  For instance, meetings between ROC and 
U.S. officials, even if discussing nothing of importance, received front-page news 
coverage in Taiwan in an effort to exaggerate the U.S. commitment to the ROC.64  As 
noted above, ROC lobbyists had also proved adept at encouraging outpourings of 
support among the American people, local and state governments, and members of 
Congress.  The Ford administration was the first to encounter this problem, and 
responded by gradually reducing ROC access to high-level American officials.65  Yet in 
February 1977, Carter’s National Security Council recommended a prohibition of all 
meetings between ROC officials and the highest level of American policymakers, which 
the administration may have taken to extremes as evidenced by the decision not to meet 
with the 1977 little league world champions when the administration discovered that 
Taiwan had fielded the winning team.66   
ROC propaganda further discredited Taiwan by emphasizing what the Carter 
administration considered an overly ideological and antagonistic stance against 
communism.  The ongoing Sino-Soviet tensions gave lie to the ROC characterization of 
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communism as monolithic, and descriptions of communist nations as inherently 
aggressive and expansionistic lacked credibility when applied toward the PRC of the 
post-Nixon era.67  Yet this did not prevent the ROC from warning its American audience 
of the dangers of cooperating with communist regimes, especially the PRC.  Through 
such organizations as the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), created by Chiang 
Kai-shek in 1966 and presided over by Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, a senior KMT official and 
president of the ROC National Assembly, the ROC warned against both normalization of 
relations with the PRC and the continuation of détente which benefited the “unchanged 
Red goal of conquest and enslavement.”68  In a 1976 brief he sent to the Carter campaign, 
ROC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Fredrick Chien characterized as “morally 
untenable” the abandonment of the “peace- and freedom-loving people” of the ROC “to 
their avowed enemy for oppression and annihilation.”69  On June 6, 1977, the Asian 
Peoples’ Anti-Communist League (APACL), also created by Chiang, dispatched a letter 
to Vice President Walter Mondale urging the United States “to abandon any illusory 
hope that the Chinese Communists may be won over as a checkmate against the Soviet 
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Union,” and “to face the reality of the international Communist race for influence in the 
Asian-Pacific region.”70 
Whereas Taipei emphasized the irreconcilable conflict between democracy and 
communism, advocates of normalization chose to focus more on the potentialities of 
long-term cooperation between China and the United States.  The writings of several 
Chinese-American organizations, such as the National Chinese-American Committee for 
the Normalization of United States-China Relations, exemplified the accommodation 
inherent in pro-recognition rhetoric.  Unlike the WACL, this organization neither 
originated with nor was operated by a government, but rather by a group of Chinese-
American intellectuals led by the American-educated Nobel Prize-winning physicist 
Yang Chen Ning.   
Yang epitomized those Chinese-Americans who had developed a sense of pride 
in the rise of China to global prominence, despite the shortcomings of the PRC 
government.  These individuals and organizations produced some of the most 
convincing and rational arguments in support of normalization.  For instance, Yang 
offered a lengthy, emotional appeal for the United States to develop a China policy that 
would minimize the risks of war and take into consideration the historical unity of the 
Chinese people.  Stressing the interests of “our friends on Taiwan,” Yang wrote of the 
need “to end the estrangement of Taiwan from its ancestral and cultural homeland,” and 
that “every other alternative spells disaster to the people in Taiwan, to the people on the 
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mainland, to the people in the U.S.”71  Yang launched his organization on February 27, 
1977, the fifth anniversary of the Shanghai Communiqué, and marked the occasion with 
“An Open Letter to President Carter” calling on him to complete the task begun by his 
predecessors.  Quoting Mansfield, a consistent advocate of improved Sino-American 
relations, the letter suggested that “If we act more wisely than in the past, we will act 
now, not on the basis of emotional catch-phrases, but on the basis of rational 
contemporary American interest in the Western Pacific.”72  The pragmatic tone and 
reasoning of such arguments accorded well with Carter’s predisposition toward 
increased international cooperation.   
In contrast, the intensive ROC lobbying efforts aimed at Congress and state and 
local governments could not have been a worse decision given Carter’s intense dislike of 
special interests.  Carter’s disdain for lobbying predated his presidency, and represented 
an entrenched aspect of his personal outlook.  The president’s deep, abiding faith in 
democracy compelled him to view any effort to subvert or unduly influence such a 
system as a form of sacrilege, as evidenced by his earlier legal battles against ballot 
stuffing and corrupt party bosses in the Georgia state senate.  These experiences justified 
Carter’s view of himself as the trustee of the public good, with the result that he often 
refused to give credence to the advice and suggestions of legislators he felt had been 
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bought off by lobbyists who “seldom represent the average citizen, and often express the 
most selfish aspect of the character of their clients.”73   
A number of events occurred during 1977 that collectively ensured that the 
administration would greet ROC lobbying efforts with hostility.  In the opening months 
of Carter’s term, details emerged regarding the South Korean influence-peddling scandal 
of 1976-77 in which the South Korean CIA had offered cash bribes to high-ranking 
members of Congress who, in return, supported legislation favorable to Korea.  By April, 
the scandal had compelled the Korean government to cease its frequent wine-and-dine 
events for American dignitaries, but had nonetheless caused significant harm to 
Congress’ reputation.  Another event that soured relations between Carter and Congress 
resulted from the president’s belief that “the extraordinary influence of the auto 
companies and oil companies in Washington,” had resulted in the addition of 
deregulation provisions in Carter’s energy bill that “unnecessarily” gave the auto 
companies $86 billion of taxpayer money.  Carter riddled his White House diary with 
references to the “almost unbelievable” influence of these lobbies.74 
In the context of these events, the ROC struggled to gain political influence 
among American politicians in order to block any administration attempt to abandon 
Taiwan.  As late as June 1977, the ROC continued to provide members of Congress with 
expense-paid trips to Taiwan, apparently unconcerned about the controversy surrounding 
Seoul’s similar activities.75  That year, ROC representatives also continued their work 
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outside of Congress, working diligently to procure resolutions from state legislatures and 
city councils declaring support for the continuation of both U.S. diplomatic recognition 
of the ROC and the Mutual Defense Treaty.  To their impressive collection of 
resolutions that they had obtained in the mid-1970s, ROC lobbyists added dozens more, 
originating from the legislatures of such diverse states as New York, Arizona, Missouri, 
Alaska, and Florida.  The resolutions obtained from city councils, equally widespread, 
included Macon, GA, St. Paul, MN, Honolulu, HI, and Las Vegas, NV. 
 Taipei also undertook an effort to appeal more directly to the president by trying 
to influence his friends and relatives in his hometown of Plains, Georgia.  This began 
even before Carter had received his nomination as president.  After he won a few 
primaries, the ROC inundated the residents of Plains with all-expense-paid invitations to 
Taipei.  The KMT wined and dined those who accepted, arranging meetings with 
important officials and presenting the visitors with expensive gifts while urging them to 
influence Carter to forget about normalizing relations with Beijing.  Carter, obviously 
displeased by this, remarked “I was able to prevent embarrassing favors to my closest 
family members, but my opposition to the trips and entertainment endangered my 
relationships with some of my hometown friends.”76  All this occurred at a time when 
Carter had pledged to accept no contributions of any sort, leading him to return all gifts, 
including dolls for his daughter, Amy.77 
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Yet the ROC persisted.  It arranged for a delegation of Georgia city officials to 
visit Taiwan in April 1977 on the occasion of the second anniversary of Chiang Kai-
shek’s death.  The delegates, including dignitaries from Plains, met with Madame 
Chiang and her son, the new President Chiang Ching-kuo.  The Chiangs had encouraged 
the delegates to obtain a letter from President Carter prior to their visit.  Though no letter 
was forthcoming, this did not prevent the Georgia delegates and KMT from reaching an 
agreement whereby both Macon and Plains became sister-cities of Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s 
second largest city.78  On October 14, Plains gained yet another Taiwanese sister city, 
Tamshui, with Americus, GA, a small town near Plains, becoming the sister city of 
Taipei County in June 1978. 
ROC efforts toward Plains occasionally bordered on the ridiculous.  In late July, 
Taipei induced Mayor Warren Blanton to invite to Plains Fan Yuan-Yan, a former PRC 
MIG pilot who had defected to the ROC earlier in the month, and who subsequently 
became an honorary citizen of the town.  Taipei even remitted $25,000 to Plains for the 
construction of an oriental garden, commemorating the event with a monument which 
stands to this day.79  In December 1977, one of the best-selling items in the town was a 
teacup and saucer set decorated with pictures of Carter, the Plains Baptist Church, and 
the local antique shop, owned by Carter’s Brother, Hugh.  These keepsakes were all 
made in Taiwan.80   
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 When interpreting what, if any, significance these initiatives had on Carter’s 
perception of Taiwan, one should consider the social circumstances of the residents of 
Plains.  One can glean a semblance of the relatively simplistic way of life of these 
residents in the fact that the office of mayor did not come with a salary, compelling 
Blanton to seek employment at the airport in Albany to supplement the income he 
received as a barber.81  One can easily imagine the president’s reaction to the news that a 
foreign power determined to influence American foreign policy for its own advantage 
had begun systematically to buy off his hometown.  Indeed, on July 29, 1977, Brzezinski 
informed Carter of these lobbying efforts.  Perhaps, then, it was no coincidence that on 
the following day Carter decided “quite abruptly” to push for immediate normalization 
with the People’s Republic of China, stating that he was “prepared to face the political 
criticism of those who would claim we were abandoning Taiwan.”82 
This negative view of the ROC government contrasted sharply with the generally 
positive view that Carter and his administration developed toward the PRC in 1977-78.  
In the opening months of his term, Carter sought to create a more cooperative 
relationship with the Soviet Union.  The administration initially did not focus much 
attention on the PRC, however, likely because of the administration’s preoccupation 
with other foreign policy priorities and the realization that the Soviet Union could 
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provide more capable assistance in global management than could the PRC.  The era of 
Mao Zedong had concluded with the Chairman’s death in 1976, but the political and 
social turmoil within China had not yet subsided to the point where the administration 
could realistically view the PRC as either a reliable or a capable international partner.  In 
contrast, the administration could readily identify areas in which the United States and 
the Soviet Union might begin immediately to make important contributions to global 
stability. 
The administration hoped to achieve greater stability in the relationship with the 
USSR primarily through arms control negotiations, specifically, by concluding a second 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.  By reducing the destructive capability of the 
superpowers in both conventional and strategic arms, Carter hoped to instigate a new 
détente in which concrete achievements toward peace replaced what Brzezinski called 
the “moral indifference” of the Nixon-Ford era.83  The president’s carefully crafted and 
flattering introductory letter to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev invited the 
Soviet Union to cooperate with the United States for mutual benefit.  Brzezinski 
characterized the Soviet response as “a bucket of cold water.”  Brezhnev offered no 
flexibility on strategic arms, and responded in an aggressive, patronizing manner to the 
administration’s emphasis on human rights, stating that he would not “allow 
interferences in our internal affairs, whatever pseudo-humanitarian slogans are used to 
present it.”  The letter was a turning point.  On the evening of February 28, five years to 
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the day after the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué and with the Soviet rebuke fresh 
in his mind, Carter decided to take more initiatives toward China.84   
Setting aside the Soviet rebuke, Carter had good reasons for this decision, for his 
administration shared Nixon and Ford’s belief that courting China now would facilitate 
China’s constructive involvement in the world and reduce the chance of future Sino-
American conflict.  In contrast, the disturbing tendency of the Soviet Union and Cuba to 
encourage or support militant revolution in Africa undermined the spirit of détente and 
created much apprehension within the administration.  Many advisers urged Carter to 
recognize the PRC in order to exert leverage against the Soviet Union, thus making the 
latter more malleable when considering American foreign policy proposals.  However, to 
view normalization merely as playing the “China card” ignores the genuine belief among 
Carter and certain of his advisers that a normalized relationship with China would reap 
significant long-term benefits vis-à-vis Beijing’s foreign relations.  For instance, in sharp 
contrast to Soviet and Cuban aggression in Africa, the PRC during the 1970s had 
gradually abandoned “support for revolutionary parties and subversive activities in 
opposition to established African governments,” and instead began to extend influence 
“through the more conventional trade, military, and aid agreements.”85  Such a contrast 
justified Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s assessment that China “had an important role 
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to play in the final quarter of the twentieth century, not simply one that might be a useful 
counterweight to the Soviet Union.”86   
Possibilities for cooperation in the developing world remained an important topic 
in Sino-American discussions through 1977 and 1978; the Carter administration 
understood that this cooperation could only occur within the context of normalized 
relations.87  Throughout most of 1977, however, Deng had yet to solidify his position in 
the PRC leadership.  Beijing’s sensitivity to Soviet initiatives led Chinese officials to 
continue asserting a hard-line critique of virtually all facets of U.S. foreign policy.  In his 
discussions with Vance in August 1977, PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua lamented the 
U.S. defensive posture in Africa, and claimed that continued support of Israel served 
only to facilitate Soviet penetration of the disgruntled Arab nations.88  Deng, now Vice 
Premier, similarly avoided Vance’s invitation to discuss possibilities for cooperation, 
stressing only that the United States should maintain superiority over the Soviet “Polar 
Bear.”89   
Despite the PRC’s single-minded focus on the Soviet threat, the Carter 
administration persisted in its efforts to convince the Chinese leadership to broaden its 
perspective.  Vance wrote to Carter that the “Chinese must be made to understand that 
we do not perceive our relations with them as one-dimensional (i.e., vis-à-vis the USSR), 
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but that we also look at our relationship in the context of key bilateral and international 
issues.”90  During his May 1978 trip to Beijing, Brzezinski also emphasized to the 
Chinese the long-term benefits of cooperation to resolve Third World conflicts, and 
stressed that “we think our friendship with you is a central part of our foreign policy as 
we try to shape a world which is truly cooperative, a world organized for the first time in 
its total history on the basis of independent states and therefore a world in which new 
political and social relationships have to emerge.”91   
Well before Brzezinski’s trip to China, however, Beijing had already begun 
adopting a remarkably different approach that signaled its willingness to engage in this 
new cooperative world.  In October 1977, there appeared the “first signs of new warmth” 
in Sino-American diplomatic contacts.  The following month, Huang Chen, who had 
recently ended his stint as Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington, submitted a 
report to the Politburo describing the “realities” of U.S. domestic politics.  His findings 
may have convinced Beijing that the administration “was not merely stalling on 
normalization” but rather “had higher priority concerns that prevented it from taking up 
the issue at this juncture.”  The PRC subsequently adopted a more positive attitude in 
terms of U.S.-USSR relations.  References to American appeasement of the Soviet 
menace ceased, and Beijing minimized “the significance of the continued inclusion of 
the US in Chinese anti-superpower rhetoric.”92   
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Beijing also expanded its involvement with other countries in the industrialized 
world including a significant expansion and liberalization of its official contacts with 
American military and diplomatic representatives – a remarkable departure given how 
China had previously linked such an expansion to progress toward normalization.  
Chinese officials meeting with their American counterparts displayed a notably warmer 
attitude, and Beijing now allowed certain kinds of contacts that it had previously 
prohibited.  In a burst of activity unseen since before the Cultural Revolution, high-level 
Chinese officials and delegations visited several nations in Western Europe to improve 
bilateral relations and obtain access to technology necessary for China’s economic 
development.  The Chinese sent a delegation to the U.N. special session on Disarmament, 
the first major disarmament conference that the PRC had ever agreed to join.  Beijing 
even increased the “frequency and correctness” of its diplomatic contact with the Soviet 
Union, thus imbuing its relations with a greater degree of “reasonableness.”93 
Similar trends occurred in the case of PRC relations with the Third World.  China 
“sharply curtailed” its support for radical opposition groups in developing countries in 
favor of “a rapid and more effective expansion of conventional diplomacy.”94  Signs of 
changing PRC policies towards Zaire, Cuba, Somalia, and Cambodia gained added 
significance from the dispatch of high-level PRC officials to numerous developing 
nations.  In May and October, PRC Premier Hua Guofeng and three Vice Premiers 
travelled to nations in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.  
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94 Ibid. 
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Contemporary observers noted how Chinese delegations visiting Third World countries 
“presented China as another developing nation, emphasized friendship, and sometimes 
served as teachers or participants in small-scale public health or agrotechnical 
programs.”95  They also sought to “change China’s image abroad from revolutionary 
challenger to fellow victim of Soviet and Vietnamese geopolitical designs.”96  Thus, by 
June 1978 – when serious Sino-American normalization negotiations began – China had 
demonstrated a “striking” shift in its approach that had created an atmosphere “clearly 
conducive to forward movement.”97  Although this change in policy may have resulted, 
at least in part, from concerns regarding intensified Soviet efforts in the developing 
world, China had nonetheless begun to adopt a new approach to international 
cooperation to which the Carter administration responded favorably.98 
Nothing in this shift pleased the administration more than indications of Beijing’s 
sympathy for and understanding of the American position vis-à-vis Taiwan’s post-
normalization status.  From the beginning of Carter’s term, administration officials, 
including the president, reiterated the need to move toward normalization in a way that 
would maintain regional stability and ensure the security of the people of Taiwan.  In 
part, this signified political expediency; whether in internal memos or in discussion with 
PRC officials, the administration frequently reiterated the domestic political problems 
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96 Kissinger, On China, 356. 
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Box 41, Folder “Weekly Reports to the President, 61-71 (6/78-9/78),” NLC.  Brzezinski composed all 
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98 See Weinstein, “Chinese Aid and Policy in Central Africa,” and Eugene K. Lawson, “China’s Policy in 
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surrounding this issue.99  A case in point occurred in late-February 1978 when Carter 
deferred a decision on additional troop withdrawals from Taiwan out of concern that this 
would cost him Congressional votes that he desperately needed to pass the Panama 
Canal Treaty.100  Ensuring that Taiwan would not immediately fall victim to military 
assault following normalization proved a necessary condition to stave off other, 
potentially more damaging political challenges.   
In its first month in office, the administration concluded that the PRC would not 
offer an explicit pledge of peaceful intent.  But by the beginning of 1978, Beijing 
noticeably reduced its references to a short-term military solution to the Taiwan problem 
and began emphasizing Chinese patience.  Later that spring, Chinese officials – making 
“comments they knew could get back to Washington” – suggested that Beijing remained 
flexible on the method that Washington might adopt to end the MDT.  The acting head 
of the PRC Liaison Office, Han Hsu, even went so far as to indicate that the PRC “might 
be willing to give private assurances” regarding peaceful liberation.101   
The failure to obtain a firm commitment from Beijing that it would not attack 
Taiwan, thus, does not represent a failure of policy, nor does it suggest that Carter lacked 
empathy for the Taiwanese.  On the contrary, his memoirs refer to preserving “the 
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guarantee of a peaceful life for the Chinese on Taiwan.”102  In the end, however, Carter 
chose to give the PRC leadership the benefit of the doubt, trusting that the new approach 
Beijing had apparently adopted throughout the previous year had created a shared Sino-
American desire for peace in the Taiwan Strait.  In a press conference following the 
normalization announcement, one official dodged the question of whether or not the 
administration had explicitly requested a PRC commitment to the non-use of force.  
Instead, he noted how the Chinese “have repeatedly stated that they are a patient people, 
that they approach historical problems with a sense of perspective,” and emphasized that 
“we are dealing here with a China that wishes to play an active role in international 
cooperation, that recognizes its own state in a good relationship with the United 
States.”103  If the sensitivity of the two-Chinas dilemma required another vague 
arrangement similar to that offered in the Shanghai Communiqué, Carter believed, as 
had the Nixon and Ford administrations, that such an arrangement would nonetheless 
represent the best opportunity for a peaceful, albeit eventual, settlement of the Taiwan 
issue that served the interests of regional stability.  This view constituted an important 
component of Carter’s moral justification for Taiwan’s “abandonment.”104   
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 On January 29, 1979, only a month after Carter officially recognized his 
government, Deng Xiaoping entered Washington, D.C.  No longer did the American 
capitol accord the Nationalist ambassador official status, nor did it perpetuate the 
“absurd” notion that the Kuomintang could possibly speak for the 800 million Chinese 
on the mainland.  Deng toured the United States in celebration, donning a ten gallon hat 
in Texas and mingling with American crowds that welcomed him with open arms.  He 
must have been pleased.  Washington had finally accepted the inevitability of communist 
rule over both the mainland and (at least in theory) Taiwan, and had bestowed upon 
China’s true leaders the respect and status that they deserved.  In so doing, Carter ended 
thirty years of estrangement for which, many contemporary officials argued, the United 
States bore considerable blame.  Such is the standard view of normalization: The 
Americans had learned their lesson.   
Yet the preceding chapters convey a different tale, namely, that from the 
standpoint of the American government China had been the student – and had learned 
well.  Beijing’s final exam occurred mere weeks after normalization.  In a private 
discussion with only Carter and his top advisors, Deng informed the president that the 
PRC would soon initiate a limited military expedition against the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam that Deng characterized as punishment for its hegemonial ambitions and its 
continued violation of its neighbors’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Deng asserted 
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to Carter that “it was highly desirable for China that its arrogant neighbors know they 
could not disturb it and other countries in the area with impunity.”1  As good as his word, 
the invasion began on February 17, with Chinese forces withdrawing twenty-eight days 
later.  Although Carter expressed concern that China would once more cast itself as an 
aggressing state, the brief Sino-Vietnamese conflict nonetheless signaled Beijing’s 
readiness to take the kind of assertive, responsible leadership role that every 
administration since Franklin Roosevelt had envisioned for it in the international order.2   
In reality, Communist China had always professed the importance of respecting 
national sovereignty, and its adherence to this idea contributed to the Sino-Soviet split as 
Moscow manifested its own imperial tendencies vis-à-vis the nations of Eastern Europe.  
Through the 1960s and ‘70s, Beijing hoped it could wrest control of the communist 
movement and focus its energies toward the achievement of a more equitable balance 
among nations, a balance that it believed the superpowers of whatever ideological 
persuasion threatened.  The Chinese invasion of Vietnam generally accorded with this 
overall objective.  Yet it also represented a departure, as China implicitly cast itself, if 
not as a superpower, then at the very least as a powerful nation intent on compelling 
obedience to the standards of international order that it considered so important – the 
same role that Washington envisioned for itself and that it hoped Beijing would also 
adopt.  Indeed, the great irony of the Sino-American Cold War conflict is that Chinese 
leaders apparently never accepted the fact that Washington genuinely shared its 
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objective of creating a global order founded on respect for the political independence 
and territorial integrity of nations.  Maoist ideology had blinded an entire generation of 
Chinese officials to this possibility.3   
 Yet ultimately this dissertation has focused not on China, but rather on the 
formation and implementation of American policy towards it.  As stated in the preface, 
this analysis did not seek to validate Washington’s approach – indeed, the various 
policies it adopted to achieve its objectives ultimately failed to achieve the desired ends.  
Rather, this dissertation sought to determine the underlying factors that determined the 
kinds of policies that these seven administrations adopted.  In this effort, this project 
began by positing four general findings. 
 The first of these contends that when one examines the thirty years from 1949-
1979 in the aggregate, a broad and general consistency appears in terms of the 
fundamental foreign policy objectives that these administrations.  An entire generation 
of American officials that came of age in the first half of the twentieth century generally 
shared the view that an anarchic international system provided no security for the United 
States, especially in the increasingly interconnected and globalized world at mid-century.  
Most Americans during the 1930s may have viewed the decision to enter World War I as 
a tragic error, but by 1945 few Americans denied that the second Great War had arrived 
at America’s door uninvited.  That stark lesson left a deep impression that has yet to 
disappear from official American thought: the United States must involve itself in 
international councils, must work to reduce or eliminate the use of military conflict as a 
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means of resolving international disputes, and must act assertively and decisively when 
aggression occurs. 
 Without question, this consideration remained foremost in the considerations of 
each administration as they formulated policies toward China.  For Truman, the Chinese 
intervention in Korea in support of an acknowledged aggressor clearly constituted a 
violation of the gravest kind, exceeded only by its decision to invade and attempt the 
conquest of South Korea.  After 1953, Eisenhower lamented that Beijing’s militancy, 
threatening posture toward its neighbors, military assaults on the offshore islands, and 
support of civil war in Vietnam all cast serious doubt on China’s advocacy of “peaceful 
coexistence.”  The most pertinent fact of American China policy during that decade is 
Eisenhower’s insistent calls for a Chinese pledge to renounce the use of force.  Kennedy 
and his team entered office prepared to believe that the tensions of the 1950s had been a 
big misunderstanding propelled by Ike and Dulles’ extreme positions.  Yet both 
Kennedy and Johnson concluded that the PRC remained a potential threat to the non-
communist nations of the region.   
For all their efforts to establish friendly relations with Beijing, Nixon and 
Kissinger believed that the potential for China’s military expansion remained ever-
present, a fact that could only be reduced through the establishment of a new balance of 
power.  The only difference with previous policy was the substitution of local forces 
(which the United States would help to develop) for American ones as the primary factor 
deterring aggression, a view that had remarkable similarities to Eisenhower’s effort to 
reduce American commitments in the region and have more “Asians fighting Asians.”  
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Some might argue (as Nixon and Kissinger did) that the re-establishment of contact itself 
had a deterrent effect.  Yet even if true, this was hardly a new development since 
Eisenhower had followed the same rational fairly successfully during the ambassadorial 
talks.  The fact that Eisenhower’s approach to the Cold War in Asia had such similarities 
with the one his vice president later adopted during the 1970s is a fascinating topic that 
the historical profession has yet to explore.   
 The rise of the international communist movement presented a new and equally 
disturbing threat – not to territorial integrity, but to political sovereignty.  The loss of 
American values to such a force had constituted a recurring fear since the Russian 
Revolution of 1919.  Far from simply protecting itself against such a threat, however, 
Washington elevated non-interference to an international principle and extended its 
protection to all nations that found themselves in a similar plight.  This perspective 
assumed, however, the complicity of indigenous forces in the expansionist objectives of 
a foreign power.  Indeed, once instilled in power, these indigenous forces had a tendency 
to then turn their energies toward conducting the same kinds of subversive activities in 
neighboring countries, thus perpetuating the cycle. 
The principle of non-interference – particularly efforts to curb communist 
subversion – permeated the making of China policy throughout the late-1940s and 1950s.  
Washington perceived a considerable divergence between the policies that Mao pursued 
and the “interests” of both the PRC and the Chinese people.  This divergence led the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations to assume that Moscow exercised an 
inappropriate amount of influence in Beijing, and that the CCP, despite having firm 
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control of the country, nonetheless constituted an example of undue foreign interference.  
Moreover, Beijing also willingly supported the indigenous communist struggles along its 
periphery and, increasingly, in other Third World nations.  Changing circumstances and 
a more nuanced understanding of global trends during the 1960s and 1970s, however, 
led American officials to conclude that while Beijing still hoped for the success of the 
global Marxist revolution, it would likely not actively seek to bring about that result.   
Washington considered this an important, if incomplete step toward China’s 
acceptance of the third general principle that guided American views of the international 
order: the notion that nations had a responsibility to act assertively in defense of these 
principles.  Casting rhetoric about the necessity of law and order in the world had done 
nothing to curb the excesses of the Axis powers, nor had it saved Eastern Europe from 
Soviet domination.  This is why the United States considered so vital an assertive 
response – militarily, economically, or politically – to a broad range of communist 
actions during these decades.  The United States had a responsibility not to stand idle in 
the face of these violations.  Indeed, Washington frequently took other countries – allies, 
communists, and neutrals alike – to task for their relative complacency in the face of 
such clear dangers to the international order that they had all collectively and so 
painstakingly constructed during the 1940s.  The Nixon administration made this point 
explicitly to Beijing in April 1972, noting the “responsibility” of powerful nations to 
exert a moderating influence in the world. 
From this analysis proceeds the conclusion that China’s relative passivity in the 
late-1960s and 1970s proved insufficient to satisfy Washington.  While doing little to 
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sabotage American efforts throughout the world, the Chinese Communists 
simultaneously sought to avoid their inherent responsibility, according to Washington, as 
a powerful (if only regional) country to exert influence over its wayward neighbors for 
the sake of the common good.  Even when it did exert such pressure, Beijing did so in 
furtherance of its ideological goals.  For instance, when Zhou urged the DRV to accept 
an armistice in 1973, he did so not to end the fighting, but only to remove American 
forces from the region and provide an environment more conducive to communist 
military victory.  The view from Washington did not reveal these details, yet the Nixon 
and Ford administrations nonetheless recognized that the rapprochement had only set in 
abeyance, rather than eliminated Mao’s revolutionary agenda.   
 Having established which principles Washington sought to uphold and the 
manner in which China appeared to violate them, the question remains as to what policy 
the United States should adopt.  A dominant theme of the preceding chapters is that 
Washington strove through a variety of means to affect a change in the PRC approach.  
Prior to the Korean War, the Truman administration hoped that this situation would not 
require American action, that Moscow would demonstrate to CCP leaders its true colors, 
thus convincing them to forsake the Soviet line.  When this hope proved illusory during 
1950, the administration adopted more assertive methods, courting disaffected CCP 
officials and attempting to foment an indigenous Chinese uprising utilizing the unsettled 
conditions in the country.  When this strategy failed, the Eisenhower administration, 
perceiving Beijing as irreversibly hostile and seeing no other alternative, pursued its own 
variant of the same strategy.  The administration applied a variety of economic, political, 
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and military pressures against the mainland, believing that this would facilitate the 
breakdown of the Chinese Communist system that Ike and Dulles both considered would 
naturally occur regardless.  Like Truman, they faced disappointment. 
 The Kennedy and Johnson administrations had no discernible method for 
achieving the reorientation of Chinese policy that both their predecessors and successors 
pursued.  In part this reflected an unjustifiably positive belief – at least initially – in the 
potential for Sino-American rapprochement among mid-level officials, but it also 
resulted from the increasingly common acceptance of the permanency of CCP control 
over the mainland.  Rather than attempting to compel change, the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations struggled inconclusively to implement a more traditional containment 
strategy while striving where possible to achieve peaceful solutions to regional crises.  
By mid-decade, the frustrations of this approach drove Johnson to deeper and poorly-
conceived military commitments in the face of mounting international pressure for 
disengagement and accommodation. 
 Yet despite the dominance of the doctrines of anti-appeasement and militant 
containment in American Cold War though, the administrations of the 1950s and ‘60s 
accepted, to varying degrees, that the American strategy must include efforts to engage 
with their ideological rivals as a way to entice them toward the adoption of more 
constructive and cooperative policies.  Truman struggled to achieve such a dialogue 
prior to the Korean War, and returned to negotiations at Panmunjom once the war 
stalemated.  The general lack of civility and the apparent disinterest of the Chinese 
negotiators for genuine progress set an expectation for the incoming Eisenhower 
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administration that talks were essentially useless so long as Mao and the radicals 
remained in charge.  Ike altered this view somewhat after the 1954-55 Strait crisis, but 
the new ambassadorial talks remained of value primarily by offering Beijing an 
alternative to overt aggression; Ike did not expect the talks to achieve a broader meeting 
of minds.  Kennedy administration officials entered office determined to rectify the 
imbalance that they perceived in Ike’s approach, giving more prominence to conciliatory 
gestures.  By mid-decade, however, many of these advocates had accepted the futility of 
convincing Beijing by such means to work constructively with the United States.   
Nonetheless, when Nixon assumed office in 1969, the balance shifted decisively 
away from containment and toward engagement, although, to be sure, containment of 
aggression remained important.  Kissinger lamented that that previous administrations 
had given scant attention to this delicate balancing act and had failed to consider what 
the United States should strive to achieve vis-à-vis China once it had re-established high-
level contact.  Praise of Nixon’s supposed genius or vision in adopting this approach has 
perhaps gone too far, since the president’s initiatives may have failed to achieve a 
rapprochement had Mao not had other compelling reasons to respond favorably to 
Washington’s overtures.  Yet the fact that Nixon and Mao had restored contact at the 
highest levels imbued conciliatory engagement with a degree of utility it had not 
previously had.  Politicians and scholars who had for so long criticized the policies of 
the 1950s and 1960s found themselves – and their advocacy – validated.  As a result, the 
incoming Carter administration perpetuated this same attitude.  Indeed, given Beijing’s 
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new foreign policy approach under Deng, maintaining a cautious containment policy 
over one that stressed conciliatory engagement made little sense. 
 The third major theme of this dissertation is that the seven administrations from 
Truman to Carter did not determine their respective China policies based on domestic 
political considerations.  Historians of American foreign relations today take for granted 
that “domestic opinion matters,” yet the often unspoken caveat of this assertion is that 
the influence domestic factors might exert over foreign policymaking – even if 
omnipresent – may prove meager depending on the issue or time period.  An intensive 
examination of the relative merits of U.S. international and domestic imperatives during 
the period in question is not required to fulfill the basic objective of this dissertation, 
namely, to demonstrate a broad consistency in American foreign policy objectives 
toward China from 1949-1979.  Indeed, to do so would involve a separate and equally 
extensive undertaking.  Yet this work nonetheless generally reinforces what numerous 
historians of Sino-American relations over the past thirty years have all found: domestic 
influences proved of secondary importance in the making of China policy.  This does not 
mean that domestic influences always are of secondary importance, only that the 
particular circumstances that prevailed during these three decades – the issues involved, 
the personalities and experiences of high-ranking administration officials, the 
willingness and ability of Congress and other domestic groups to exert influence over 
policymaking, among other factors – did not allow any significant interference in the 
implementation of policies that the Executive branch pursued for its own internationalist 
agenda.   
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A common phenomenon, according to historian Leonard Kusnitz, is that 
“officials do not anticipate actual reactions, but only the possibility of them” because of 
the “very real fear of office-holders that their actions may later bring down upon them 
the electorate’s wrath.”4  The problem this raises is the ability of any given presidential 
administration to determine accurately the domestic reception of any given policy.  
Truman and Eisenhower apparently did not consider the potential domestic reaction to 
their policies as significant enough to cause reconsideration of their respective policies.  
Kennedy and Johnson do seem to have been influenced by a critique of their 
predecessor’s approach offered primarily by contemporary scholars, some of whom 
joined the administration.  Yet these influences remained subsumed beneath the 
preferences of the president and his closest advisors.  Nixon and Kissinger pursued Sino-
American rapprochement for philosophical internationalist reasons, and implemented the 
policy in secret in part as a means to ensure that domestic pressures would not interfere.  
Carter believed that presenting an undistorted message to the American people would 
suffice to secure their approval of his policies.  Yet he also viewed Congress as too often 
obstructing the Executive branch from implementing the policies it considered most 
conducive to international order. 
What of the domestic influences that historians so often cite as influencing China 
policy?  The existence of a lobby in support of the ROC prior to the Korean War could 
not prevent the Truman administration from its hands-off approach to the island.  The 
McCarthyite hysteria of the 1950s paralleled Eisenhower’s own views rather than 
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forcing him to adopt a position that he did not favor; his own experiences had already 
provided a sort of guidebook for dealing with aggressive violators of the international 
order, a guidebook he followed closely.  Studies of public opinion during the 1958 
Taiwan Strait crisis show that anti-appeasement ranked high on Eisenhower’s list of 
priorities; while the public outcry against Washington’s hard line convinced the 
administration to tone down its rhetoric, it had little effect on the substance of policy.5  
Once they learned through experience that China was as uncooperative as their 
predecessors had claimed, Kennedy and Johnson perpetuated a rigid China policy that 
defied the critiques of both contemporary scholars and mid-level administration officials.  
Johnson altered his approach on only two occasions, neither of them because of 
domestic pressures: the first resulting from the turning tide in the United Nations in 
favor of seating China, and the second resulting from indications of the impending 
demise of radical Maoism.  Domestic views during the 1970s tended to approve of 
ongoing support of Taiwan, though the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations 
considered this secondary to the more important objective of perpetuating and 
solidifying the Sino-American rapprochement.  During the 1976 presidential campaign 
domestic pressures produced a Republican political platform that differed markedly from 
the China policy Ford had pursued.  Yet once Ford won the nomination he returned 
again to his preferred approach, at least until he lost the election several months later.   
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The fourth major theme of this dissertation is that these seven administrations 
formulated virtually all of their policies toward Taiwan in order to advance their 
objectives regarding China and the broader international order.  In part, this conclusion 
constitutes an extension of the argument for the secondary importance of domestic 
opinion.  Studies that attribute policies to ROC lobbying and anti-communist domestic 
pressures take the opposite view, arguing that Washington had as its starting point 
concern for the well-being and security of Taiwan or sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek’s 
ambitions to return to the mainland.  But while many officials may have preferred to 
have the KMT rather than the CCP ruling the mainland, this consideration was not the 
point of departure for China policy.  Truman clearly attempted to work out an 
accommodation with Beijing in 1949-50.  Within Eisenhower’s strategy, a Nationalist 
return constituted only one unlikely outcome among several possibilities.  Taipei lost its 
utility for purposes of fomenting mainland uprisings during the 1960s, yet gained new 
value as an important staging point for regional military operations.  Following the Paris 
Peace Accords of 1973, Washington no longer required Taiwan for this reason.  After 
that point, Nixon and Ford traded off adjustments in its ROC policy in return for 
alterations in PRC behavior during the normalization process.  In only a few instances 
did Washington’s approach to Taiwan reflect objectives independent from the struggle to 
compel Beijing to reorient its foreign policy. 
 Despite the general failure of Washington’s policies through much of the period 
in question, China had nonetheless undertaken the reorientation of its foreign policy 
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approach that American officials had long sought.  China’s leaders after 1979, in the 
words of historian Rosemary Foot, 
eschewed their revolutionary rhetoric.  They became active in a United 
Nations once reviled as being in the grip of the superpowers; they 
participated in an anti-Soviet containment coalition for as long as it was 
necessary; they joined keystone economic institutions that espouse the 
norms of liberal capitalism and that once were seen as oppressive; and 
they openly accepted that they had much to learn from advanced capitalist 
states.6 
At this point, the United States confronted what historian John Gaddis once 
characterized as the classic dilemma of foreign policymaking: having gotten what you 
want, what next?   
Looking beyond 1979, one can perhaps discern an important shift of emphasis in 
American China policy.  Achieving the “tolerable state of order” with the communist 
nations freed American officials to focus more attention on an array of important 
second-tier foreign policy preferences and goals that Washington previously felt it could 
not safely pursue without jeopardizing its more fundamental objectives and principles.  
Collectively, this second group of principles falls under the broad heading of “human 
rights” and includes the expansion of political, religious, and economic freedoms 
throughout the world.  These principles did not suddenly emerge after 1979, but rather 
constituted traditional American values dating at least to the American Revolution.  
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Franklin Roosevelt gave expression to them in his Four Freedoms, and throughout the 
Cold War a variety of official and private groups and organizations pursued many of 
these kinds of reforms to the extent that they did not interfere with Washington’s Cold 
War strategy.  Both domestic and international developments during the 1960s and ‘70s 
placed considerable emphasis on the pursuit of human rights, especially as it pertained to 
minority groups at home and the emerging nations of the Third World.  A rising chorus 
of criticism in the United States charged the executive branch with undermining the 
development of these values in the international community. 
As regards China, this criticism pointed out the rising standard of living of the 
Chinese people and the relative security that the CCP had provided to its country after a 
century of humiliations.  Especially after the rapprochement, an increasing number of 
American visitors to China returned with stories of progress that suggested the promise 
of further social reforms to come.  Indeed, in his 1979 meetings with Carter, Deng 
pledged to allow a greater degree of religious freedom in China and to permit the 
publication and distribution of Bibles.  He also noted the necessity of legal reforms and 
stated that Beijing had recently permitted “substantial freedom of speech and expression,” 
although, he added, such liberties “had to be approached very cautiously.”7  The Carter 
administration, viewing human rights as a process and prioritizing its own geostrategic 
objectives, chose to minimize its criticism of China’s human rights record.8  A decade 
later, however, the Tiananmen Square incident highlighted – in dramatic fashion – the 
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ongoing lack of political freedom within China and cast Beijing in the American mind as 
among the world’s foremost human rights violators.   
Yet Washington continued to believe that it could formulate a policy conducive 
to the strengthening of human rights and the development of democracy in China.  As 
journalist and historian James Mann argues, since 1979 Washington has premised its 
China policy on the notion that economic engagement with Beijing will inevitably lead 
to its political liberalization, an assumption Mann questions.9  Historian Jeffrey Engel 
also notes this element of American policy, pointing out that having chosen to engage 
with China, American leaders ever since have relied upon “the transformative power of 
their free-market ideal.”10  The final page of that particular effort has yet to be written. 
While efforts to prevent aggression continue – particularly evidenced in the case 
of the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait and measures taken since 2001 to curb state-
sponsored terrorism – Washington has increasingly exerted its influence to resolve 
humanitarian crises and encourage the respect for human rights (as it defines them) in 
repressive societies.  Yet this poses a problem of no small significance, for the pursuit of 
human rights in many cases interferes in the internal affairs of nations that may not 
necessarily pose a threat to their neighbors and are not already subject to interference 
from a foreign country.  The United States has thus conducted its affairs in a manner that 
reflects in certain respects the behaviors that it previously found so unacceptable among 
its communist rivals.  In this regard, China and the Soviet Union, through the use of their 
                                                            
9 James Mann, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York: 
Viking, 2007). 
10 Engel, “Of Fat and Thin Communists,” 473. 
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U.N. veto power, ironically have stood out as the primary advocates of non-intervention, 
particularly protesting the various humanitarian interventions of the United States and its 
allies.   
Certainly, however, Washington has not pursued this new approach with the 
vigor that characterized its Cold War struggle against aggression and subversion.  Yet, 
while Washington may find the current state of affairs in the international community 
“tolerable,” it apparently continues efforts to create one it finds “preferable.”    
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